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Preface 
 
Aldrich (1999) pointed out that it is not the intentions, but one’s actions that matter. To be 
honest, I did not intend to involve myself in a PhD trajectory at the start of my academic 
journey in 1990, when I entered the Master of Business Administration program at the 
Rotterdam School of Management. It was indeed the string of actions, some initiated by 
myself, some induced by my environment, that led to this thesis. 
A first decisive action that had unforeseen consequences was my acquaintance with 
Ronald Boers, to whom I was introduced in the second year of my studies. He shared my 
passion for sports and incidentally appeared to also study Business Administration. At the 
end of his studies, he introduced me to Henk Volberda whom he had assisted in doing case 
study research and teaching activities. I was first afraid, and later excited, to be offered the 
opportunity to add academic working experience to my study (and, of course, to make 
some money along the way). A case study into strategic renewal at Ericsson was one of the 
many projects I got involved in. This case study, which was conducted by the very 
inspiring group of Martin Wielemaker, Eva Meeusen-Henniger, Carlo Jochems and 
myself, turned out to be a very insightful and rewarding project that opened my eyes for 
the many opportunities of doing academic research. 
In the meantime, I had started Japan Sciences to complement my Business Administration 
education, and only needed to do an internship and write my Master’s theses to finish both 
studies. Right at that time, Henk Volberda and Frans van den Bosch were awarded with an 
Impuls research grant to study strategic renewal of large, European incumbent firms. They 
had a research proposal and a research grant – but no staff. In hindsight, this was another 
action with unforeseen major consequences. Not being hindered by significant research 
experience, I took up the challenge to start up this research. Marjolijn Dijksterhuis was my 
research partner during the early stages, and with the research assistance of Niels van der 
Weerdt and Annette Kapitan, we meandered through that first year. Our main objective 
was to define the research objectives, form a team of research partners, and establish a 
research strategy. I managed to combine the set-up of the ‘Strategic Renewal of Large 
European Corporations project’ with finishing my two studies by positioning it as my 
internship and by moulding materials produced for the research project into two theses. 
That year of working full-time with academics increased my interest for doing research, 
and I had many talks with Henk Volberda and Frans van den Bosch about continuing my 
research efforts for the Strategic Renewal project. Becoming an AIO (in decent English: 
PhD student) was one of the more attractive, but simultaneously scary, options. Attractive, 
as it offered the opportunity to develop my intellectual and research skills at the renowned 
ERIM research school. Scary, as the task of writing and defending a PhD thesis is a rather 
daunting and potentially lonely process that has many pitfalls. 
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Alongside my academic endeavours, I had developed a career into sports. Triathlon, the art 
of swimming, biking and running from sunrise to sunset, had become my way of life, and I 
realised that exploiting my potential in this sport would be difficult to combine with a 
nine-to-five job. The way I lived life during academic research would be really suited to 
continue my rise in the sport. I decided to take up the gauntlet and try to combine academic 
research with developing my athletic abilities. 
I found out that doing academic research and racing Ironmans is not an easy task. I could 
not have coped with my busy schedule without the assistance of my supervisors, Frans van 
den Bosch and Henk Volberda. They kept the pressure high when it was needed – when 
writing papers, and especially in the latter stages of writing this thesis – which forced me 
to keep my focus. They did a wonderful job in coaching me to the finish line. Frans and 
Henk, thank you for giving me the opportunity to develop myself in academia. I hope to 
continue our cooperation in the future. 
A special thanks goes to the student-assistants who were involved in the various stages of 
my research. Annette Kapitan and Niels van der Weerdt assisted me during the turbulent 
exploratory early stages when I wrote my research proposal and decided on the 
methodological approach. Then came the illustrious ‘4M’s’: Martijn Bax, Marijn Hoff, 
Marten Stienstra, and Martijn Videler, who assisted me during the arduous task of coding 
tons of data. This foursome lightened the long days of coding data with many good laughs 
– especially during our infamous SRC lunches and four o’clock breaks. That period 
moulded a bond that lasts until today.  
I further thank SM-8 students who worked with the coding procedure and offered the 
opportunity to test it on a broader sample of firms and provided valuable feedback. 
Special thanks goes to Arie Lewin, whose NOFIA course at Duke University in 1998 
provided me with some fascinating ideas that have become key to my dissertation, and 
whom followed me during my research. Charles Baden-Fuller provided me with useful 
advice and I appreciate his continuing interest in my research. 
The past five years allowed me to cooperate with many inspiring colleagues. Special 
thanks goes to Martin Wielemaker, who served as my mentor during the first stage of my 
research. Raymond van Wijk and Marjolijn Dijksterhuis travelled the PhD trajectory 
simultaneously and where supportive in more than one way. We shared the same hallway, 
spend time gossiping about academic and private concerns, and share some special 
experiences during our international conferences. I further thank Marten Stienstra and 
Sophie Schweitzer for their interest in sharing ‘personal developments’ that developed 
alongside my academic life. 
These acknowledgements would remain incomplete without thanking a number of people 
that supported me – not necessarily in academics, but in developing myself as a person. 
First of all, I thank my family for providing a sound basis for my endeavours. Through 
sports, I met Cynthia, Herman, George, Ronald and Miquel were always available when I 
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needed a good conversation or a had to reflect on one of my ‘Fleur-actions’. I could not 
have developed into the person I am today without you. 
It is not thanks to, but despite of myself that I reached this stage. Above all the persons I 
mentioned, I thank God who blessed me with perseverance and strength to undertake this 
challenge. He kept me honest when I thought I could do it myself and helped me out in 
times of doubt. 
It is indeed not intentions, but actions that produce outcomes. I did not intend, nor foresee, 
myself emerging into a PhD candidate, let alone reaching the state of defending my PhD 
thesis. I am grateful and honoured to have been able to travel this journey. 
 
Bert Flier 
Barendrecht 
November 2003 
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 1
1 Introduction 
 
Corporate executives are the Alices in Wonderland (Carroll, 1946) of our time. Despite the 
fact that strategic change is high on the managerial agenda, it seems very difficult to build 
a sustaining lead on the competition. Organisations that are exposed to global competition, 
fragmenting markets, and new technologies are forced to renew continuously (Guth and 
Ginsberg, 1990). Renewal can be achieved by combining resources in novel ways and by 
rejuvenating mature businesses to create new wealth. However, firms have to make 
commitments to the strategic choices they have made (Ghemawat, 1991) at the same time, 
which asks for stability. This results in a paradox. Organisations should both ‘engage in 
enough exploitation to insure the organisation’s current viability and engage in enough 
exploration to insure its future viability’ (Levinthal and March, 1993: 105). Firms thus 
have to capitalise their present capabilities while simultaneously developing new 
capabilities. This poses severe challenges to management, especially when future needs 
conflict with current conditions. The notion of unstable environments1, coupled with 
organisations’ tendency to ossify as they mature (Delacroix and Swaminathan, 1991; 
Miller and Chen, 1994; Volberda, 1998), are the rationale for studying strategic renewal of 
large, mature organisations. The focal point of this study is how large, mature 
organisations cope with this paradox2 of strategic renewal (Volberda, Baden-Fuller and 
Van den Bosch, 2001). 
Not all theories consider strategy to be a dynamic concept. Ansoff’s (1965) influential 
Corporate Strategy conceives strategy as a formal planning process. This school 
propagates planning as a means to cope with turbulent environments. However, the very 
nature of planning disencourages change because it intends to point the way (Mintzberg, 
1990). The positioning school (cf. Porter, 1980) suggests equilibrium by stating that firms 
should build defensible positions that can be sustained over time. The resource-based 
perspective (cf. Wernerfeld, 1984; Barney, 1991) argues that an organisation’s distinctive 
resources define its performance. Market imperfections and the inimitability of resources 
restrict the mobility of resources. This maintains the established order between firms. 
Punctuated equilibrium theory (Gersick, 1991; Utterback, 1994; Romanelli and Tushman, 
                                                           
1 Some authors (cf. D’Aveni, 1994; Thomas, 1996; Hamel, 2000) contend that 
environments have become more and more ‘hypercompetitive’, which obviously would 
increase the need for strategic renewal. A minority of views adheres to a view of 
hypercompetition occurring in a pattern of ebb and flow (Nault and Vandenbosch, 1996). 
McNamara et al. (2003) contend that the hypercompetition of today is to a large extent ‘the 
same as it ever was’. They argue that understanding the cycles of increasing and 
decreasing turbulence in business fields is most important. 
2 The key characteristic in paradox is the simultaneous presence of contradictory, even 
mutually exclusive elements (Quinn and Cameron, 1988: 2). 
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1994) characterises organisational development by long periods of stability that are 
infrequently punctuated by short periods of quantum change3. In these theories, stability is 
the normal state of affairs, instability the exception. 
From a theoretical point of view, strategic renewal may take place at different levels and 
can be driven from forces internal and external to the organisation. Strategic choice theory 
(Child, 1972; Miles and Snow, 1978) acknowledges that organisations are able to change 
their destiny by adapting to and reshaping their environments. Managers are the 
intermediaries between organisation and environment, and are attributed with capacity to 
cope with environmental changes and to rejuvenate ossified structures. Population 
ecologists (Hannan and Freeman, 1977, 1984; Aldrich and Pfeffer, 1976) however have a 
different stance, arguing that the environment selects organisations that fit their resource 
niche best through a process of variation, selection and retention. The task of managers is 
to exploit the environment to develop a good fit. This leads to a build-up of structural 
inertia, which eventually renders organisations obsolete. Exploration only diminishes 
survival chances. Instead, the market selects out firms whose competencies have become 
outdated, and the current organisational population will gradually be replaced by new 
organisations that emerge over time: strategic renewal occurs at the population level. 
Institutional theory argues that organisations are converging to institutionally derived 
archetypes. This convergence stems from isomorphic pressures. Neo-institutional theory 
states that strategic renewal is hard to control, as it is shaped by the interplay of the 
institutional context and organisational dynamics. 
This variety of paradigms in organisational science shows multiple sides of the same 
phenomenon. The lack of a uniform theory has however hampered progress in 
management and organisation research because of contradictory findings (McKelvey, 
1997). To break out of this ‘straight-jacket’ of organisation research (Daft and Lewin, 
1990), McKelvey (1997) argues to study firms as quasi-natural phenomena. This requires 
integration (Schoemaker, 1990; Rajagopalan and Spreitzer, 1996) or synthesis (Elfring and 
Volberda, 2001) of single-lens perspectives and connection of firm and population level 
effects (Lewin and Volberda, 1999) that form the basis of the adaptation-selection debate 
(Baum, 1996). This study answers this call by applying a coevolutionary approach. We 
conceive of strategic renewal as the joint outcome of managerial voluntarism and 
environmental determinism (Lewin and Volberda, 1999), and aim to increase 
understanding in the field of strategic management by studying the transition phenomena 
(McKelvey, 1997) that link the two. 
                                                           
3 Not all ancient literatures accord with this traditional static view. Schumpeter (1934) 
noted the mechanism of creative destruction, set in train by ‘endlessly innovative’ 
entrepreneurs who constantly upset the market. Thus, disequilibrium instead of equilibrium 
is what drives economic wealth. Incrementalism (cf. Lindblom, 1959; Quinn, 1980) is a 
more recent advocate of continuous, albeit gradual, change. 
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1.1 Aim of the study 
Although organisations have the potential to live forever, only few reach maturity and even 
less survive for long periods of time. Why do some firms survive, whilst so many others 
fade away? Is long-term survival of firms caused by endogenous or by exogenous factors? 
Do managers make a difference, or are organisations at the mercy of their environments? Is 
success just a matter of luck? Population ecologists theorise that strategic renewal attempts 
are futile as the fitness to the environment determines organisations’ survival. Moreover, 
inertial pressures prevent adaptation and even decrease survival chances (Hannan and 
Freeman, 1977; Aldrich and Pfeffer, 1976). Institutional theory (Dimaggio and Powell, 
1983; Greenwood and Hinings, 1996) argues that isomorphism forces firms to mimic each 
other, which makes a fast follower strategy the best method of strategic renewal. At the 
other hand, contingency (Burns and Stalker, 1961; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967), strategic 
choice (Thompson, 1967; Child, 1972), and learning theories (Fiol and Lyles, 1985; 
Argyris and Schön, 1978) endow organisations with capacity to adapt their organisation 
and shape their environments, suggesting that strategic renewal is manageable and vital to 
the success of organisations. This schism of organisations being languid subjects to 
environmental selection mechanisms versus the idea of organisations being gifted to 
change their destiny stems from differences in research methods and the application of 
singular theoretical lenses. This divide has hampered our understanding why some 
organisations survive whilst others fade away (Lewin and Volberda, 1999; Volberda and 
Lewin, 2003). The result is that the adaptation-selection debate remains unresolved (Baum, 
1996), despite numerous studies into the question whether firms can escape the 
environmental selection mechanism.  
This study builds on single-lens theories and adds a coevolutionary perspective to examine 
interactions between large, established organisations and their environments in strategic 
renewal processes. Studying large incumbent firms can aid to understand the effect of 
inertial pressures in processes of strategic renewal, helps to assess isomorphic forces, and 
contributes to gain insight into managerial adaptation in times of environmental change. 
We include the firm, national, and industry level of analysis to gain insight into the variety 
of influences on the strategic renewal process. 
 
The aim of this study is to increase understanding of the interaction between managerial 
adaptation and institutional and environmental selection forces in strategic renewal 
processes by combining single-lens perspectives and a  coevolutionary perspective. 
 
We note five elements that add value to this research. First, this study synthesises multiple 
levels of analysis (cf. Levinthal, 1995; Lewin and Volberda, 1999; Baden-Fuller, 1995). 
Second, it develops new metrics that facilitate the analysis and comparison of strategic 
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renewal processes within and between firms over time and across different nations 
(McKelvey, 1997). Third, the time dimension is explicitly incorporated in our study of 
strategic renewal processes (cf. Porter, 1991; Van den Bosch, 2001; D’Aveni, 1994). 
Fourth, this study increases insight into the unexplored territory of the coevolution of 
organisations and their environments (Lewin and Volberda, 1999). Fifth, this study 
informs practitioners about the effect of the environment on companies, and inquires 
managers on the degree of freedom to follow deviant strategies. 
 
1.2 Research questions 
Two research questions guide this thesis: 
 
1. How do large multi-unit firms renew in an increasingly turbulent environment? 
 
2. To which extent are strategic renewal actions driven by managerial intentionality, 
and/ or by environmental selection and institutional pressures? 
 
We first note that our research questions have a descriptive and analytic character. The 
coevolutionary perspective presupposes multidirectional causalities between evolution at 
firm and environment level (McKelvey, 1997), and assumes that non-linear relations 
between variables can occur because of mutual, simultaneous, lagged, and nested effects 
(McKelvey, 1997; Lewin and Volberda, 1999). Our coevolutionary stance thus precludes 
the traditional specification of causal relations between variables. Our theoretical 
foundation includes both voluntaristic and deterministic perspectives, and includes the 
firm, national, and industry level of analysis. We contemplate strategic renewal from three 
single-lens perspectives; managerial intentionality, institutional theory, and the 
environmental selection perspective. We develop a coevolutionary framework of strategic 
renewal in which theories relating to environmental selection, institutional, and managerial 
intentionality effects are consolidated. Organisations resemble each other and survival 
chances are determined by irreversible external forces if one takes an institutional or 
population perspective. Managers have some ability to adapt their organisation to the 
environment when taking a managerial agency stance. The next chapter goes further into 
this divide and its implications, and defines propositions that relate to the four theoretical 
perspectives. The empirical section investigates the changing landscape of the European 
financial services industry, which has been confronted with significant changes in the past 
decade. This sector offers an excellent research venue to study strategic renewal behaviour 
of Europan financial incumbents. The investigation of renewal behaviour will mainly 
concentrate on assessing effects relating to single-lens theories, and to some extent assess 
coevolutionary interaction effects operating between levels of analysis. 
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1.3 Defining strategic renewal 
The field of strategic management theory is highly fragmented. It offers no clear definition 
of strategy4 (Mintzberg, 1990), let alone strategic renewal. We start by exploring the 
dynamic nature of strategic renewal, and then investigate different types of renewal. Many 
authors argue there should be a balance between opposite types of change. We revisit these 
literatures to track down relevant issues in studying strategic renewal. Various definitions 
of strategic renewal and related concepts are investigated, after which we develop our 
definition of strategic renewal. We do not intend to develop an encompassing and all-
inclusive definition, but construct a definition that functions within the context of this 
dissertation and can be operationalised in the empirical world. 
 
The dynamic nature of strategic renewal 
Many studies into renewal and change processes are static, utilising large samples and 
statistics and focusing on the antecedents and consequences of typically a single change 
event. Population ecologists for instance study which organisation-population fits are most 
effective, but leave the process of how ‘fit’ is achieved out of the analysis. This results in 
static interpretations. Since organisations live in a changing environment, ‘fit’ should be a 
dynamic concept (Volberda, 1998). Process-oriented researchers usually execute 
longitudinal case studies and concentrate on the managerial role in change processes 
(Rajagopalan and Spreitzer, 1996). A process view on strategy is also taken by Mintzberg 
(1978) and Hax (1990), who define strategy as the pattern of decisions a firm makes. This 
definition indicates that a firm’s strategy emerges from the actions it undertakes5, and 
gives historical validity. Analysing strategy in terms of an organisation’s decision history 
usually results in some strategic pattern from which a dominant strategy emerges. This 
path of strategic footprints often indicates the future destination of the organisation (Hax, 
1990), and enables operationalisation in the empirical world. 
Speed of change is an important determinant in studying the renewal process. D’Aveni 
(1994) emphasises that success is often tied to speed. Dumaine (1989) and Stalk (1988) 
caution that overspeeding is counterproductive, as too short a reaction time can lead to 
overreaction and excessive information searches and may even result in chaos (Volberda, 
                                                           
4 Literally, strategy means ‘the art of the general’ (Hart, 1967). The word strategy is 
derived from the ancient Greek strategos, which is a compound of stratos; army,  and 
agein; to lead (Cummings, 1993). 
5 One may also reverse the relationship between action and strategy. This relates to one of 
the key debates regarding the relation between organisational change and strategy: does 
strategy emerge from change, or does change follow from strategy? Early strategic theory 
conceived of change, or action, as arising from strategy (cf. Ansoff, 1965). More recent 
conceptions consider strategy to be the product of the many and varied changes an 
organisations undertake over time (cf. Miles and Snow, 1978; Mintzberg, 1987). 
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1998). The reality, however, is that many managers act prudently and wait until the impact 
of external turbulence exceeds a threshold before responding (Ansoff, Eppink and Gomer, 
1975). This results in organisational inertia (Hambrick and D’Aveni, 1988) and causes 
longer delays and more muted actions. In sum, strategic renewal is a dynamic concept that 
can be estimated from a firm’s decision history. The next section builds on the notion that 
organisations may drift into chaos or, in case of delayed timing, accumulate inertia by 
discussing different types of renewal. 
 
Types of strategic renewal 
Change from one state to another is one of the basic research interests in organisation 
theory. Snow and Hambrick (1980) indicate an organisation’s reaction to an environmental 
change might be viewed as strategic change. However, as most responses to organisational 
changes are done in a familiar way, such responses are rather a continuation, instead of 
change, of strategy. Snow and Hambrick (1980) thus argue that real strategic change 
occurs when new solutions are applied to problems. Van den Ven and Poole (1995) define 
strategic change as a difference in the form, quality or state over time in an organisation’s 
alignment with its external environment. Likewise, March (1981: 564) noted that ‘Most 
change in organisations results neither from extraordinary organisational processes nor 
forces, nor from uncommon imagination, persistence of skill, but from relatively stable, 
routine processes that relate organisations to their environments’. In other words, responses 
to environmental change in familiar ways are a continuation or at most an adjustment to 
strategy. Strategic management literature therefore distinguishes between radical and 
continuous change. Van den Ven (1992: 1980) states that ‘the time required for 
phylogenesis (the generation of originals through variation or speciation processes) is 
much greater and less predictable than the time required for ontogenesis (the reproduction 
of originals through selection and adaptation processes)’. The distinction between 
phylogenesis and ontogenesis has been addressed in various wordings in the management 
literature. Volberda (1998) referred to it as the paradox of preservation and change, and 
Huff et al. (1992) as the tension between inertia and stress. Gemawhat (1991) labeled this 
the paradox of commitment versus flexibility. Mezias and Glynn (1993: 77-78) add to 
these: incremental convergence and radical orientation (Tushman and Romanelli, 1985); 
persistence and change (March, 1981); frame bending versus frame breaking change 
(Tushman et al., 1986), and incremental versus radical innovation (Dewar and Dutton, 
1986; Ettlie et al., 1984; Nord and Tucker, 1987). Thompson (1967) labeled the 
management of these contradictory forces the paradox of administration. James March’s 
(1991) exploration versus exploitation paradox is one of the better-known distinctions 
between phylogenesis and ontogenesis. Exploration is associated with experimenting with 
technologies, ideas, paradigms, knowledge, and strategies trying to find new ways to age 
old problems. Exploitation is defined as: “…the refinement and extension of existing 
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competencies, technologies, and paradigms” (March, 1991: 85). Levinthal and March 
(1993) argued for a balance between exploration and exploitation to promote long-term 
survival chances. 
The distinction between exploration versus exploitation relates to the difference between 
Schumpeterian and Austrian entrepreneurship (Volberda, 1998). Schumpetarian 
entrepreneurship promotes radical innovations by breaking new ground. These innovations 
are based on ‘creative destruction’ (Schumpeter, 1934) by departing from existing routines, 
and by destroying the value of existing commitments and competencies (Clark, 1985). 
Austrian entrepreneurship links to incremental innovation, which seeks to exploit currently 
available knowledge and existing opportunities. The organisation develops a set of routines 
to adapt to environmental demands. This results in a quest for stability and equilibrium. 
Organisations become very efficient in ‘doing things right’, but the switching costs to other 
trajectories also grow (Volberda, 1998). 
The phylogenesis and ontogenesis concepts also relate to punctuated equilibrium theory. 
This theory describes organisational development as a path oscillating between stability 
and change in which long periods of equilibrium are punctuated by sudden eruptions of 
fundamental change. Equilibrium periods are not times of complete standstill, but a smooth 
evolvement of the organisational system with minor adjustments. The question whether 
evolutionary change proceeds at a gradual versus saltational rate is an empirical one. This 
however does not fundamentally alter the theory of evolution (Van de Ven, 1992). To 
summarise, strategic renewal is more than change or adjustment of strategy: organisations 
need both exploration and exploitation in their strategic renewal endeavours. 
 
Strategic management literature on strategic renewal 
Strategic renewal and related concepts are increasingly popular research topics in strategic 
management literature. Exhibit 1.1 gives an overview of strategic renewal definitions6. 
Volberda et al. (2001) indicate the importance of an organisation’s commitment to existing 
routines by concentrating on escaping path dependency. Floyd and Lane (2000) focus on 
knowledge and competence development, whilst Huff et al. (1992) concentrate on aligning 
organisation and environment to overcome the tension between inertia and stress. Mezias 
and Glynn (1993) build on the concept of innovation and stress the radical and 
discontinuous nature of corporate renewal. Baden-Fuller and Volberda (1997) consider 
renewal, or rejuvenation, a holistic process during which old routines and capabilities are 
converted into new. We use the elements of organisational heritage, organisation-
environment alignment, and the distinction between radical and continuous renewal in 
developing our definition of strategic renewal. 
                                                           
6 We found that many studies do not define their renewal concept, which makes it difficult 
to relate to others’ conception of strategic renewal. 
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Strategic renewal defined 
From the above, we learn that strategic renewal is: 
• Aimed at keeping organisation and environment aligned (Snow and Hambrick, 
1980; Van de Ven and Poole, 1995; Huff et al., 1992; Volberda, Baden-Fuller and 
Van den Bosch, 2001), 
• A dynamic concept (Volberda, 1998; Mintzberg, 1978; Hax, 1990), and 
• Requires balance (Van de Ven, 1992; Volberda, 1998; Huff et al., 1992; Mezias 
and Glynn, 1993; Thompson, 1967; March, 1991) and pacing (D’Aveni, 1994; 
Dumaine, 1989; Stalk, 1988). 
 
The first definitial element relates to the strategic character of renewal: to align 
organisation and environment. Snow and Hambrick (1980: 527) note that strategy is ‘the 
mechanism that guides environmental alignment and provides integration for internal 
operations’, which acknowledges the operation of forces internal and external to the 
organisation (also see Van de Ven and Poole, 1995; Huff et al., 1992). Second, strategic 
renewal is a dynamic concept (Volberda, 1998) that can be estimated from an 
organisation’s decision pattern (Mintzberg, 1978; Hax, 1990). This element provides 
Exhibit 1.1 Definitions of strategic renewal and related concepts 
 
Strategic renewal can be broadly defined as the activities a firm undertakes to alter its 
path dependence (Volberda, Baden-Fuller and Van den Bosch, 2001: 160) 
 
Strategic renewal is ‘an evolutionary process associated with promoting, 
accomodating, and utilizing new knowledge and innovative behaviour in order to bring 
about change in an organisation’s core competences and/or a change in its product 
market domain’ (Floyd and Lane, 2000: 155) 
 
Strategic renewal is a tension between inertia (supporting the current way of doing 
things) and stress that arises from a mismatch between the demands and opportunities 
an organisation faces and its capacity to respond to these conditions (Huff, Huff and 
Thomas, 1992). 
 
Corporate renewal is associated with ‘the process of innovation, defined as nonroutine, 
significant, and discontinuous organisational change’ (Mezias and Glynn, 1993: 78) 
 
Rejuvenation is a holistic process to replace outdated routines and capabilities (Baden-
Fuller and Volberda, 1996) 
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historical validity, and allows it to be operationalised. Third, strategic renewal requires 
balancing and pacing. We define strategic renewal as the strategic action pattern to keep 
organisation and environment aligned, i.e. ‘the activities a firm undertakes to alter its path 
dependence’ (Volberda et al., 2001). We distinguish between three dimensions of strategic 
renewal (cf. Pettigrew, 1988; and Mintzberg, 1990), more specifically the context, content, 
and process of strategic renewal. The context dimension refers to environmental forces that 
constrain and enable strategic renewal at firm level. The content dimension refers to the 
balance of exploitation and exploration, and the process dimension relates to the dynamic 
character and temporal issues of strategic renewal. Strategic renewal can be both a 
voluntaristic and deterministic process, being driven by managerial intentionality, and/or 
institutional and environmental pressures, and strategic renewal actions may accelerate and 
decelerate over time. Strategic renewal is not always successful as it is a necessary, but not 
sufficient, precondition for survival as we argue next. 
 
Long term survival and strategic renewal 
To what extent is strategic renewal a necessary and sufficient condition for long-term 
survival? Kanter (1983: 23) argues that organisations ‘cannot survive without innovation’. 
Huff et al. (1992: 55) conjecture that ‘the need for renewal is never ending. The viable 
organisation must have the capacity to frequently improve its alignment with internal and 
external demands’. These arguments are based on the assumption that organisations strive 
for long-term survival. Population ecologists (Hannan and Freeman, 1977; 1984) however 
see organisational birth and death as a natural process. An organisation can properly fulfil 
its function as long as it fits its environmental niche. However, an organisation’s inertness 
diminishes survival chances in times of environmental change. Eventually, the old 
population of organisations will be replaced by new organisations that are better suited to 
changed environmental conditions7. The single goal argument has a similar ‘live and let 
die’ stance. Organisations may be founded to fulfill a single goal, for instance rent 
generation. Terminating the organisation by having it acquired, broken-up, or shutdown 
might serve the purpose of economic rent generation better (Barney, 1996). A 
counterargument is that organisational failure and decease result in high societal and 
economic costs, which might justify investments to renew troubled firms. Adherents of the 
adaptation perspective – e.g., behavioral theory (Cyert and March, 1963), strategic choice 
theory (Child, 1972; Thompson, 1967), dynamic capabilities theory (Teece et al., 1997), 
and organisational learning theory (Fiol and Lyles, 1985; Argyris and Schön, 1978) – posit 
that organisations are able to withstand the pressures of environmental change by adjusting 
the organisation. 
                                                           
7 This study focuses on large, long-lived organisations. We wish to note that a large 
organisational size buffers firms to some extent from selection pressures (Levinthal, 1990). 
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Change beyond incremental adaptation is not necessary in times of environmental stability. 
Refining procedures and defending current markets may be sufficient and result in above 
average returns. Changing the environment by being the first mover to break the rules of 
the game may however be very advantageous, although risky. 
Strategic renewal however is necessary in periods of significant environmental change. 
Such times expose organisations to enormous challenges, especially those who digged into 
their current activities and made large commitments to the stable situation. This does not 
imply that strategic renewal is always successful, as population ecologists notice. 
Organisations might react too soon, too late, or apply inappropriate solutions to problems. 
In conclusion, strategic renewal is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for long-term 
survival in times of environmental change. 
 
1.4 Methodological implications and empirical setting 
The tradition of much research addressing issues of strategic change examines the variance 
of external conditions and organisational forms conducive towards strategic change (Miles 
and Snow, 1994). These research efforts focus on change as a discrete event rather than as 
an ongoing process and typically employ comparative statics. Research based upon 
comparative statics however often not reflects the real challenges which organisations face 
in a pluralistic world. Analytical approaches centered on comparative statics are less suited 
to investigate dynamic, or evolutionary phenomena such as processes of strategy 
formulation and implementation (Mintzberg and Westley, 1992), or organisational change 
(Miller and Friesen, 1980). 
Our methodology is designed towards developing and measuring metrics that track down 
strategic renewal trajectories based on realised renewal actions. These metrics should 
enable the analysis and comparison of strategic renewal processes within and between 
firms over time and across institutional settings and industries (McKelvey, 1997), and to 
discern between managerial intentionality, institutional, and environmental pressures 
(Lewin and Volberda, 1999) that drive strategic renewal of large and mature organisations.  
We chose the European financial services sector as our research field. The financial 
services sector is profoundly important to the economies of many Western European 
economies. In 1999, financial services firms accounted for seventy-two out of the 
Financial Times’ top three hundred quoted European companies (FT, January 1999). Their 
importance in market capitalisation is even greater. European financial services have 
recently been confronted with several environmental shocks. The past decade has 
witnessed the introduction, in 1992, of a single European market permitting cross border 
mergers and alliances and the breakdown of barriers between banking and insurance 
sectors (Flier et al., 2001). At the same time, firms have had to adapt to European 
directives and changed corporate governance legislation, had to implement new rules of 
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compliance (e.g. the Basle Agreement), and had to cope with the deregulation of capital 
markets. More recently, companies were faced with the introduction of the Euro in 1999, 
and European financials had to manage the abolition of national currencies in 2002. In the 
midst of these structural changes, established banks and insurance companies have had to 
learn to embrace new information and communication technologies and electronic 
commerce. These developments have given rise to an emerging on-line financial services 
complex (Hensmans et al., 2001), which created another major challenge for financial 
services providers. This has challenged top management to think of strategic renewal as an 
ongoing journey instead of a destination, making European financial incumbents an 
appropriate research venue. 
 
1.5 Thesis outline 
This thesis is structured around three main sections (Figure 1.1). Section one constructs the 
theoretical and empirical foundation of this study and comprises the first three chapters. 
We defined the research aim and the central research questions that guide this study in this 
chapter, and also introduced and defined the strategic renewal concept. The second chapter 
develops a coevolutionary framework of strategic renewal. It builds on three single-lens 
theories pertaining to managerial intentionality, institutional, and environmental selection 
theories, and indicates their implicit strategic renewal conception. The coevolutionary 
perspective bridges these three theoretical silos. We construct an integrative framework 
that shows the interplay of the three single-lens effects on the formation of strategic 
renewal actions. Finally, this chapter defines propositions relating to the four theoretical 
perspectives. 
The third chapter introduces the empirical setting and methods by presenting our research 
methodology. We conceive of strategic renewal as a three-dimensional concept, which 
allows to develop a set of six attributes to measure strategic renewal. Our methods are 
based on assessing changes inside and outside incumbent firms. Internal changes are 
estimated by tracking down realised actions of strategic renewal. These strategic renewal 
actions are coded along four coding categories, which allow assessing incumbents’ 
strategic renewal behaviour. External changes relate to changes in national financial 
systems in the European financial landscape. The second section reports the empirical 
findings and comprises chapters four, five and six. The fourth chapter explores 
environmental changes by indicating changes in capacity, competition, and concentration 
indicators across national financial systems. It further analyses the diffusion of regulations 
and technologies across five European countries to determine the degree of convergence 
and divergence across five European countries. Chapter five explores main characteristics 
of strategic renewal of the sample of thirty financial corporations. Based on descriptive 
statistics, it identifies differences and similarities of strategic renewal attributes at the 
 12
industry, country, and firm level of analysis. The outcomes reveal both differences and 
similarities at the three levels of analysis, depending on the strategic renewal attribute 
analysed. 
 
Figure 1.1 Thesis design 
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renewal behaviour of financial incumbents of first and late mover countries that were 
identified in the fourth chapter. In first mover countries, the implementation speed of new 
1. Introduction 
-Research aim 
-Research questions 
2. Theory 
-Single-lens theories 
-Coevolutionary model of strategic   
 renewal 
-Propositions 
3. Methodology 
-Dimensions of strategic renewal 
-Strategic renewal attributes 
-Convergence and divergence at  
 sector and national level 
Part I 
4. Changing landscape of European financial services
-Capacity, competition and concentration of European  
  financial markets 
-Diffusion of regulations and technologies 
Part II 
5. Strategic renewal characteristics 
of European financials 
Strategic renewal characteristics at: 
-Industry, 
-Country, and 
-Firm level of analysis 
6. Strategic renewal of British, 
Dutch, and French financials 
-Environmental selection, institu- 
 tional, and managerial intentionality  
 effects 
-Coevolutionary effects 
 Part III
7. Discussion and conclusion 
-Reflection on propositions and research questions
-Scientific and managerial implications 
 13
EU-regulations and of technological innovations is substantially higher compared to late 
mover countries. We select financial incumbents of two fast moving countries; the United 
Kingdom and the Netherlands, and of one late moving country; France, to explore 
environmental selection, institutional, and managerial intentionality effects in strategic 
renewal behaviour of financial incumbent firms. It further investigates coevolutionary 
interaction effects operating between levels of analysis. The final chapter comprises our 
third and final section. This chapter discusses our main findings and propositions and 
answers our research questions. It further indicates scientific and managerial implications, 
and suggests issues for future research. 
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2 A coevolutionary theory on strategic renewal 
Integrating managerial intentionality, institutional, and  
environmental selection perspectives 
 
We shape our environments, then our environments shape us 
- Winston Churchill - 
 
Coevolutionary theory seeks to understand the simultaneous evolution of organisations and 
their environments (Baum and Singh, 1994). Coevolution asserts that the concurrent 
operating of adaptation and selection explains processes of change and renewal. We 
selected three single-lens perspectives that cover a broad spectrum of the debate: the 
managerial intentionality, the institutional, and the environmental selection perspective. 
The strategic choice and dynamic capabilities approach constitute the managerial 
intentionality perspective, which addresses the adaptation side of the debate. Classical and 
neo-institutional theories are the building blocks of the institutional perspective. 
Population ecology and the resource-based perspective are applied to address the selection 
side of the debate. The fourth theoretical building block is coevolutionary theory. 
This chapter first discusses these theories and indicates the role of managers, environment, 
and the strategic renewal conception implicit to each perspective. We then use these 
theoretical building blocks to develop a co-evolutionary framework of strategic renewal 
that integrates the three single-lens perspectives. The final part of this chapter develops a 
set of four propositions that relate to our theoretical perspectives. 
 
2.1 The managerial intentionality perspective 
Strategic choice theory (Child, 1972; Miles and Snow, 1978) endows organisations with 
capacity to change their destiny by adapting themselves and reshaping their environments. 
It builds on the concept of purposeful action and assumes that intentionality matters: large, 
complex firms can and do revitalise themselves. Child’s (1972) strategic choice theory 
departs from the political process by which leading groups in the organisation actively 
influence organisational structures. Decision makers decide upon courses of action. 
Strategic choices relate to the organisation’s environment, performance standards, and to 
the design of organisational structures. 
In a review of strategic choice theory, Child (1997) notes that it essentially refers to an 
ongoing dynamic process, during which the evaluation of information obtained from both 
the organisation and the environment leads to the identification of opportunities and 
threads. The ensuing learning process, which develops through debate, negotiating and the 
exercise of choice, results in action. These actions lead to outcomes, which may be both 
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internal adjustments and changes to the environment. Child (1997) distinguishes between 
two cycles that relate actions to situational constraints and opportunities. The ‘inner 
structuration’ cycle concerns the organisational design and refers to organisational actors 
being informed or constrained by the organisation’s existing structures and routines they 
are developing. The ‘outer structuration’ cycle regards the environment, which both 
informs and constrains the opportunities for action of organisational actors. The dynamics 
of these two cycles leads to an evolutionary framework of organisational change in which 
action and constraint act in mutuality. 
Miles and Snow (1978: 21) developed an interactive view of organisation-environment 
relationships, which they coined the ‘adaptive cycle’: ‘The strategic choice approach 
essentially argues that the effectiveness of organisational adaptation hinges on the 
dominant coalition’s perceptions of environmental conditions and the decisions it makes 
concerning how the organisation will cope with these conditions.’ Based on a study of U.S. 
firms and hospitals, Miles and Snow (1978) distilled four generic categories of 
organisational policies to deal with the environment. The categorisation into defender, 
prospector, analyser and reactor types added refinement to the strategic choice concept and 
argued that different strategy types lead to differential strategic choice making. Some 
strategy types are better suited to adapt to change than others, resulting in differences in 
organisation-environment relations and performance (Forte et al., 2000). 
Thompson’s (1967) model of strategic decision-making is built on the assumption that 
decision makers function as intermediaries between organisation and environment. This 
model places strong demands on managers to use the most applicable decision approach. 
Managers should take into account situational constraints surrounding a decision, and 
select one of four optimal decision approaches based on the combination of clarity or 
ambiguity regarding, firstly, the objectives and, secondly, the means of producing results 
that are inherent in a decision task. Nutt (2002) put Thompson’s (1967) prescriptions 
regarding strategic decision making to the test. He found that managers were prone to use 
the wrong decision approach, and that decisions that followed prescription were more 
successful than others. 
Few organisations function at the limits of their efficiency (Cyert and March, 1963), 
resulting in organisational slack. This slack allows multiple forms of organisation to exist 
in an environmental domain. The dynamic capabilities perspective argues that a limited 
repertoire of available routines severely constrains a firm’s available strategic choices 
(Teece, 1984). The suppression of choice is a condition for the exploitation of a core 
competence. Many studies show that in highly competitive environments a core 
competence can become a core rigidity (Leonard-Barton, 1992; Burgelman, 1994; Barnett, 
Greve and Park, 1994), or competence trap (Levitt and March, 1988; Levinthal and March, 
1993). Firms develop core rigidities together with highly specialised resources to enhance 
profits. This comes at the price of reduced flexibility (Volberda, 1996). Wernerfelt (1984) 
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pointed at the possibility of managerial action to develop new capabilities. Teece, Pisano 
and Shuen (1997) suggested that organisational resources cannot be taken for granted. The 
firm must thus remain in a dynamic capability-building mode, which is an organisation’s 
latent ability to renew its core competence. This dynamic capabilities view argues that an 
organisation should retain its capacity to renew, augment, and adapt its core competence 
over time. In the same vein, Baden-Fuller and Stopford (1994) argue that mature 
businesses can be rejuvenated, and may even change their industries. They found evidence 
that managerial action is most important to firm performance, not the industry or 
institutionally based advantages. 
In conclusion, the managerial intentionality perspective endows managers with managerial 
leeway to adapt the organisation to the environment or to reshape environmental 
conditions, taking into account organisational and environmental constraints and 
opportunities. Organisational slack enables multiple forms of organizing to coexist in an 
environment. Dynamic capabilities allow an organisation to renew its competencies and to 
keep the organisation up to date with its environment. 
 
2.2  The institutional perspective 
Institutional theory builds on the notion of organisational similarity. Classical institutional 
theory (cf. DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977) focuses on isomorphic 
pressures that drive organisations towards, and maintains, institutional environments. 
Organisational forms and practices are considered to become increasingly homogeneous as 
organisations are converging to institutionally derived and created templates, coined 
organisational archetypes (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). As institutionalists are concerned 
with explaining uniformity of organisational forms, the primary unit of analysis is the 
institutional field (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). Isomorphism is a key concept in 
institutional theory, and refers to a constraining process that makes units operating in the 
same set of environmental circumstances to resemble each other (Hawley, 1968). 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) distinguish three types of isomorphism; coercive, normative, 
and mimetic isomorphism. Coercive isomorphism is driven by formal and informal 
pressures that dependent organisations exert on each other, by cultural expectations, and 
the legal environment in which the organisation functions (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). 
Normative isomorphism results from professionalisation. Important drivers of 
professionalisation are universities, professional associations, and other educational 
institutions in which managers and staff are educated. These institutions and associations 
have a significant effect on the development of organisational norms among influential 
organisational members. Hiring and filtering practices of personnel are other drivers of 
normative isomorphism. Normative pressures lead organisations that operate in the same 
institutional environment to denote certain types of actions as normatively sanctioned and 
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legitimated, and to define and operationalise problems in similar ways. Mimetic 
isomorphism is the process of modeling one organisation on another in terms of 
organisational structure and organisational procedures. Organisations typically model 
similar organisations that are seen as successful and legitimate. Organisations may rise to 
this status by formal and informal processes including government recognition, 
acknowledgement by professional associations, or by being a key partner in union-
management negotiations. Mimetic isomorphism may result in bandwagon pressures 
(Abrahamson and Rosenkopf, 1993). Bandwagons refer to strategies that diffuse through 
an organisational field once a strategy is perceived to be legitimate (Meyer and Rowan, 
1977). 
Classical institutional theory essentially denies the possibility of change in institutional 
environments (Kondra and Hinings, 1998). ‘Old institutionalism’ (Greenwood and 
Hinings, 1996) cannot explain change because of lacking explanations of intra-
organisational change dynamics. Greenwood and Hinings (1996) thus developed a neo-
institutional theory, which incorporates change by linking the organisational context and 
intraorganisational dynamics. The embeddedness of organisations in their institutional 
context is a basic reason for organisations’ resistance to change. The more organisations 
are coupled to a prevailing organisational template in a highly structured institutional 
context, the higher the resistance to change, and the more radical organisational responses 
in case the environment changes drastically. The pace of change is contingent on the 
differences in structures of distinct institutional sectors. Some institutional fields are more 
insulated from other fields than others. The more permeable industry boundaries are, the 
more likely changes in for instance the dominant organisational template. That is, changes 
vary across institutional sectors. Internal dynamics of organisations result in differences in 
the pace of change within sectors. In an uncertain environment, changes in the power 
structure and competing ideas lead to different strategic thinking. This gives rise to the 
emergence of new strategies. Thus, changes also vary within sectors (Greenwood and 
Hinings, 1996). 
Kondra and Hinings (1998) extend this dynamic view of institutional theory, based on the 
notion that institutional environments may be subject to change themselves. In their view, 
potential for change starts with organisational diversity. ‘Institutional fit’, defined as ‘the 
degree of compliance by an organisation with the organisational form or structures, 
routines and systems prescribed by institutional norms’ (Kondra and Hinings, 1998: 750) 
is used to distinguish between organisations that have high or low fit. Organisations having 
high fits have low performance ranges; those with low institutional fits may perform 
significantly above or below the institutional range. Whereas low performers are not 
expected to alter institutional norms, it is the high performers that drive institutional 
change: high performing firms may lead others to exercise coercive pressures to rule out 
change; they may be mimiced, or they may be ignored. Interestingly, Kondra and Hinings 
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(1998) borrow from both strategic choice and population ecology to introduce potential for 
diversity, thus change, to occur. High performing firms may have chosen to deviate from 
other firms in the institutional environment because of ‘active agency’ (cf. Child, 1972), a 
‘genetic distortion’ (Hannan and Freeman, 1989; Powell, 1991) that occurred in the 
mimicing process, or because they are new entrants. Beckert (1999) also calls for linking 
strategic choice theory to institutional theory. To account for ‘intentional rational agency’, 
he conjectures that the new institutionalism should incorporate change by including 
strategic agency. Institutions play a dual role in enabling agency. On the one hand, 
institutions are a precondition for strategic agency, whilst on the other hand; 
institutionalised practices should be violated to realise better options than those available 
under the prevailing institutional norms. To reconcile strategic agency with institutional 
theory, Beckert (1999) advances structuration theory (Giddens, 1984). Under this theory, 
‘action … develops in a duality between agency and structure’ (Beckert, 1999: 789). 
Barley and Tolbert (1997) also build on structuration theory (Giddens, 1976; 1979) to 
introduce dynamism into institutional theory. They indicate that the creation, alteration, 
and reproduction of institutions have been largely ignored by institutional theory. They 
advance Giddens’ (ibid) structuration theory to address the ‘becoming’ or process 
dimension of institutionalisation. Whereas Kondra and Hinings (1998) focus on divergence 
of actors and Beckert (1999) focuses on the role of entrepreneurs, Barley and Tolbert 
(1997) concentrate on different strength of institutions themselves in shaping behaviour of 
constituent units. That is, Barley and Tolbert (1997) focus on the degree to which 
institutions vary in their normative power and their effect on behaviour. 
Classical institutional theory postulates that organisations will converge to institutionally 
derived archetypes. The neo-institutionalist perspective argues that strategic renewal is the 
result of social and political processes of organisational members. Isomorphic forces exert 
mimetic pressures on individual firms’ renewal attempts. The renewal process is difficult 
to control because it results from the interplay of the institutional context and 
organisational dynamics, and it varies across and within sectors depending on the degree of 
normative power exerted by different institutional environments. 
 
2.3 The environmental selection perspective 
Resource-based theory and population ecology focus on different levels of analysis. Both 
theories apply selection logics (cf. Lewin and Volberda, 1999) to explain differences in 
firm performance. Regarding the link between population ecology and resource-based 
theory, Barney (2000a: 268) remarks: ‘Is population ecology theory, extended to explain 
differences in firm performance, a special case of resource-based theory, or is resource-
based theory a special case of population ecology theory? As a resource-based theorist, I 
think the answer to this question is obvious! In the long run, however, I am quite confident 
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that these two sets of ideas will merge to become an integrated theory of firm 
performance’. 
The resource-based view seeks to explain differences between firms operating in similar 
product markets. As such, resource-based theory is concerned with identifying and 
explaining characteristics of firm resources that lead to sustainable competitive advantage. 
Resource-based theory has two elemental assumptions. First, resources are 
heterogeneously distributed across firms. Second, resources are immobile, or ‘sticky’, and 
cannot be transferred from one firm to another without cost. Building on these axioms, 
Barney (1991) theorises that resources that are valuable, rare, difficult to imitate and non-
substitutable may yield sustainable competitive advantage. The ferment of resource-based 
theory lies in Penrose’s ‘The theory of the growth of the firm’ (1959)8. One stream of 
resource-based theories builds on Penrose’s discussion on how to expand. This school 
emphasises that diversification should be in line with a firm’s core competencies 
(Wernerfelt, 1984), and concentrates its research on how resources result in diversification. 
Ricardian logic (Ricardo, 1817) is used by another stream of resource-based theories. 
Ricardian logic states that performance differences result from ownership of resources that 
have differential productivity (Makadok, 2001). Ricardian resource-based theorists study 
the question of how to compete: how and why do resources lead to different competitive 
advantage of firms operating within the same business (Barney, 1991)? 
The resource-based view has endured some criticism as to the extent to which it is a 
theory. The resource-based view has contributed to explaining and predicting 
sustainability, but falls short in explaining or predicting competitive advantage (Priem and 
Butler, 2000b). Priem and Butler (2000a) argue that the resource-based view is 
tautological, allows for equifinality, underestimates the role of product markets, and has 
limited prescriptive implications. Barney (2000b) responded to this critic, but has difficulty 
in convincing Priem and Butler (2000b) on especially the tautology argument and the 
necessity of including some external notion to determine resource value. Further 
development seems necessary to come at a full-fledged theory of sustainable competitive 
advantage (Priem and Butler, 2000b). 
Resource-based theory has a rather pessimistic view on renewal. It conceives the firm to be 
a bundle of intangible and tangible resources that has to be identified, selected, developed, 
and deployed to generate superior performance (Wernerfelt, 1984; Learned et al., 1969). 
Firms have a capacity for outstanding short-term performances, but lack capacity for 
change in the longer term. ‘Firms are stuck with what they have, and have to live with 
what they lack’ (Baden-Fuller and Volberda, 1996: 11). Levinthal and March (1993) argue 
                                                           
8 This is the canonical reference. Henderson (2000) however sees Nelson and Winter’s 
(1982) An evolutionary theory of economic change and Stinchcombe’s (1965) Social 
structure and organisations as the basic streams of thought on which the resource-based 
view rests. 
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that successful firms tend to develop current competencies further and further. This process 
can make a firm dig into its current repertoire of competencies and increases the 
opportunity and unlearning costs to develop new competencies. This is coined the 
‘competency trap’, a term also used by Levitt and March (1988). Leonard-Barton (1992) 
indicates that core competencies can evolve into core rigidities (also see Burgelman, 
1994), and posits that organisations have to develop new products and processes while also 
maintaining current capabilities. Managers face the paradox that ‘core capabilities 
simultaneously enhance and inhibit development’ (Leonard-Barton, 1992: 112). Current 
capabilities can be beneficial for developing new capabilities, for instance by applying 
existing technologies in new fields or by using distinct managerial and value systems in a 
new landscape. Current capabilities may however also hinder new capabilities 
development. A firm may ‘overdevelop’ its current capabilities, overvaluing some 
disciplines over others. This can result in rigidities that make creation of new capabilities 
more difficult. 
The latter argument connects resource-based theory to the dynamic capabilities view (cf. 
Amit and Schoemaker, 1993; Teece et al., 1997). Whereas the resource-based view 
concentrates on which resources to select, the dynamic capabilities approach focuses on 
how to deploy capabilities. The important distinction between resources and capabilities is 
in their timing. Resources create economic rent before their acquisition, as firms have to 
outsmart others in picking those resources that will result in higher future value than other 
resources, or by not acquiring resources whose value will decrease over time. Capabilities 
can only create economic rent after resources have been acquired. Resources place 
emphasis on cognition and informational factors, whilst capabilities concentrate on 
structural design factors to best deploy the acquired resources (Makadok, 2001). 
Population ecology is based on a biological evolutionary metaphor and seeks to explain the 
large variety in kinds organisations (Hannan and Freeman, 1977). Boone and Van 
Witteloostuijn (1995) mention two perspectives that explain diversity of organisational 
forms. The Lamarckian view asserts that organisations continuously refine strategies and 
structures to changing environmental conditions: organisations are flexible. The Darwinian 
view holds that old organisational forms die and are outplaced by new ones: organisations 
are inert. Population ecology adheres to the second view, as it states that organisations may 
change, but not as fast as their environments. Even if organisations would be flexible, 
survival chances would be reduced as changing the core features of the organisation 
essentially results in a new organisation. This ‘new’ organisation is then faced with 
liabilities of newness, which are theorised to have much lower survival chances then 
organisations that maintain the fit with their environment. Changing in a controlled way is 
problematic as the future state of the environment is unpredictable, organisational 
decision-making is a political process, and because intentions and organisational outcomes 
are decoupled. Organisation-environment matches are on average random: the 
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environment selects organisational forms (Hannan and Freeman, 1989). Diversity can be 
understood by investigating birth and death rates of organisational forms, not be studying 
managerial adaptations – which are essentially random acts that will or will not result in 
environmental fit9. 
Population ecology (Hannan and Freeman, 1977; 1984; Aldrich, 1979, 1999) asserts that 
large organisations are well suited to exploit today’s markets, but can hardly at all be 
adapted to the future. Change occurs at the population level through a continuous process 
of variation, selection, and retention, during which the environment selects organisations 
that fit the resource base of an environmental niche best (Hannan and Freeman, 1977). 
Organisations that are reliable, accountable and reproducible (Hannan and Freeman, 1984) 
will be favored in the selection process. Organisations that survive the selection process 
will in turn increase their level of structural inertia. As the environment changes, the 
relative inertness of these organisations inevitably results in deteriorating performances. 
This structural inertia is difficult to overcome and results in the market eventually selecting 
out firms whose competencies have become outdated (Aldrich, 1979, 1999; Hannan and 
Freeman, 1984). New organisations that emerge over time eventually replace the current 
organisational population. Recent population ecologists (Singh, 1990; Barnett and 
Burgelman, 1996) are less pessimistic. They suggest that organisations can adapt to the 
environment if that environment is relatively stable. In times of radical change the 
organisational population will generate a variety of strategies, of which only some will 
prove to be successful. Firms who have tried a different strategy have to comply with this 
dominant strategy; otherwise they will be selected out. However, no single firm can 
consistently create the dominant strategy as the variations in new strategies result from a 
random process. This eventually results in a change of the composition of the 
organisational population over time. 
Strategic renewal at the level of the firm is extremely difficult according to population 
ecology. Renewal occurs at the population level through a process in which the market 
selects out firms whose competencies have become outdated. These organisations are 
replaced by new organisations. This suggests strategic renewal takes place on the 
population level. 
 
                                                           
9 Instead of taking survival or failure as the criterion of successful organisation-
environment adaptation, some researchers apply structural change or stability as measure 
of success. Birth and death rates allow to observe an organisational population to adapt by 
selecting out the less fit organisations. Using the criterion of structural change might 
indicate that almost all organisations survive, but undergo significant internal structural 
changes. Perrow (1986) notes that this addition can violate selection theories that build on 
biology and ecology. 
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2.4 Comparing single-lens perspectives 
The three single-lens perspectives have varied assertions regarding the strength of selection 
forces and the potential for adaptation. We summarised these different assertions in Table 
2.1, which indicates the role ascribed to management and the environment by the different 
theories. The last column indicates the strategic renewal view implicit to each theoretical 
perspective. 
 
Table 2.1 Three single-lens perspectives on strategic renewal 
Theoretical 
perspective 
Role of 
management 
Role of 
environment 
Strategic renewal 
perspective 
Strategic 
choice 
theory  
Intermediary 
between firm and 
environment 
Environment offers 
constraints and 
opportunities 
Active role for 
managers to adapt 
organisation and 
environment 
M
an
ag
er
ia
l 
in
te
nt
io
na
lit
y 
Dynamic 
capabilities 
view 
Concentrate on 
continuously 
renewing knowledge 
base 
Changing 
environments 
render current 
capabilities 
obsolete 
Organisations 
should remain in a 
dynamic capability 
mode to achieve 
SCA 
Classic 
institutiona
l theory 
Build and retain 
legitimacy by 
conforming to 
institutional 
practices 
Population 
isomorphism exerts 
mimetic pressures 
on firms’ renewal 
attempts 
Organisations 
converge to 
institutionally 
derived archetypes 
In
st
itu
tio
na
l p
er
sp
ec
tiv
e 
Neo-
institutiona
l theory 
Internal dynamics 
(changes in power 
structure; competing 
ideas) may breed 
new strategies 
Environments 
exercise different 
degrees of 
normative power  
Renewal results 
from the interplay of 
institutional context 
and organisational 
dynamics 
Resource-
based view 
Selection, 
deployment and 
maximisation of 
firm resources 
Resources only add 
to competitive ad-
vantage in relation 
to other firms’ 
resource bases 
Firms are stuck with 
what they have, and 
have to live with 
what they lack 
En
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l s
el
ec
tio
n 
Population 
ecology 
Management should 
concentrate on 
exploiting its niche 
and cannot influence 
survival chances 
Environment 
selects best fitting 
organisations 
New entrants 
redefine environ-
ment; strategic 
renewal occurs at 
population level by 
organisational birth 
and death 
Source: Adapted from Lewin and Volberda (1999: 524) 
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Our selection of single-lens theories illustrates the multiplicity of perspectives that exists in 
organisation theory. There is no uniform theory of organisation because of the complex, 
idiosyncratic nature of organisational phenomena (McKelvey, 1997). Coevolutionary 
theory asserts that it is not a matter of either adaptation or selection, but the concurrent 
operating of adaptation and selection processes that explains renewal processes. The next 
section elaborates this coevolutionary perspective. 
 
2.5 Coevolutionary theory 
Lewin and Volberda (1999: 526) define coevolution as ‘the joint outcome of managerial 
intentionality, environment, and institutional effects’. McKelvey (1997) suggests 
coevolution as one of four frontiers to attack the idiosyncrasy problem in organisation 
science. Lewin, Long and Carroll (1999: 535) posit that a coevolutionary perspective 
‘considers organisations, their populations, and their environments as the interdependent 
outcome of managerial actions, institutional influences, and extra-institutional changes’. 
These conceptions indicate that coevolution should be studied on multiple levels of 
analysis. Baum and Singh (1994) propose that changes may occur in all organisations or 
populations that interact, either through direct interaction or feedback. McKelvey (1997) 
distinguishes between micro- and macrocoevolution. Microcoevolution refers to 
coevolution within firms, whereas macrocoevolution takes place between firms and their 
niche.  
Interaction effects within and between levels of analysis are a key issue in coevolutionary 
research. Interaction effects typically are not linear and may lead to counterintuitive 
outcomes because of feedback loops. Baum and Singh (1994) define three coevolutionary 
interaction models; the competition, the predator-prey, and the three variables model. 
Lewin and Volberda (1999) mention mutual, simultaneous, lagged, and nested interaction 
effects. McKelvey (2002: 1) points out that coevolution: ‘approximates a mutual-causal, 
deviation-amplifying, positive feedback process (Maruyama, 1963)’, in which A reacts to 
B, and B to A, and so on, until halted by a damping mechanism. As coevolutionary theory 
is still under development, authors have defined coevolution in multiple ways. Table 2.2 
presents an overview of definitions of coevolution. 
This study builds on Lewin and Volberda’s (1999) definition of coevolution as the joint 
outcome of managerial intentionality, institutional, and selection effects. Coevolutionary 
effects are operationalised by assessing feedback processes between organisations and 
their environments (Baum and Singh, 1994; Lewin and Volberda, 1999). These interaction 
effects can be simultaneous and lagged, and are of a mutual-causal nature (McKelvey, 
2002). 
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Table 2.2 Definitions of coevolution in selected sources 
Author(s) Definition of coevolution 
Aldrich (1999: 38) Coevolution […] describe[s] situations in which organisations 
and populations not only respond to influences from their 
environments, but also affect their environments. 
Baum and Singh 
(1994: 380) 
The study of coevolution fundamentally is a feedback approach to 
the study of organisation-environment relations. 
Lewin, Long and 
Carroll (1999: 535) 
[Coevolution] theory considers organisations, their populations, 
and their environments as the interdependent outcome of 
managerial actions, institutional influences, and extra-institutional 
changes. 
Lewin and Volberda 
(1999: 526) 
We define coevolution as the joint outcome of managerial 
intentionality, environment, and institutional effects. Coevolution 
assumes that change may occur in all interacting populations of 
organisations. Change can be driven by direct interactions and 
feedback from the rest of the system. 
McKelvey (1997: 
359) 
The ecological definition of coevolution recognises the 
fundamental interdependency between firms, competitors, and 
niche resources available for harvesting: each changes as the other 
changes 
McKelvey (2002: 1) Coevolution approximates a mutual-causal, deviation-amplifying, 
positive feedback process (Maruyama, 1963). Thus, A reacts to B; 
B reacts to A; the deviation-amplifying cycle repeats indefinitely 
until some damping mechanism halts it. 
 
We now have elaborated three single-lens perspectives and coevolutionary theory. These 
are the theoretical building blocks underlying our analysis of strategic renewal. The next 
paragraph integrates the selected theories as we develop a coevolutionary framework of 
strategic renewal. 
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2.6 Integrating multiple levels of analysis: strategic 
renewal from a coevolutionary perspective 
 
Organisations in a structured field respond to an environment that consists of other 
organisations responding to their environment, which consists of organisations’ responses 
- Thomas Schelling (1978) - 
 
After mainstream theories on organizing had been established, a debate evolved that 
classified organisation theories into paradigms. McKelvey (1997: 352) exclaimed that 
‘[e]ven a hermit in bleakest Antarctica must be aware of the organisation science paradigm 
war by now.’ A plethora of paradigms have been formulated in organisation science. Clegg 
et al. (1996) identify eight paradigms, whilst Donaldson (1995) even distinguishes 15 
paradigms. The classification of Burrell and Morgan (1979) of four main paradigms in 
organisation studies was very influential. They concluded that paradigms were essentially 
incommensurable, leading to considerable debate. This debate has led some writers (cf. 
Reed, 1985; Alvesson, 1987; Ackroyd, 1992) to conclude that the conviction of 
incommensurability hinders organisational theory development. Instead, they argue for 
theoretical synthesis of insights of different paradigms. Coevolution theory obviously 
adheres to this argument. 
Our discussion of single-lens theories mentioned a number of attempts to enhance the 
applicability of single-lens perspectives by integrating concepts of other theories. Beckert 
(1999) discussed the added value of bringing strategic agency and structuration theory into 
institutional theory. Boone and Van Witteloostuijn (1995) studied the potentials for cross-
fertilisation of industrial organisation and organisational ecology. Kondra and Hinings 
(1998) build on strategic choice and population ecology to add an explanation for 
institutional change to institutional theory. The problem of addressing change with 
traditional institutional theory was also pointed out by Roberts and Greenwood (1997), 
who integrate elements of institutional theory into the comparative-efficiency approach of 
transaction cost economics. In a similar vein, Amburgey and Rao (1996: 1282-1283) noted 
that ‘organisational ecology needs consensus to generate cumulative knowledge, but new 
concepts and information must be incorporated if ecological theory is to remain vibrant 
[my italics]. Child (1997) revisited strategic choice theory to display its potential to 
integrate different perspectives in organisational theory. 
These and other attempts indicate a growing awareness of the added value of combining 
both adaptation and selection views on organisations. Voluntaristic and deterministic 
approaches are typically seen as two sides of a continuum (Baum, 1996; Lewin and 
Volberda, 1999). Barnett and Carroll (1995) position the debate even more extreme, using 
the terms theoretical camps when distinguishing between adaptation and selection 
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perspectives. Hannan and Freeman (1989) however state that determinism and voluntarism 
are two sides of the same coin. The essence of the adaptation-selection debate is whether it 
is relative inertia, resulting in Darwinian selection, or relative flexibility, reflecting the 
Lamarckian view that explains organisational diversity (Boone and Van Witteloostuijn, 
1995). These authors indicate that behavioural theory indicates substantial overlap between 
voluntaristic and deterministic views with regard to the strategic-decision making process. 
This view is reflected by Miller (1993) and Burgelman (1991). Miller (1993) indicates that 
successful organisations tend to simplify over time, which can eventually result in 
organisational failure. This simplification results from the same reasons that caused the 
initial success, and are strongly related to the reliability, accountability, and reproducibility 
assumptions of population ecology. Burgelman (1991) applies an intra-organisational 
ecological view on strategy making. He ties the two ends of the adaptation-selection 
continuum by stating that organisations can achieve enduring success by balancing inertia 
and flexibility in their strategy making process. Firms should find a delicate balance 
between induced and autonomous strategic initiatives. Induced strategic initiatives fit 
within the current strategy and build on past success. Internal selection of these initiatives 
obviously only allows coping with incremental environmental changes, resulting in inertia. 
Firms should balance these with autonomous strategic initiatives, which fall outside the 
current strategic scope. The nurturing and selection of autonomous initiatives results in 
continuous strategic renewal and allows for anticipatory adaptation. Burgelman (1991: 
257) reconciles the two views by indicating the importance of ‘balancing […] variation-
reducing and variation-increasing mechanisms. It suggests that one process leads to 
relative inertia and incremental adjustments, while the other expands the firm’s domain 
and renews the organisation’s distinctive competence base, countering inertia and serving 
some of the functions of reorientation.’ 
We concur with these calls to reconcile adaptation and selection theories. Building on 
Weick (1995), we propose to study strategic renewal by identifying and analysing strategic 
renewal actions of firms: ‘it is what managers do, not what they plan, that explains their 
success’ (ibid: 55) [my italics]. Mintzberg and Waters’ (1985) distinction regarding 
realised strategies aids to disentangle managerial intentionality and institutional and 
environmental selection effects operating on actions of strategic renewal. Mintzberg and 
Waters (1985) define strategy as a ‘pattern in a stream of decisions’ (also see Mintzberg, 
1978), and distinguish between two strategy types. The first is a deliberate strategy, which 
materialises from precise intentions in the organisation that are common to most of the 
organisational actors and are realised as intended. A purely deliberate strategy should not 
be interfered by any environmental influence. The second type is the emergent strategy. 
This strategy type has consistency in action over time without any intention leading the 
strategy (Mintzberg and Waters, 1985). The emergent and deliberate strategy types relate 
to McKelvey’s (1997) distinction between the natural and rational systems view (Scott, 
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1992) of organisation science. The natural systems view conjectures that emergent system 
behaviour, which McKelvey (1997) extends to selectionist effects, lead to natural order in 
firms that does not result from purposeful or intentional activity. The rational systems view 
maintains that order in firms results from managerial decisions. Obviously, purely 
deliberate or emergent strategies are hard to find in the empirical world as they represent 
ideal type strategies. They however are very helpful to make the theoretical distinction 
between actions driven by managerial intention and actions resulting from institutional and 
environmental selection pressures. The interaction between natural and rational 
phenomena (McKelvey, 1997) eventually results in organisational reality. Figure 2.1 
displays the underlying processes that drive strategic renewal actions. We use this model to 
explicate how managerial intentionality, institutional, and environmental selection effects 
impact on strategic actions. As such, we use core concepts of strategic choice theory and 
dynamic capabilities theory to managerial intentionality effects. Classical and neo-
institutional theory is applied to theorise how institutional effects contribute to shaping 
strategic actions. The resource-based view serves to determine organisational specifics that 
influence managerial adaptation. Population ecology finally informs about environmental 
selection effects. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Managerial intentionality effects 
The managerial intentionality perspective conjectures that dynamic capabilities, casu quo 
purposeful strategic action, drive intentional adaptation. Strategic choice theory asserts that 
contextual factors are not the only determinants of the way in which organisations are 
designed and structured (Child, 1972). Managers have room to choose idiosyncratic 
courses of action. Strategic choice theory considers managers as decision makers that 
intermediate between the organisation and its environment (Thompson, 1967) instead of 
passive recipients of environmental forces. These key decision makers, or dominant 
Figure 2.1 A coevolutionary model of strategic renewal 
Institutional and 
environmental selection 
effects 
Managerial intentionality 
effects 
Emergent strategies Deliberate strategies 
Realised strategy 
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coalition, decide on the course of strategic actions to adapt the organisation to its 
environment. Purposeful strategic action influences an organisation’s strategic path, 
indicating managerial intentionality effects. 
The managerial intentionality perspective asserts that multiple types of purposeful strategic 
action are viable across organisations operating within the same environmental constraints. 
Cyert and March’s (1963) concept of organisational slack is conducive to explain this 
equifinality. Organisational slack is indicated by the fact that virtually no organisation 
functions at the limit of its efficiency. Organisational slack may be the reason that multiple 
forms of organizing and strategizing are viable within an environment. 
The dynamic capabilities view attributes similar adaptive powers to management. It 
proposes that organisations should continuously renew their knowledge base to escape the 
competence trap. The current knowledge base however is shaped by a firm’s history. 
Prahalad and Bettis (1986) state that firms develop ‘dominant general management logic’ 
through experience. Although the dominant logic concept was originally used to develop 
an overall theory to link diversification and performance, it is also conducive to explain 
constraints inherent to the managerial intentionality perspective. A firm’s dominant logic is 
shaped by the managers’ perception of the world and their ways of dealing with the world 
(Dobbin and Baum, 2000). Prahalad and Bettis (1986: 490) define the dominant general 
management logic ‘as the way in which managers conceptualise the business and make 
critical resource allocation decisions’. More generally, the dominant logic can be 
considered as both a knowledge structure and a set of elicited management processes 
(Prahalad and Bettis, 1986). The dominant logic resides in an organisations’ ‘dominant 
coalition’, which processes organisational events through preexisting knowledge systems. 
These knowledge systems, or schemas, facilitate environmental scanning, event selection, 
assessment of consequences, and taking appropriate actions quickly and efficiently. The 
dominant coalition’s experiences shape its view of the world and mould its repertoire of 
tools to realise strategic actions. Managers thus tend to define problems in similar ways 
and develop preferential ways of dealing with critical tasks (Prahalad and Bettis, 1986). 
Firms may run into trouble when circumstances change, as past experiences that are stored 
in the organisation’s dominant logic may constrain future adaptations (Dobbin and Baum, 
2000). Dominant logic links to Weick’s (1979) concept of environmental enactment. 
Organisational members form, or enact, their environment through social interaction. The 
resulting pattern of enactment constructs organisational reality influences future 
enactments. 
To summarise, managerial intentionality effects refer to managerial leeway to design 
purposeful action. Organisational slack explains why multiple courses of action may be 
viable within an environment. Dominant logic and environmental enactment both facilitate 
and constrain the development of a firm’s knowledge base as proposed by the dynamic 
capabilities view. 
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Institutional effects 
Convergence to organisational archetypes is the focal point of institutional theory. 
Isomorphism is the constraining process that makes organisations converge to archetypes 
and explains homogeneity of forms of organizing. Institutionalisation processes can be 
dissected into preconscious and postconscious institutionalisation (Roberts and 
Greenwood, 1997). Preconscious institutionalisation refers to organisations taking for 
granted patterns of organizing and acting, simply because of not perceiving or thinking 
about it: they ‘unconsciously’ follow institutional practices. Preconscious 
institutionalisation links to Mintzberg and Waters’ (1985) emergent strategy type, as there 
are by definition no intentions connected to strategic actions resulting from preconscious 
institutional behaviour. If actors fail to act on their interests despite recognizing more 
efficient design adoptions than those suggested by institutional rules, a postconscious 
institutionalisation process is in play. In this case, actors recognise an opportunity to 
diverge from established institutional arrangements, but only consider the range of 
alternatives acceptable within the current institutional context. That is, managerial 
intentions to undertake deviant strategic actions are ruled out by institutional pressures, 
resulting in an emergent pattern of strategies evolving through conscious isomorphic 
behaviour. 
Figure 2.1 shows a feedback loop from realised strategy to institutional effects. 
Institutional theory postulates that firms model their behaviour on other firm’s behaviour. 
Diffusion processes, coined bandwagons, can explain this process. Bandwagons relate to 
the concept of mimetic isomorphism and explain the diffusion of both efficient and 
inefficient strategies across an industry. Bandwagon pressures drive organisations to adopt 
strategies10 that have ambiguous returns. Bandwagons arise from the sheer number of 
organisations that already adopted the strategy, not from an organisation’s individual 
assessment of the strategy’s efficiency or return (Abrahamson and Rosenkopf, 1993). 
Organisation innovation diffusion literature (cf. Abrahamson and Rosenkopf, 1991; 1993; 
O’Neill, Pouder and Buchholtz, 1998) discerns institutional and competitive bandwagons. 
Institutional bandwagons refer to the process of legitimisation. The mere fact that a 
strategy type has been accepted by a large number of organisations leads other 
organisations to adopt the strategy, irrespective of its expected performance gains (Meyer 
and Rowan, 1977). New practices may be ‘infused with value’ (Selznick, 1957: 17). This 
process commences when early adopters implement a strategy type to improve their 
                                                           
10 Abrahamson and Rosenkopf’s (1993) article discusses the diffusion of innovations. The 
term innovation is defined rather broadly as they indicate that any innovation, being 
organisational, technological, managerial, or strategic can result in a bandwagon, as long 
as the assessment of the innovation’s return is ambiguous. This includes the type of 
strategic actions we discuss. 
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performance without knowing its performance effects. As the strategy continues to diffuse, 
a threshold is passed beyond which it is not the expected performance gains, but the 
adoption of the strategy itself that provides legitimacy. Not adopting would appear 
abnormal to stakeholders, which urges the population of organisations to adopt the strategy 
because of fear of losing stakeholder support. The process underlying competitive 
bandwagons is fear of losing competitive advantage. Competitive bandwagons arise when 
organisations are temped to adopt a strategy type because of the risk of falling behind the 
average performance of their industry in case the strategic invention turns out to be 
successful (Abrahamson and Rosenkopf, 1993). Adopting a strategy that has unknown 
performance outcomes is also seen as beneficial. It will lead the organisation to 
approximate the average performance of its population irrespective of the strategy 
succeeding or failing. 
Interestingly, isomorphic behaviour does not always result in homogeneity. DiMaggio and 
Powell (1983: 149) (Dobbin and Baum) refer to a situation of serendipity, noting that 
‘there are those who, in their imperfect attempts to imitate others, unconsciously innovate 
by unwittingly acquiring some unexpected or unsought unique attribute which under the 
prevailing circumstances prove partly responsible for the success’. This relates to the 
‘genetic distortion’ effect mentioned by Kondra and Hinings (1998) and explains that some 
institutionally derived strategic actions may have unintended and unexpected innovative 
effects. Kondra and Hinings (1998) and Beckert (1999) further suggest introducing 
elements of strategic choice into institutional theory to explain institutional change.  
Institutional theory asserts that isomorphism results in mimetic behaviour, which explains 
convergence to organisational archetypes. Preconscious and postconscious 
institutionalisation indicates that organisations unconsciously or consciously conform to 
institutional practices, resulting in emergent strategizing. Diffusion theory explains the 
process of strategies diffusing through an institutional field via either institutional or 
competitive bandwagons. Institutional processes typically lead to homogeneity in 
organizing and strategizing, although neo-institutional theory indicates that genetic 
distortion effects and strategic agency may breed innovations and lead to institutional 
change. 
 
Environmental selection effects 
We derive environmental selection effects from both the resource-based view and 
population ecology. The resource-based view is concerned with selection pressures arising 
from the firm level, and population ecology focuses on selection forces operating on the 
population level. 
The resource-based view assumes that a firm’s performance is determined by the 
distinctive resources it controls (Wernerfelt, 1984). Resource heterogeneity and resource 
immobility enable the durable existence of valuable, rare, inimitable and non-substitutable 
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resources. These characteristics render resources to be strategically relevant, drive 
sustained competitive advantage, and explain performance differences within industries 
(Barney, 1991). Firm-specific resources make it very difficult for firms who are less 
competitive to copy successful peers, and explains differences in performance within 
industries (Barney, 1991). The flipside of ‘sticky’ organisational advantages (Barney, 
1991) is the inherent difficulty for firms to change to, or adopt, superior strategies. As 
successful firms continuously develop their competencies, it will be increasingly difficult 
to develop new competencies. This may result in a ‘competency trap’ (Levinthal and 
March, 1993; Levitt and March, 1988) and may deteriorate existing competencies into 
‘core rigidities’ (Leonard-Barton, 1992; Burgelman, 1994). As such, path dependency 
effects constrain the renewal of a firm’s resource base. Resource-based theory asserts that 
strategies and forms of organisation tend to endure; eventhough organisations operate 
under environmental pressures (Dobbin and Baum, 2000). Firms are seen as intrinsically 
historical and social entities. The organisation’s historical route that obtained and built its 
set of resources (Barney, 1991) explains firm performance; not just the industry structure. 
Population ecology attributes little power to organisations to change their environment. 
Instead, population ecologists assert that strategic renewal occurs at the population level 
through a process of variation, selection and retention. Hannan and Freeman (1984) argue 
that organisations that try to adapt to their environmental niche reduce their survival 
chances. Structural inertia is a necessary and inevitable process occurring in organisations 
that optimise their survival chances. Organisations that are reliable, accountable and 
reproducible will have higher survival chances than others (Hannan and Freeman, 1984). 
These demands however lead to a build-up of structural inertia. This inertia in turn 
deteriorates organisations’ potential to adapt to environmental changes. As the 
environment favours organisations with high levels of structural inertia, management’s 
task is to focus on its environmental niche, optimise the organisation’s specialisation to its 
niche and keep its fingers crossed (Lewin and Volberda, 1999). 
Resource heterogeneity and resource immobility explain performance differences within 
industries. The firm-specific nature of resources essentially rules out imitation by other 
firms. Path dependency effects imply difficulties to alter a firm’s resource base. In their 
quest to acquire reliability, accountability and reproducibility, firms build up their level of 
structural inertia. This increases survival chances in times of stable environmental 
conditions, but severely constrains adaptation in times of change. As fit to changing 
environmental conditions is essentially a stochastic process, no organisation can 
consistently create fitting strategies, resulting in the organisational population gradually 
being replaced over time. Table 2.3 summarises core concepts of single-lens theories, 
respectively indicating managerial intentionality, institutional, and environmental selection 
effects. 
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Table 2.3 Managerial intentionality, institutional, and environmental selection  
effects influencing strategic renewal actions 
 Theoretical 
perspective 
Core components Authors 
Strategic choice 
theory 
Purposeful strategic action drives 
deliberate strategies. 
Organisational slack allows for 
different forms of strategizing 
Child (1972; 1999); 
Thompson (1967); 
Cyert and March 
(1963) 
M
an
ag
er
ia
l i
nt
en
-
tio
na
lit
y 
ef
fe
ct
s 
Dynamic 
capabilities theory 
Dominant logic and environmental 
enactment influence the development 
of a firm’s knowledge base 
Teece, Pisano and 
Shuen (1997); 
Prahalad and Bettis 
(1986); Weick (1979) 
Classical 
institutional theory 
Isomorphism explains convergence to 
organisational archetypes 
Preconscious and postconscious 
institutionalisation result in emergent 
strategies 
DiMaggio and 
Powell (1983; 1991); 
Meyer and Rowan 
(1977); Roberts and 
Green-wood (1997) 
Neo-institutional 
theory 
Genetic distortion effects and 
strategic agency explain institutional 
change 
Kondra and Hinings 
(1998); Beckert 
(1999) 
In
st
itu
tio
na
l e
ff
ec
ts
 
Diffusion theory Institutional and competitive 
bandwagons diffuse strategies 
through an institutional field 
Abrahamson and 
Rosenkopf (1991; 
1993) 
Resource-based 
theory 
Resource heterogeneity and 
immobility explain performance 
differences and rule out imitation 
Path dependency effects impede 
alteration of a firm’s resource base 
Barney (1991; 1996); 
Wernerfelt (1984) 
En
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l s
el
ec
tio
n 
ef
fe
ct
s 
Population 
ecology 
Level of structural inertia increases as 
organisations try to become reliable, 
accountable and reproducible 
Structural inertia increases survival 
chances in stable environments; 
decreases survival rates in changing 
environments 
Fit is a random process; environment 
selects organisational forms 
Hannan and Freeman 
(1977; 1984); Aldrich 
(1979; 1999) 
 
Our coevolutionary framework (cf. Figure 2.1) integrates managerial intentionality, 
institutional, and environmental selection effects operating on strategic acting. Our 
selection of single-lens theories illustrate that the focal point – the individual firm, the 
institutional environment, or the population level – has a large impact on the explanation 
and prediction of strategic renewal processes. We argued that studying strategic renewal on 
the level of actions aids to disentangle the various effects operating on a firm’s realised 
strategy. Our framework asserts that strategic renewal can both be induced because of 
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managerial intentionality effects, or result from institutional or environmental selection 
pressures. For instance, in the case of a greenfield investment, is it: 
• Undertaken as a purposeful action to develop a new strategy; 
• Driven by mimetic isomorphic behaviour to gain legitimacy of organisational 
stakeholders; 
• Originating from an attempt to maximise the deployment of the firm’s resource base 
to further exploit the firms’ environmental niche? 
 
Managerial intentionality, institutional, and environmental selection effects can obviously 
not be directly inferred from strategic renewal actions. We will design our research 
methodology to detect characteristics of these three effects. To this end, we develop a set 
of attributes to operationalise the strategic renewal construct (cf. section 3.2). The next 
section develops a set of propositions that link to the three single-lens perspectives and 
coevolutionary theory. 
 
2.7 Propositions 
We structure the development of propositions along the four theoretical perspectives 
applied in this chapter. The propositions relate to our central research questions developed 
in the first chapter. Our research questions ask how incumbent firms renew themselves, 
and to what extent managerial intentionality, institutional, environmental selection, and 
coevolutionary effects operate on strategic renewal actions. 
 
Managerial intentionality theory 
Building on organisational learning theories, the dynamic capabilities approach focuses on 
how individuals, teams, and management use information and knowledge to reconsider the 
fit of the organisation to its environment (Best, 1990; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Van 
Den Bosch and Van Wijk, 2001). A firm’s absorptive capacity11 plays an important role in 
assessing this fit (Lewin et al., 1999). An organisation’s absorptive capacity influences the 
expectation formation process and its balance of exploration and exploitation (Van Den 
Bosch et al., 1999). The higher the absorptive capacity, the more a firm’s aspiration level 
or expectation formation process will be defined in terms of environmental opportunities, 
independent of performance criteria (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990: 137). Firms with higher 
levels of absorptive capacity will tend to be more proactive: fortune favors the prepared 
firm (Cohen and Levinthal, 1994). We indicated that concurrent or delayed acting can be 
related to institutional theory and environment selection, whilst proactive or firm specific 
                                                           
11 Absorptive capacity is defined as ‘the ability to recognize the value of new knowledge, 
assimilate it, and apply it to commercial ends’ (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990: 128). 
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timing, frequency or volatility suggests managerial intentionality. From a managerial 
intentionality approach, we thus expect firm-specific patterns regarding the timing, 
frequency and volatility of strategic renewal actions: 
 
Proposition 1. From a managerial intentionality approach, renewal actions of incumbent 
firms will show firm-specific patterns regarding the temporal dimension of strategic 
renewal actions. 
 
Institutional theory 
Institutional theory examines the influence of the institutional context on the organisational 
structure (Tolbert and Zucker, 1996; Scott, 2001; Wicks, 2001) and contends that 
population isomorphism moulds organisations to organisational archetypes (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1991). Institutional and competitive pressures drive organisations to adopt 
initiatives undertaken by other organisations in their institutional environment. These 
bandwagons cause a significant number of organisations in institutional settings to 
undertake similar initiatives. These initiatives are typically difficult to assess and do not 
lead to obvious strategic or financial advantages. The initiative becomes infused with value 
as the number of organisations that adopt the initiative increases. Organisations that do not 
adopt the initiative risk loss of stakeholders’ support, which may lead them to adopt the 
innovation after all (Abrahamson and Rosenkopf, 1993). Greenwood and Hinings (1996) 
also recommend a fast follower strategy to achieve long-term survival to prevent firms 
from drifting away from the prevailing institutional template. Scott (2001) emphasises the 
impact regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive institutional factors have on 
organisations. Examples in the financial services industry include regulations on 
performing both banking and insurance activities, shared perceptions about risk avoidance, 
and organisational structures and accountability rules imposed by government regulations. 
Institutional effects on strategic renewal actions suggest our second proposition: 
 
Proposition 2. From an institutional approach, an incumbent firm will mimic the renewal 
actions of other incumbent firms in its institutional environment. 
 
Environmental selection theory 
Resource-based theory asserts that firms have a capacity for outstanding short-term 
performances, but lack capacity for change in the longer term. Baden-Fuller and Volberda 
(1996: 11) indicate that, according to resource-based theory, ‘Firms are stuck with what 
they have, and have to live with what they lack’. Overdeveloping current competencies 
may result in competency traps (Levinthal and March, 1993; Levitt and March, 1988) or 
core rigidities (Leonard-Barton, 1992; Burgelman, 1994). Population ecology views 
organisations as structurally inert and slow to change (Hannan and Freeman, 1984). 
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Individual attempts to renew decrease firm survival chances, whilst high reliability, 
accountability and reproducibility increase survival chances (Hannan and Freeman, 1989). 
Renewal patterns of firms in established industries are thus predominantly characterised by 
exploitation actions. Population ecology asserts that organisations should exploit their 
environmental niche. This also applies to times of environmental changes, as exploration 
sets back the liability of newness clock (Stinchcombe, 1965). Changing organisations 
encounter similar problems as newly founded organisations, and firm’s performance levels 
and survival chances are threatened (Hannan and Freeman, 1984; 1989). This introduces 
our third proposition: 
 
Proposition 3. From a population ecology approach, incumbent firms pursue exploitation 
actions over exploration actions to achieve high reliability, accountability and 
reproducibility. 
 
Coevolutionary theory 
The previous propositions are based on single-lens theories. A coevolutionary approach 
considers strategic renewal as the ‘joint outcome of environmental selection, institutional, 
and managerial intentionality effects’ (Lewin and Volberda, 1999). By considering 
strategic renewal actions of firms as coevolutionary interaction effects between multiple 
levels of analysis, the outcome of strategic renewal actions will deviate from the 
predictions derived from the single-lens theories. Figure 2.1 suggests differences between 
single-lens predictions and coevolutionary outcomes. In the empirical world, purely 
deliberate strategies will be as rare as actions that are solely driven by institutional or 
environmental selection pressures. Interaction effects between managerial agency, 
institutional, and environmental selection forces will lead to unforeseen deviations from 
single-lens predictions. We therefore propose that deviations from the first three 
propositions can be explained by using a coevolutionary approach: 
 
Proposition 4. From a coevolutionary perspective, interaction effects of environmental 
selection, institutional effects at country level, and managerial intentionality at firm level 
explain deviations of observed strategic renewal actions of incumbent firms from 
predictions derived from single-lens theories. 
 
The empirical research will in particular address the first three propositions and will 
highlight some of the empirical issues related to investigating the fourth proposition. 
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2.8 Conclusion 
This chapter started by presenting three single-lens theoretical perspectives on strategic 
renewal. The managerial intentionality perspective acknowledges a potential for strategic 
renewal at firm level by developing adequate organisational capabilities and undertaking 
purposeful strategic action. The institutional perspective indicates constraining behaviour 
exercised by isomorphic forces. These forces exert pressures to conform to institutional 
practices and archetypical behaviour. According to environmental selection theories, 
strategic renewal is a population-level phenomenon during which a variation-selection-
retention process selects best fitting organisational forms and practices. 
We integrated these single-lens perspectives using a coevolutionary perspective, 
considering coevolution as the joint outcome of managerial intentionality, institutional and 
environmental selection effects (Lewin and Volberda, 1999). A coevolutionary framework 
of strategic renewal was developed that distinguished between deliberate and emergent 
strategizing. Deliberate strategizing relates to managerial intentionality, whereas emergent 
strategizing suggests institutional and environmental effects. We consequently developed a 
set of propositions that allow connecting multiple levels of analysis and informing on both 
adaptation and selection of firms’ strategic renewal behaviour.  
To investigate the propositions developed in this chapter, we need methods to examine 
strategic renewal at both the industry and firm level. Our next chapter explains how we 
designed a set of attributes that operationalise the construct of strategic renewal and that 
allow measuring strategic renewal behaviour of large incumbent firms, as well as assessing 
changing environmental selection and institutional forces in the environmental realm. 
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3 Methodology 
 
Empirical coevolutionary research is a promising, but rather difficult, research venue. The 
definition of what constitutes evolutionary analysis in general is still developing (Greve, 
2001), and, therefore, the definition of proper coevolutionary analysis is even more 
difficult to formulate. Analysing strategic renewal behaviour at different levels of analysis 
in itself is no sinecure. This study mainly focuses on understanding environmental 
selection, institutional, and managerial intentionality effects operating on strategic renewal 
behaviour of European financial incumbents, and offers some insights into coevolutionary 
interaction effects. As such, this chapter aims to develop a research methodology that 
allows distinguishing environmental selection, institutional, managerial intentionality, and 
coevolutionary interaction effects in strategic renewal behaviour. These theories have 
different apprehensions on how the ordering of firms within their environment occurs. The 
environmental selection and institutional perspectives link to the natural systems view in 
organisation science, which attributes order to emergent system behaviour. Managerial 
intentionality relates to the rational systems view and assumes that order or pattern in firms 
results from managerial decisions. To distinct between these effects, one should be able to 
assess the environmental and institutional ‘laws in the background’, as well as managerial 
‘contingency in the details’ (Gould, 1989: 290, in McKelvey, 1997). Our methods are 
designed to, on the one hand, perceiving the overall pattern of events, and, on the other 
hand, acknowledging details in strategic renewal behaviour pointing at idiosyncrasies (cf. 
Tsoukas, 1994). 
We start out by developing a set of methodological requirements that acknowledge 
principles of coevolutionary research. We then distinguish between the context, content, 
and process dimension of strategy and operationalise the strategic renewal construct by 
designing six attributes that relate to these dimensions. We consequently clarify our sector 
and country selection, construct our sample of financial incumbents and define the research 
period. We explain our coding procedure to track down and analyse strategic renewal 
actions by describing the coding methods and coding categories pertaining to the six 
attributes of strategic renewal. The reliability and validity of our approach is discussed 
next, and we explain our data mapping and analysis procedure. The final section presents 
methods to assess changing environmental selection and institutional forces by measuring 
patterns of diffusion of regulatory and technological developments. 
 
3.1 Methodological requirements 
Strategic actions are the central element of our strategic renewal definition (cf. 1.3.4) and 
coevolutionary framework (cf. 2.6). Our research questions (cf. 1.2) ask for, firstly, 
tracking down strategic renewal trajectories (research question 1), and secondly to 
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distinguish between environmental selection, institutional, and managerial intentionality 
effects (research question 2). Distinguishing between these effects, that play on different 
levels of analysis, require to pay sufficient attention to managerial action ‘trees’ without 
loosing sight on the environmental selection and institutional background forest ‘laws’. 
Our methods should therefore be designed to, firstly, detect actions of strategic renewal to 
determine an organisation’s realised strategy (cf. Mintzberg and Waters, 1985; Weick, 
1995). Secondly, our view of strategic renewal as a strategic action pattern asks for 
addressing the time dimension. To understand similarities and differences in strategic 
renewal behaviour between firms, our methods should thirdly allow for cross-firm 
comparisons. Fourthly, our methodology should allow understanding and distincting the 
various adaptation and selection effects distinguished in the second chapter. We now 
discuss these four implications more extensive. 
 
Realised strategy 
Realised strategic actions are the starting point in operationalising the strategic renewal 
concept. We concentrate on realised actions, as it is the acts of managers, and not their 
plans or intentions, that explains success (Weick, 1995). Prescriptive schools of thought 
conceive of strategy as what managers plan, or intend, to do in the future. Consequently, 
strategy is considered as a process in which implementation follows formulation. 
Descriptive schools of thought construe strategies from identifying patterns in streams of 
behaviour (Mintzberg and Waters, 1985). We follow this descriptive school and design our 
methods to capture an organisation’s realised strategy by disclosing the pattern of strategic 
actions over time. This action stream allows discerning patterns of strategic renewal 
behaviour and gives historical validity to the process of strategic renewal. These strategic 
renewal patterns contribute to answer our first research question: How do large multi-unit 
firms renew in an increasingly turbulent environment?  
How to collect data on strategic renewal actions is an important methodological decision. 
Organisation researchers apply a variety of methods to study strategic change processes. 
One method is to ask managers to identify past events using questionnaires or semi-
structured interviews. Cooperation of the company and access to top-level executives is 
critical in this approach. This makes studying a large and international sample of firms 
over a rather long period of time difficult. Reconstructing renewal trajectories from 
managers’ recollection runs the risk of failure to adequately remember and date past events 
(Morris, 1994), and to attribute rational explanations to past decisions resulting in 
retrospective sense making (Weick, 1988; Weick and Daft, 1983). 
A second approach is to construct a comparative longitudinal case study in which 
companies are studied on several occasions during a number of years (cf. Pettigrew and 
Whipp, 1991; Dougherty and Hardy, 1996; Leonard-Barton, 1990). Our research questions 
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however require studying a large sample of companies over a rather long period. Time and 
monetary constraints render this approach unfeasible. 
A third method builds on the notion that organisations leave traces. This allows tracking 
down renewal trajectories from communication media including television and radio 
sources, newspaper articles, the Internet and company reports. Miller and Friesen (1980) 
applied this approach in their study to identify archetypes of organisational adaptation and 
used books to compile organisational histories of 36 firms over a twenty-year period. They 
argued that the ‘only manageable way to do this is using detailed published organisational 
histories in the form of books’ (Miller and Friesen, 1980: 272). Other studies that 
investigated temporal changes across firms (e.g., Smith, Grimm and Gannon, 1992; Meyer, 
Goes and Brooks, 1993; Webb and Pettigrew, 1999) also used contemporaneous archival 
sources. We will apply this method, as it proved to be an efficient data collection strategy 
that overcomes much of the shortcomings of questionnaires or case studies as described 
above, and decreases financial and time constraints. 
 
Strategic renewal as a pattern of strategic actions 
The tradition of much research addressing issues of strategic change examines the variance 
of external conditions and organisational forms conducive towards strategic change (Miles 
and Snow, 1994). These research efforts focus on change as a discrete event rather than as 
an ongoing process, and typically employ comparative statics. Analytical approaches 
centered on comparative statics however are less suited when they are used to explore 
dynamic, or evolutionary phenomena such as the processes of strategy formulation and 
implementation (Mintzberg and Westley, 1992), or organisational change (Miller and 
Friesen, 1980). 
Studies of strategic change processes can be designed in various ways. Van de Ven (1992) 
distinguishes three commonly applied methods to study strategy processes. The first is a 
logic used to explain a causal relationship between dependent and independent variables in 
a variance theory. The second comprises a category of concepts that refer to individual or 
organisational actions. The third approach is ‘a sequence of events or activities that 
describes how things change over time’ (Van de Ven, 1992: 170). In describing and 
analysing processes of strategic renewal, ‘motion pictures’ of the process are clearly 
preferred to making a couple of snapshots (Pettigrew and Whipp, 1991: 31). We therefore 
apply the third approach. 
 
Cross-firm and longitudinal comparisons 
The cross-sectional approach refers to studying strategy renewal processes across a number 
of firms at a given point in time (Porter, 1991). This approach is mainly suited to execute 
comparative studies of static situations. However, this does not render insight into the 
chain of causality of different strategic renewal processes and their outcomes. One should 
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move further back in the chain of causality to understand the dynamics of the renewal 
process (Porter, 1991). We thus designed our methods to capture both a longitudinal and a 
cross-sectional dimension in studying strategic renewal behaviour. 
In summary, our methods are designed to: 
• Measure realised strategy (cf. Mintzberg, 1979; Mintzberg and Waters, 1985), using 
contemporaneous data that allows 
• Execution of both longitudinal, and 
• Cross-sectional analyses (cf. McKelvey, 1997; Lewin and Volberda, 1999; Dean, 
Carlisle and Baden-Fuller, 1998). 
 
The first step in satisfying these requirements is measuring realised strategy. The next 
section operationalises the strategic renewal construct. To this end, we distinguish between 
the context, content, and process dimension of strategic renewal and develop a set of 
attributes relating to these dimensions. 
 
3.2 Operationalising strategic renewal 
We defined strategic renewal as the strategic action pattern to keep organisation and 
environment aligned. We theorised how strategic actions come about by developing a 
coevolutionary framework of strategic renewal actions (Figure 2.1), and distinguished 
between emergent and deliberate strategies. Emergent strategic actions are realised without 
intentions and link to institutional and environmental selection effects, whereas deliberate 
strategies materialise as intended and as such refer to managerial intentionality. The 
coevolutionary nature of this study requires developing metrics that allow to distinct 
between these three effects. We operationalise strategic renewal using six attributes. These 
attributes relate to three dimensions of strategy (cf. Pettigrew, 1988; and Mintzberg, 1990) 
and comprise the context, content, and process of strategic renewal. The context dimension 
regards the ‘where’ question of strategic renewal – that is, the environments in which firms 
operate – and reflects the fact that strategies do not arise from an organisational vacuum. 
The content dimension concentrates on the ‘what’ question, whilst the process dimension 
concerns the ‘how and when’ of strategic renewal. Attributes relating to the context and 
content of strategic renewal distinguish between different classes of actions. The process 
dimension refers to the temporal character of strategic renewal and assesses the frequency 
and volatility of strategic renewal actions. 
The six attributes are 1) internal versus external strategic actions, 2) domestic market 
versus international market actions, 3) exploitation versus exploration actions, 4) 
contraction versus expansion actions, 5) the frequency, and 6) the volatility of strategic 
renewal actions. Figure 3.1 presents an overview of the three dimensions of strategic 
renewal and the six strategic renewal attributes. 
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We next explicate these six attributes and indicate their theoretical and practical relevance. 
Regarding theoretical relevance, we aimed to develop attributes that cover fundamental 
theoretical issues of strategic change. We sought to secure practical relevance by 
embedding our attributes in the empirical reality. As such, the attributes are related to 
managerial challenges faced by incumbents operating in the European financial services 
sector (Flier et al., 2001). 
 
Context 
The context dimension is measured by two attributes; the external/ internal ratio and the 
domestic/ international market ratio. The external/ internal ratio is defined as the number 
of external strategic renewal actions divided by the total number of actions over a time 
period. External actions involve parties outside a firm’s boundaries in implementing 
strategic renewal, and include mergers, acquisitions, joint ventures, and cooperative 
agreements. Internal actions take place within the firm and comprise greenfield 
investments, the launch of a new line of services, and rationalisations. The process of 
importing external units into the organisation, or selling internally developed units to other 
organisations, links the intraorganisational and interorganisational levels of analysis. 
Institutional approaches highlight isomorphism regarding internal and external renewal 
actions of firms that operate in the same institutional context. Other literatures however 
Strategic 
renewal 
Context 
Content 
Process 
External/ internal ratio 
Domestic/ international market ratio 
Exploitation/ exploration ratio 
Contraction/ expansion ratio 
Frequency of strategic renewal actions 
Volatility of strategic renewal actions 
Figure 3.1 Dimensions and attributes of strategic renewal 
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endow management power to determine its own balance of external and internal actions. 
Penrose (1959) distinguished between internal versus external growth through acquisitions, 
and suggested that idiosyncratic managerial resources might result in firm specific 
balances of external and internal actions. Managerial intentionality suggests internal 
variation as a means to overcome environmental selection processes. Burgelman (1996: 
20) pointed out that ‘surviving firms effectively substitute, to some extent, internal 
selection for external selection’. Top management may stimulate the development of 
promising internal renewal activities by giving front-line management initiatives incentives 
to do so (Angle and Van de Ven, 1989; Burgelman, 1983; 1994). According to this 
approach, the internal selection environment serves as the catalyst of renewal (Galunic and 
Eisenhardt, 1996), in which top management acts as retrospective legitimiser (Burgelman, 
1983) or judge and arbiter. Regarding external actions, networks and alliances are 
important vehicles that may provide external renewal opportunities (Thorelli, 1986; 
Hamel, 1991; Koza and Lewin, 1999). This measure not only has theoretical, but also 
practical relevance. The deregulation of financial activities, and increasing integration and 
convergence across European countries offered new opportunities to enter new markets on 
both the domestic and international market. It is of strategic importance to decide on acting 
on these opportunities autonomously (internal actions), or cooperate or merge with 
external parties (external actions). 
This links to the domestic versus international market ratio, our second attribute covering 
the context of strategic renewal. Domestic market actions take place on the organisation’s 
domestic markets, whereas international market actions are executed across the border. 
Typically, literatures on internationalisation focus on the ‘how’ and ‘when’ of 
internationalisation processes. Vernon (1966) for instance described sequential modes of 
internationalisation, and Buckley and Casson (1976) concentrated on the choice between 
exporting and foreign direct investment as means of internationalisation. Bartlett and 
Ghoshal (1995) summarise the motivations for going abroad, which captures the strand of 
internationalisation literature that addresses the ‘why’ question. The practical relevance of 
this attribute is related to financial incumbents’ responses to changes in the European 
financial landscape. Our research sample (cf. Table 3.1) is constructed of incumbents from 
seven European countries that are confronted with significant environmental changes and 
increasing convergence across formerly segregated European financial systems (see 
Chapter 4). Firms may respond in different ways to these changes. For example, do they 
act on these changes by expanding internationally, or instead concentrate on the domestic 
market to defense established positions? Our empirical section investigates these questions 
in greater detail. 
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Content 
The exploration/ exploitation ratio and the contraction/ expansion ratio comprise the 
content dimension of strategic renewal. The exploration/ exploitation ratio is the third 
attribute and is based on March’s (1991) distinction between exploration and exploitation. 
The exploration/ exploitation ratio is defined as the number of exploration actions divided 
by the total number of strategic actions over a time period. Exploitation is primarily related 
to refinement and efficiency, which relates to environmental selection. March (1991: 71) 
pointed out that exploration ‘includes search and variation’. According to environmental 
selection theories, strategic renewal is highly constrained by resource scarcity and 
structural inertia. Institutional approaches emphasise that successful firms undertake 
similar strategic renewal activities and aim their actions at strengthening and exploiting 
existing core competencies. This contrasts to theories focusing on managerial 
intentionality, which suggest that firms can and do overcome their rigidities by behaving 
differently and exploring new competencies. The balance of exploration to exploitation 
actions is linked to changes in the population of organisations (March, 1991; Levinthal and 
March, 1993; Lewin, Long and Carroll, 1999), and as such also signals multi-directional 
causalities. 
The fourth attribute is the contraction/ expansion ratio. Contraction actions are actions that 
decrease activities, whereas expansion actions increase activities. The theoretical relevance 
of this concept is largely covered by literatures connected to the first three attributes, and is 
introduced to be able to distinct retreating actions from those that aim to expand an 
incumbents’ activities. 
 
Process 
The last two attributes of strategic renewal relate to the process, or temporal, dimension, 
and concern the frequency and volatility of strategic renewal actions. In hypercompetitive 
environments, success is often tied to speed (D’Aveni, 1994). Managers often act 
prudently and wait until environmental turbulence reaches a critical threshold before 
responding. This often results in organisational inertia (Hambrick and D’Aveni, 1988) and 
increasing environmental selection pressures. As such, concurrent or delayed acting can be 
related to institutional theory and environment selection, whilst proactive or firm specific 
frequency or volatility suggests managerial intentionality. The fifth attribute is the 
frequency of strategic actions, measured as the number of strategic actions undertaken by 
an organisation during a time period. The final measure concerns the volatility of strategic 
renewal actions, which is the standard deviation of a strategic renewal ratio over a time 
period. The practical relevance of assessing frequency and volatility of strategic renewal 
actions relates to the timing and intensity of incumbent firms to environmental changes. 
Depending on how incumbents perceive the organisation-environment link and the 
seriousness of environmental changes, they may undertake many or few actions in times of 
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change. These differences are indicated by the frequency of strategic renewal actions. 
Likewise, some firms may opt for a stable pattern of strategic renewal actions, whereas 
others ride a rollercoaster change pattern. The volatility of strategic renewal actions 
assesses these differences. 
Section 3.6 explains in detail how we designed our methods to measure these attributes. 
We however first justify our country and sample selection, and sources of data. 
 
3.3 Sector and country selection 
We selected the European financial services sector as our research site. We note four 
reasons to select this sector. First, the financial services sector is profoundly important to 
the economies of many Western European economies. Financial services firms account for 
seventy-two out of the top three hundred quoted European companies (Financial Times, 
1999) and their importance in market capitalisation is even greater. Second, financial 
services firms are much reported in the media because of their significance. This allows 
second sourcing of data. Third, the European financial services sector has recently been 
confronted with significant environmental jolts, which have challenged top management to 
think of strategic renewal as an ongoing journey instead of a destination. The past decade 
witnessed the introduction of a single European market permitting cross border mergers 
and alliances and the breaking down of barriers between banking and insurance sectors 
(Flier et al, 2001). At the same time, firms had to adapt to the deregulation of capital 
markets, new European directives, and changing rules of corporate governance such as the 
introduction of new rules of compliance. In 1999, companies were faced with the 
introduction of the Euro. In the midst of these structural changes, established banks and 
insurance companies had to embrace new information and communication technologies 
and electronic commerce. These developments blurred the boundaries between the 
formerly separated financial services sectors of banking, insurance, and securities, and of 
adjacent industries such as telecom and retail. These developments led to an emerging 
industrial complex focused on financial services, making strategic renewal an important 
issue for financial corporations (Hensmans et al., 2001). A fourth argument is that the 
financial services industry has become a competitive and dynamic environment in which 
many large, established multi-unit firms operate. This makes this sector an excellent real-
life laboratory for studying strategic renewal processes (cf. Bourgeois and Eisenhardt, 
1988; Wooldridge and Floyd, 1990; Pennings and Harianto, 1992; Webb and Pettigrew, 
1998). 
We selected seven European countries that differ considerably in history, market structure, 
and competitive landscape. This enables to study the influence of differences in national 
institutional contexts on strategic renewal behaviour. Six out of the seven selected 
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countries are European Union (EU) members: France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Norway is no EU member. 
 
3.4 Sample selection and research period 
Our sample was selected from large, established European financial services firms. Large 
financial incumbents have had to deal with substantial changes in their environment, 
allowing studying the effects of changing environmental conditions on firms’ strategic 
renewal behaviour. As these firms typically have been in existence for several decades and 
have a relatively large size, they have accumulated legacy and inertia to serve as examples 
of how incumbents deal with internal barriers to change. Differences pertaining to the 
national institutional environments in Europe allow discerning institutional pressures 
operating on firm’s strategic renewal behaviour. Managerial intentionality effects are 
assumed to result from intentional behaviour of incumbents’ management to adapt their 
organisation to environmental changes. A practical consideration for selecting large, 
market-leading incumbents is that their strategies are reported most in the media (Fombrun 
and Shanley, 1990), which generates sufficient data. We thus decided to study the largest 
financial corporations in each of the seven countries to maximise the amount of research 
materials. The companies meet the following additional requirements: 
• The company has its annual reports (or at least the Letter to the Shareholders) printed 
in English; 
• The company is mentioned in the Financial Times database; 
• The company is present in the Worldscope database. 
 
The resulting sample is presented in Table 3.1. The research period starts in 1990, which is 
the first year in which secondary data was made available in the on-line Financial Times 
database that we consulted. The research period ends in 1997. This eight-year period 
should be sufficiently long to discern different patterns of strategic renewal behaviour, and 
generates a feasible amount of research data to analyse. To be more precise, this eight-year 
time period resulted in 45,788 Financial Times newspaper articles and 240 Annual Reports 
to be analysed for strategic action content. We now comment on our data source selection. 
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Table 3.1 Research sample 
Organisation Country Industry* 
1. Axa France Insurance 
2. Banque Nationale de Paris France Banking 
3. Paribas France Banking 
4. Société Générale France Banking 
5. UAP France Insurance 
6. Allianz Germany Insurance 
7. Commerzbank Germany Banking 
8. Deutsche Bank Germany Banking 
9. Dresdner Bank Germany Banking 
10. Banca Commerciale Italia Italy Banking 
11. Cariplo Italy Banking 
12. Credito Italiano Italy Banking 
13. Generali Italy Insurance 
14. INA Italy Insurance 
15. Abn Amro Netherlands Banking 
16. Aegon Netherlands Insurance 
17. Fortis Netherlands Insurance 
18. ING Netherlands Insurance 
19. Rabobank Netherlands Banking 
20. Christiania Norway Banking 
21. Den Norske Bank Norway Banking 
22. Storebrand Norway Insurance 
23. Union Bank of Norway Norway Banking 
24. Handelsbanken Sweden Banking 
25. S-E-Banken Sweden Banking 
26. Skandia Sweden Insurance 
27. Swedbank Sweden Banking 
28. Barclays United Kingdom Banking 
29. Lloyds TSB United Kingdom Banking 
30. Prudential United Kingdom Insurance 
* Note: Industry is defined by the Primary SIC Code of the organisation (source: 
Worldscope, 1998). 
 
3.5 Sources of data 
Our data was collected from both secondary and primary sources. Secondary sources 
include company and press agency reports. Company reports regard the Annual Report, 
and more specifically the Letter to the Shareholders. The Letter to the Shareholders was 
selected for its concise summary of the year, and reports on strategic actions that were 
deemed most important by the Top Management Team. 
The Financial Times comprises press agency reports. We chose the Financial Times above 
potentially more detailed national sources (e.g., the Dutch Financieele Dagblad) to prevent 
differences stemming from using different sources for each country and to overcome 
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linguistic problems. The Financial Times moreover is one of the prime business 
newspapers in Europe that extensively covers moves of European financial services 
companies. Financial Times articles are accessible through an easily searchable and 
downloadable on-line database that covers our entire research period, allowing for an 
efficient selection and downloading procedure of relevant articles. 
The primary source is interviews with top management team members of a selection of 
firms in our sample. We used these interviews to validate our findings and gain additional 
understanding on our findings based on secondary sources. The next section indicates how 
we retrieved and coded strategic actions from our sources. 
 
3.6 Coding methods 
Our methods were designed to retrieve and code strategic actions. The literature has not 
reached consensus as to what constitutes a strategic decision or, in our terminology, action 
(cf. Dean and Sharfman, 1996) as the strategy concept is not unambiguously defined in 
strategic management (Mintzberg, 1990). Exhibit 3.1 presents an overview of definitions 
of strategic actions and related concepts. 
 
 Building on these notions, we sought to construct a definition that includes realised 
actions and are of strategic importance to the organisation. We thus defined a strategic 
action as a realised action that transcends daily operations and impacts the overall 
Exhibit 3.1 Definitions of strategic actions and related concepts 
 
Quinn (1980) considered decisions ‘strategic’ when they determine the overall 
direction of the firm. 
 
Mintzberg et al. (1976) characterised strategic decisions as committing substantial 
resources, setting precedents, and inducing less important decisions. 
 
Hickson et al. (1986) described strategic decisions as ill-structured, nonroutine and 
complex. 
 
Schwenk (1988) considered strategic decisions to be ‘substantial, unusual, and all-
pervading’. 
 
Ferrier, Smith, and Grimm (1999: 378) ‘assume that if an [competitive] action was 
reported as news in major media outlets, it represented a significant, newsworthy 
deviation from the acting firm’s normal routines and actions’. 
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behaviour of the organisation. Such processes typically include mergers and acquisitions, 
joint ventures, new business ventures, and sale or closure of businesses and activities. 
Although this definition seems rather generic, coders had no trouble in identifying strategic 
actions. 
We tracked down strategic actions by compiling all clippings in our sources that mentioned 
strategic actions of our sample firms using Sage’s NUD*IST software package. NUD*IST 
is the abbreviation of Non-numerical Unstructured Data Indexing, Searching, and 
Theorizing. It was developed by Sage to analyse qualitative, unstructured texts (Richards 
and Richards, 1991). In comparison to non-automated procedures, NUD*IST facilitates the 
consequent ordering of data per theme (in our study per strategic action). It allows viewing 
the context of selected texts (‘Jump to Source’), enables to relocate data to another node in 
the index tree (for instance, to the year in which the action materialised), and features 
memos that can be attached to nodes to explicate the coding decision of the information 
stored in a node. It also permits to quickly review the entire coding process. All data is 
digitally available, which makes the newspaper clippings and Letter to Shareholder 
‘browsable’ and more easily accessible than having the data stored in print. 
 
3.7 Coding procedure 
Financial Times articles and Letters to the Shareholder were used to retrieve strategic 
actions undertaken by our sample companies. To enhance the quality of coding, coders 
read up on the companies to construct a frame of reference. Using annual reports, Internet, 
and other sources, a company overview comprising the company’s history, its activities, 
and its geographic spread was composed. This document helped to grasp the legacy of the 
company and the sector and understand the context of strategic actions. Coders obviously 
further increased their understanding about the company during the data collection process 
as they read through hundreds of articles on the companies. We started the coding 
procedure only after all articles had been collected. This sequential process allowed coders 
to build up substantial knowledge about the researched companies before going into the 
coding stage. 
As we wanted to record realised actions, our sources had to contain convincing argument 
that the action had been implemented. Thus, intentions, speculations, or rumours were not 
coded. Strategic actions that occurred in years outside our 1990-1997 research period were 
not coded as well. We proceed by describing how we selected relevant newspaper 
clippings from the Financial Times and text units from the Letter to the Shareholders to 
track down realised strategic actions. 
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Financial Times articles 
The Financial Times database contains all articles published in the Financial Times from 
January 2, 1990. All potentially relevant newspaper clippings were retrieved by searching 
each of the eight research years (1990-1997) on company name. This resulted in an 
overview of all articles in which the company’s name was mentioned. Many articles in 
which the company name appeared did not report on strategic actions, but contained stock 
prices, quotes of financial analysts working for a sample company, reports of company 
sponsored cultural activities and the like. To select relevant clippings, the articles were 
viewed by context. In this option, the line in which the company name appears is showed, 
as well as the previous and next line. This was usually sufficient to determine whether that 
newspaper clipping contained information on strategic actions. Coders browsed the entire 
article if they were not sure about the nature of the article. Selected newspaper clippings 
were consequently saved on disk as a text file. 
As NUD*IST requires a strict text layout, we first edited the Financial Times text files in 
Word before importing them into NUD*IST. This included marking the header of the 
document according to NUD*IST specifications, highlighting the company’s name to 
facilitate coding, and splitting the document into text units. A text unit can be a line, 
sentence, or paragraph, and is the smallest part of a document that can be coded and 
retrieved in the NUD*IST software package. For our data, we found ‘sentences’ the most 
appropriate text unit format. As the Financial Times standardly clefts sentences into lines 
by putting a paragraph mark after each line, we changed the text unit format into 
‘sentence’ by placing paragraph marks after each sentence. The resulting text files were 
then imported in NUD*IST and ready for further analysis. 
 
Letter to the Shareholder 
We collected the Annual Reports of our sample companies for all of the eight research 
years (1990-1997). Because of the diversity of languages in our samples (Dutch, English, 
French, German, Italian, Norwegian, and Swedish), we chose to study the English version 
of Annual Reports12. As the Letter to the Shareholder must be made digitally available to 
be analysed in NUD*IST, we scanned these using a Hewlett Packard ScanJet 5200C 
scanner. The Hewlett Packard OCR (Optical Character Reading) software package, version 
2.00, was used to convert the scans into text. The digitised Letters to the Shareholder were 
consequently saved to disk. Consequently, these documents were spelling-checked in 
                                                           
12 We acknowledge that using the English translation of the original Annual Report 
(except of course for the British companies) could result in loss of information. The nature 
of the information we use however minimizes this risk, as we search for the factual 
reporting of strategic actions. It is unlikely this information is influenced by the language 
in which the action is reported. 
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Word and, just as the Financial Times documents, split up into one-sentence text units, 
after which they were ready to be imported into NUD*IST for further analysis. 
 
NUD*IST coding procedure 
Per company, sixteen text files were imported into NUD*IST. Eight contained Financial 
Times newspaper clippings for each study year, and the other eight comprised the yearly 
Letter to the Shareholder. The coding procedure consisted of three steps. 
1. Retrieving and categorizing possible strategic actions into nodes, 
2. Selecting realised strategic actions, 
3. Coding realised strategic actions. 
 
Retrieving and categorizing of text units 
Once text files were imported into NUD*IST, the first step was to classify text units 
(sentences) into an index tree. An index tree consists of nodes and serves to organise large 
data files. Nodes are containers for thinking about data (Richards and Richards, 1991). The 
hierarchy of our index tree descended from company, to year, into strategic action nodes. 
Obviously, the company names and years could be defined in advance. The strategic action 
nodes emerged during the coding process. We now describe this coding process. 
We browsed the Word edited Financial Times documents in NUD*IST year by year. Texts 
referring to potential strategic actions were saved in action nodes (e.g., node 1 1 113: 
Merger ABN Amro). We chose to list potential strategic renewal actions to capture all 
actions that had potential to become implemented. These included rumours, speculation, 
company plans, and the like. This allowed to retrieve all potentially relevant text units and 
did not force the coders to make an a priori decision whether to code an action or not. Text 
units that referred to that same strategic action in subsequent newspaper clippings were 
stored as well in this same node address. We applied this same procedure to the Letter to 
the Shareholders. That is, coders read through the entire Letter to the Shareholders and 
stored text units that made reference to a potential strategic action in the corresponding 
node address (if that action was also mentioned in the Financial Times), or made a new 
node address (in case the action was not mentioned in the Financial Times). This resulted 
in an easily accessible collection of nodes that contained all information reported in both 
the Financial Times and the Letter to the Shareholder. 
 
                                                           
13 1 1 1 is the node address in NUD*IST. The first ‘1’ denotes the company, ABN Amro. 
The second ‘1’ indicates the year, 1990. The third ‘1’ refers to the action number, 1. The 
next action node would be labeled 1 1 2, andsoforth. Consequently, in the Dutch 
NUD*IST project, node address 2 3 4 is: ‘2’ company: Aegon; ‘3’ year: 1992; ‘4’: action # 
4 reported in our sources in that year. 
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Selecting realised strategic actions 
The collection of strategic action nodes was consequently reviewed to determine which 
were actually implemented. We checked our sources for convincing evidence that actions 
had materialised during our study period. Convincing evidence included actions described 
in the past tense (Last month, Axa opened a representative office in Mexico), or being 
confirmed in a later article (an acquisition that was announced in one Financial Times 
article and being confirmed in an ensuing article). This resulted in a list of realised 
strategic actions per company and research year. Actions that did not materialise and/or did 
not take place in the study period were thus not coded. 
 
Coding realised strategic actions 
We defined a set of coding rules and arrived at an intercoder reliability of 91%. Teams of 
two trained coders then coded realised strategic actions. Most of the materials have been 
co-coded by the author, who was assisted by doctoral students. These students were 
selected from a doctoral course in which the coding procedure had to be applied, and were 
trained by the ESRC to prepare them for the practice of coding. The first step was to 
individually code realised strategic actions. In the second step, coders compared their 
coding results. In case of discrepancy, the coders checked each other’s argumentation. If 
one coder appeared to have made a coding mistake, (s)he would be corrected by the other. 
If coders could not agree on the coding of a category because of lacking evidence in our 
sources, they entered a ‘missing value’. 
The set of realised strategic actions was coded for four dichotomous categories; internal 
versus external, domestic market versus international market, exploitation versus 
exploration, and contraction versus expansion. Since coding is dependent on the 
availability of data, strategic actions were coded insofar our sources provided sufficient 
detail to code an action. Thus, missing information sometimes resulted in three of four 
coding categories being coded. We now describe these coding categories in greater detail. 
 
3.8 Coding categories 
Our coding categories are based on the strategic renewal attributes that were developed in 
section 3.2. The four resulting coding categories are (1) internal versus external actions, (2) 
domestic versus international market, (3) exploitation versus exploration actions, and (4) 
expansion versus contraction. We discuss these categories in more detail. 
 
Internal versus external 
Strategic actions are firstly classified as either internal or external (cf. Penrose, 1959; 
Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975). Internal strategic actions are defined as renewal attempts 
that originate from within the firm. Examples are start-ups, greenfield investments, 
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obtaining licenses, and spin-offs. External strategic actions are defined as strategic 
activities undertaken in conjunction with other organisations. These include mergers, 
acquisitions, alliances, joint ventures, and divestitures. 
 
Domestic versus international 
Strategic actions are secondly categorised as either domestic or international market 
actions (cf. Ansoff, 1987; Porter, 1991; Mintzberg, 1988). Domestic market actions are 
aimed at an organisation’s home country, which is defined as the country in which the 
headquarters are located. All other markets are defined as international markets14. 
 
Exploitation versus exploration 
Thirdly, strategic actions are labeled as either exploitation or exploration (cf. March, 1991; 
Levinthal and March, 1993). March (1991: 85) described exploitation as ‘the refinement 
and extension of existing competencies, technologies, and paradigms’. Exploitation actions 
specialise, rationalise, or elaborate on the current range of activities. Exploitation actions 
include cost savings, growing scale such as an investment bank acquiring another 
investment bank to grow scale, and specialisation as is the case when a wholesale bank is 
focusing on retail banking. Exploration is related to experimenting with technologies, 
ideas, paradigms, knowledge, and strategies trying to find new ways to age old problems 
(March, 1991). Exploration is defined as adding new activities to the current repertoire of 
activities, making new, innovative combinations of current activities, or expanding the 
geographic scope of an organisation’s markets15. Examples include establishing an Internet 
outlet, an insurer going into banking, and entering the Asian market. 
 
Contraction versus expansion 
Strategic actions are fourthly classified as either contraction or expansion. Contraction 
actions decrease the current range of activities. Such actions include divestments, closing 
offices, and dissolving alliances. Expansion actions extend the current range of activities. 
These comprise acquisitions, greenfield investments, and opening a new distribution 
channel. 
 
                                                           
14 In case a company has two headquarters that are based in two countries (e.g., Fortis: 
Belgium and the Netherlands), these two countries are regarded as the home market. 
15 In the context of the financial services sector, entering foreign markets requires new 
competencies to cope with new institutional environments, regulations, and business 
practices of foreign clients (Sivula et al., 2001). 
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3.9 Resulting measures 
The coding results have been stored in a database. This database contains the realised 
strategic actions of our thirty sample companies. The data comprise ‘core’ strategic action 
data, derivative variables, control measures and contextual data. 
 
Core variables 
The strategy type and six derivative variables constitute our core variables. The four 
coding categories of realised strategic actions – internal versus external, domestic versus 
international, exploitation versus exploration and contraction versus expansion – 
theoretically result in 24 = 16 strategy types. Since exploration contraction actions do not 
exist by definition, twelve strategy types remain. These are explicated in Table 3.2. 
 
Table 3.2 Twelve strategy types 
Strategy 
type 
Coding 
key 
Coding description 
A 0000 Internal, domestic market, exploitation, contraction action 
B 1000 External, domestic market, exploitation, contraction action 
C 0100 Internal, international market, exploitation, contraction action 
D 1100 External, international market, exploitation, contraction action 
E 0001 Internal, domestic market, exploitation, expansion action 
F 1001 External, domestic market, exploitation, expansion action 
G 0101 Internal, international market, exploitation, expansion action 
H 1101 External, international market, exploitation, expansion action 
I 0011 Internal, domestic market, exploration, expansion action 
J 1011 External, domestic market, exploration, expansion action 
K 0111 Internal, international market, exploration, expansion action 
L 1111 External, international market, exploration, expansion action 
 
In analysing strategic renewal behaviour, we will predominantly use the relative use of 
strategy types instead of nominal counts of strategy types. The relative use, or percentual 
division, of strategy types is computed by dividing the number of actions of a strategy type 
by the total number of actions. This measure is more useful for cross-firm comparisons, as 
it corrects for differences in the number of realised strategic actions. 
Strategy types are the concatenation of the four categories of strategic acting. Four ratios 
have been derived from these categories: the IE (Internal actions/ (internal + external 
actions) ratio, DI (Domestic actions/ (domestic + international actions) ratio, IR 
(exploitation/ (exploitation + exploration actions) ratio, and CE (contraction/ (contraction 
+ expansion actions) ratio. The strategy types and ratios enable to evaluate the pattern of 
strategic acting within a single firm (for instance, the IE ratio over the eight-year research 
period or the percentual division of strategy types over time), and to make comparisons 
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across organisations (for example, the IE ratio of one firm versus other firms’ average over 
a time period). A third measure is the frequency of strategic actions. This measure consists 
of the number of strategic actions undertaken by an organisation during a time period. A 
final measure concerns the volatility of strategic renewal actions. The volatility is based on 
the standard deviation of the division of strategy types, or ratios, over a time period. 
 
Additional variables 
The organisation size variable, measured as the number of employees within a year (cf. 
Miller & Chen, 1996), is taken from Worldscope. The industry variable is derived from the 
primary Standard Industry Classification (SIC) code as listed in the Worldscope database 
and is either Banking or Insurance. The country variable denotes an organisation’s home 
base, defined as the country in which the headquarters are located16. The time variable is 
the year of observation. 
 
Table 3.3 Core and additional variables and their measurement 
Variable Measurement 
Core variables  
Strategy type Concatenation of four categories of strategic actions, resulting 
in 12 discernable combinations 
IE Ratio Internal actions/ (internal + external actions) 
DI Ratio Domestic actions/ (domestic + international actions) 
IR Ratio Exploitation actions/ (exploitation + exploration actions) 
CE Ratio Contraction actions/ (contraction + expansion actions) 
Frequency 
Volatility 
Number of actions within a year 
Standard deviation of division of strategy types, or ratios, 
over a time period 
Additional variables  
Organisation size Number of employees in year t 
Industry Main industry in which the organisation operates, based on 
primary SIC code (Banking or Insurance) 
Country Country in which headquarters are located 
Year Year of observation 
 
3.10 Reliability and validity 
How can we be sure that the events reported in our sources represent organisational reality 
(cf. Stablein, 1996)? The use of two sources allowed comparing Financial Times reports to 
accounts in the Letter to the Shareholders. As the Letter to the Shareholders focuses on key 
                                                           
16 The only exception is Fortis. It has a full-fledged organisation (including separate 
headquarters) in both Belgium and The Netherlands. 
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events, we could not trace all actions that were reported in the Financial Times in the 
Letter to the Shareholders. 
We used the Financial Times and the Letter to the Shareholders to track down, date, and 
code renewal actions. To avoid logging proposed actions and speculative reports, our 
method was designed to select actions of which we had convincing evidence to have been 
realised (cf. 3.7.5). Companies have a legal requirement to give a proper overview of key 
events in the Annual Report. This convinced us that actions reported to be realised in the 
Letter to the Shareholder were in fact implemented. In case an action mentioned in the 
Financial Times was not reported in the Letter to the Shareholder, we consulted other 
sections of the Annual Report to validate the action. Combined with the factual nature of 
reporting17, we were confident that our coding system recorded actions that were indeed 
realised. 
Our companies went through a continuing series of multi-level changes, ranging from 
drastic events such as merging with another company, more common incidents like 
bringing new products to the market, to less significant incidents such as changing the head 
office design. We acknowledge that our data collection method inevitably leads to missing 
some of these events, as not all actions are being reported in the Financial Times or Letter 
to the Shareholders. We expect, however, marginal activities are less likely to be reported 
than those of greater significance. As marginal projects are subject to the same potential 
bias, and since actions are evaluated in terms of their ratios rather than counts, 
interpretation problems caused by this potential bias are largely avoided. Moreover, other 
methods suffer from the same shortcomings. We already mentioned that using memory as 
the prime source of data collection runs the risk of creating retrospective sense making 
(Weick, 1988; Weick and Daft, 1983). Relying on memory to track down events that 
occurred ten years ago makes it difficult to be certain about the exact timing of events, and 
will probably lead to signaling only those that were important in hindsight and thus easily 
remembered. Our contemporaneous data collection strategy also overcomes potential 
difficulties of using different case writers to study different banks, which may cause 
problems in making cross-firm comparisons. 
We considered using other sources. We investigated strategic renewal actions reported in a 
local Dutch financial newspaper, Het Financieele Dagblad (HFD) and found that all 
actions reported in the Financial Times (FT) were also reported in HFD. Actions reported 
in the FT were predominantly on the strategically important corporate level, whereas 
actions reported in HFD also regarded divisional and business unit actions of less strategic 
value. The FT thus had more concise reporting than the more elaborate HFD. 
                                                           
17 Examples of the nature of reporting include: ‘Last week, Deutsche Bank agreed to buy 
Banca Popolare di Lecco’; ‘Barclays has sold its Danish car, farm, and business financing 
and leasing operation to Alm Brand, a Danish banking and insurance group’. 
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We recognise that there are potential biases in our data. For example, The London 
Financial Times paid more attention to Dutch banks in later years than in early years, and 
paid more attention to the quoted banks rather than unquoted banks such as the Rabobank. 
However, including the Letter to the Shareholders compensates this effect. We moreover 
found that the Financial Times gives a higher priority to reporting strategic actions in 
relation to other, for this research less relevant, news. This corrects differences in reporting 
frequency across companies and years. 
Classification schemes should be reliable in terms of consistency and reproducibility 
(Weber, 1990). To maximise consistency, we designed a set of coding rules. Applying 
NUD*IST to systematically order our data in action nodes minimised chances of missing 
relevant passages. Using the Jump to Source option allowed us to view the context of 
important text units. This increased the coding quality. Using a pair of coders for each 
company offered to possibility to correct coding mistakes. We investigated reproducibility 
concerns by assessing interrater reliability, which was at a 91% level. 
In addition to reliability, the classification scheme must be valid. This firstly regards the 
extent to which the variables that result from the classification scheme are correlated with 
some other measure of the same construct (construct validity). Secondly, the extent to 
which it ‘behaves’ as it is supposed to in relation to other variables (hypothesis validity) 
should be sufficient. Finally, the categorisation scheme should measure the construct it is 
intended to measure (face validity) (Weber, 1990: 18-21, in: Morris, 1994). In content 
analysis, semantic validity must also be demonstrated. This is the extent to which persons 
familiar with the language and texts agree that the list of words placed in the category have 
similar meanings or connotations (Krippendorf, 1980: 159ff). The validity of the human-
coded content analysis schemes has primarily rested on the establishment of semantic 
validity through the use of multiple coders. The extent to which the coders agree on the 
categorisation of the text is presumed to provide an indication that the process used in the 
categorisation is valid. Establishment of stronger forms of validity such as construct 
validity is difficult, as no good alternative measures exist for our construct (cf. Morris, 
1994). 
 
Some remarks on the coding procedure 
Our coding procedure essentially measures contemporaneous data containing collective 
sensemaking and acting. We first note that Financial Times articles aren not necessarily 
independent from company sources (casu quo the Letter to the Shareholders). For example, 
press releases formulated by companies may have been printed unabridged in the Financial 
Times. We however argue that press releases printed in the Financial Times evidently have 
been deemed important enough to include or report on by the Financial Times editors. 
Reputational status and journalistic principles moreover require to check on the reliability 
of such press releases. As such, these reports are important from at least two perspectives: 
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the company and the financial press. Typically, articles on major companies are written by 
a group of specialist reporters who have substantial knowledge on a selection of 
companies. On the one hand, this creates an extra bias. On the other hand, these reporters 
should be better in selecting noticeable events on those companies. 
The percentage of tags (i.e., number of articles which report on potential renewal actions) 
is inversely proportional to the number of hits. This means that articles that report on 
strategic change actions (which are to be tagged) have a higher chance of being reported 
than ‘less relevant’ statements on a company. This reduces the bias relating to 
underreporting or overreporting of respectively less popular (e.g., unquoted) and more 
popular (e.g., large British) companies. 
Finally, we noticed a bias concerning the type of actions being reported in our sources. 
Actions reported in the Letter to the Shareholders, which was selected for its concise 
overview of the year, mostly concern corporate level actions. The Financial Times 
publishes events that are of interest to its audience. These events also typically concern the 
corporate level. Thus, division or business level actions are underreported in our sources. 
Another reason for finding predominantly corporate level actions stems from our article 
selection procedure. Financial Times articles were searched by company name (e.g., ING). 
Articles that reported on actions of divisions (e.g., Postbank or Nationale Nederlanden) and 
did not include the compay name were thus not found. This bias is consistent for all firms. 
 
3.11 Data mapping and analysis 
Menard (1991) describes three ways in which longitudinal quantitative data can be 
presented and analysed. First, the numerical display refers to counts of actions over a time 
period. We will apply this method by presenting tables to communicate counts or ratios of 
strategic actions. Second, data can be displayed graphically to detect and convey patterns 
that emerge from large data sets. We experimented with the display of our data using 
Tufte’s (2001) The Visual Display of Quantitative Information as a guideline. The 
resulting graphics serve as a first step in detecting various effects operating on strategic 
renewal behaviour. Third, renewal patterns can be studied using mathematical (including 
statistical) methods. Statistical methods are used to test environmental selection, 
institutional, and managerial intentionality effects in strategic renewal behaviour. 
 
3.12 Measuring patterns of diffusion of regulatory and 
technological developments 
The European financial industry has experienced a series of environmental shocks that 
altered the selection environment. Global interdependencies of regional financial systems 
have increased, borders between banking, insurance, and securities have blurred, new 
entrants have entered the financial sector, and new technologies have had major 
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consequences on financial corporations. To estimate changes in the selection environment, 
we follow Haveman et al. (2001) and investigate the impact of developments in regulations 
and technologies across countries. We determine the implementation year of European 
Union (EU) banking regulations and significant technological innovations across European 
countries based on Gual (1999) and secondary data. This data is used to assess to what 
extent regulatory and technological changes were country-specific or industry-generic. 
Country-specific effects occur when the diffusion of new regulations and technologies 
differs across countries. This would indicate the existence of national institutional 
differences in European financial services. Industry generics refer to similar diffusion 
patterns across the financial services sector, independent of country. Industry generics 
point at the European industry environment determining environmental selection. We 
detail this procedure in the next chapter in which we investigate the changing landscape of 
the European financial services sector. 
 
3.13 Conclusion 
The firms examined in this study are large and complex and executed numerous actions. 
To sort out the key strategic actions we relied on top management’s statements in the 
Letter to the Shareholders and on the financial press, i.e. the Financial Times. These 
sources provided concurrent documentation of strategic actions, which from two 
perspectives appeared to be significant. We essentially compiled a contemporaneous 
record of collective sense making of strategic actions from the point of view of the 
financial press and corporate decision makers. The analysis of strategic renewal behaviour 
will primarily focus at understanding environmental selection, institutional, and managerial 
intentionality effects, and further indicate coevolutionary interaction effects operating 
between levels of analysis. 
Before we explore the strategic renewal behaviour of European financial services firms in 
greater detail, we investigate how the environment in which these firms operate has 
developed in the last two decades. 
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4 The changing landscape of the European  
financial services sector 
 
The European financial services sector has changed dramatically during the last decade. 
This chapter aims to provide understanding about changes in the environment in which 
financial incumbents operate by studying strategic renewal from an outside-in perspective. 
Our central research questions ask to analyse strategic renewal behaviour of financial 
incumbents, and to distinguish between three different effects. This chapter takes an 
industry and country perspective on strategic renewal and estimates changing 
environmental selection and institutional forces in the European financial landscape. The 
object of this chapter is to investigate whether national financial systems that constitute the 
European financial sector are converging or diverging. Increasing industry-generic effects 
would indicate convergence, whereas intensifying country-specifics point at divergence. 
We secondly indicate how these changes may influence financial incumbents’ strategic 
renewal behaviour. 
Multiple forces are reshaping the European financial services sector. To understand the 
degree of congruence between national financial systems that constitute the European 
financial landscape, we start out by indicating basic characteristics of national banking 
structures. More specifically, we estimate the evolvement of capacity, profitability and 
concentration indicators in six national financial systems during the last decade. The 
findings indicate that national financial systems are in different stages of development, and 
that there appears to be sufficient room for further development of national banking 
structures. This first reconnaissance is followed by a cross-country study of the diffusion 
of new regulations and technologies (cf. Gardener and Molyneux 1990; Bikker and 
Groeneveld, 1998; Canals, 1999)18, two major forces that have had significant effect on 
incumbent firms’ strategic renewal behaviour. The results indicate both country-specific 
and industry-generic diffusion patterns of regulations and technologies. Patterns of national 
divergence are indicated by the fact that some countries consistently walking in front in 
implementing new regulations and technologies. On the other hand, the results indicate a 
development towards increasing speeds of diffusion across the investigated countries, as 
differences between countries in implementing more recent changes have grown smaller 
                                                           
18 Taylor (1999) investigated three driving forces behind the revolution in the financial 
services sector: deregulation and privatisation, the introduction of new technologies and 
new products, and the entry of new competitors from other countries and industries. Canals 
(1997) discussed four factors that impact on the banking industry in industrialized 
countries: deregulation, globalisation, disintermediation and new competitors, and 
(information) technology. Yoffie (1997) discerns three drivers of digital convergence in 
financial services: regulations, technologies, and managerial intentionality. 
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during the research period. This suggests emerging convergence in European financial 
services. The consequence of increasing convergence illustrated by increasing 
consolidation in European financial services. We conclude by selecting three countries 
from which incumbents’ strategic renewal behaviour will be analysed in the next chapter. 
 
4.1 Basic characteristics of national financial systems 
To assess general developments and difference and similarities of banking structures 
constituting the European financial landscape, we investigated the evolvement of capacity, 
profitability and concentration indicators in six national financial markets (cf. Groeneveld 
and Swank, 1998). Excess capacity proxies indicate the degree of rationalisation in 
national financial markets and reveals characteristics of the underlying structure of a 
country’s financial sector. Profitability indicators estimate the level of competition within 
national financial systems. Concentration data indicate the evolvement of the process of 
consolidation of banking firms within national financial markets. 
Financial services firms play a pivotal role in the functioning of an economy because of 
their intermediary role in the monetary system. We indicate their importance by calculating 
the total assets of credit institutions as a percentage of GDP. Table 4.1 shows that the 
significance of credit institutions increased substantially during the period 1985-1997 
(ECB, 1999)19. Italy is an outlier, as it is the only country where the importance of credit 
institutions in terms of assets as a percentage of GDP declined. 
 
Table 4.1 Assets of credit institutions (percentage of GDP) 
Country 1985 1990 1995 1997 % change 1985-1997 
France 177 216 224 245 +38.4% 
Germany 185 220 223 256 +38.4% 
Italy 167 133 150 155 -7.2% 
Netherlands 141 190 194 227 +61% 
Sweden 152 215 179 213 +40.1% 
United Kingdom 194 228 296 328 +69.1% 
Source: ECB (1999) 
 
                                                           
19 We wish to note that the intermediary role of credit institutions is partly being taken 
over by institutional investors. As this process of disintermediation (the reduction banks’ 
involvement in borrowing or saving activities) occurred in a period in which the pace of 
growth of financial assets outgrew GDP growth, the assets of credit institutions as a 
percentage of GDP increased (ECB, 1999). 
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Capacity of national financial systems 
Excess capacity in European banking is used as an indicator of the underlying competitive 
structure of a country’s financial services sector. Excess capacity is estimated by 1) the 
number of credit institutions, 2) the number of branches per 1,000 inhabitants, 3) the 
number of ATMs per 1,000 inhabitants, and 4) the number of employees per 1,000 
inhabitants. High levels of excess capacity indicate room for consolidation of a country’s 
banking structure in terms of these and other aspects. Table 4.2 shows the number of credit 
institutions. In all but one country, the number of credit institutions decreased. The most 
significant decrease was measured in Sweden. The number of credit institutions grew in 
the Netherlands, which can be explained by the already high degree of consolidation (both 
in absolute and relative terms) in 1985. 
 
Table 4.2 Number of credit institutions 
Country 1985 1990 1995 1997 % change 1985-1997 
France 2105 2027 1469 1299 -38.3% 
Germany* 4740 4720 3785 3578 -24.5% 
Italy 1192 1156 970 935 -21.6% 
Netherlands 81 111 102 90 +11.1% 
Sweden 779 704 249 242 -68.9% 
United Kingdom n.a. n.a. 564 551 n.a. 
Source: ECB (1999) 
* From 1990, eastern Germany has been included in the data. 
 
The development of the number of branches is shown in Table 4.3. The number of 
branches decreased significantly between 1985 and 1997 in all countries except Italy. The 
enforcement of the Unified Banking Act as of September 1, 1993, which lifted the ban on 
the number of branches a bank was allowed to have (Gianni, 1998), explains the increase 
of branches in Italy. A country in which branch density is relatively high seems to have 
room for further rationalisation. These include Germany, France, the Netherlands and Italy 
(ECB, 1999). 
 
Table 4.3 Number of branches per 1,000 residents 
Country 1985 1990 1995 1997 % change 1985-1997 
France 0.47 0.45 0.44 0.44 -6.4% 
Germany 0.61 0.63 0.59 0.57 -6.6% 
Italy 0.23 0.31 0.41 0.44 +91.3% 
Netherlands 0.59 0.54 0.44 0.44 -25.4% 
Sweden 0.42 0.38 0.30 0.29 -30.9% 
United Kingdom 0.38 0.35 0.33 0.32 -15.8% 
Source: ECB (1999) 
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The number of Automatic Teller Machines (ATMs) is the third indicator of capacity 
developments and is listed in Table 4.4. Over the period 1985-1997, the number of ATMs 
increased significantly across the six countries investigated. However, significant 
differences remain. Most remarkable is that Germany has almost twice as much ATMs per 
1,000 residents than (the much less populated) Sweden. 
 
Table 4.4 Number of Automatic Teller Machines (ATMs) per 1,000 residents 
Country 1985 1990 1995 1997 % change 1990-1997** 
France 0.16 0.26 0.39 0.42* +61.5% 
Germany n.a. 0.18 0.44 0.50 +177.8% 
Italy n.a. 0.17 0.38 0.44 +158.8% 
Netherlands n.a. 0.18 0.36 0.38 +111.1% 
Sweden 0.15 0.25 0.27 0.27 +8% 
United Kingdom 0.18 0.25 0.29 0.38 +52% 
Source: ECB (1999) 
* Data from 1996; no data available for 1997 
** Because of data unavailability, changes of the 1990-1997 period have been calculated. 
 
The proportion of bank employees is the final capacity indicator (Table 4.5). This number 
remains relatively differentiated across the six countries, varying from a low of 4.93 in 
Sweden to a high of 9.16 in Germany (both figures of 1997). This differentiation suggests 
room for further staff reductions in especially Germany and the United Kingdom (ECB, 
1999). 
 
Table 4.5 Number of bank employees per 1,000 residents 
Country 1985 1990 1995 1997 % change 1985-1997 
France 7.71 7.63 7.05 6.89 -10.6% 
Germany 9.46 11.1 9.28 9.16 -3.2% 
Italy 5.66 5.92 6.23 6 +6% 
Netherlands 7.54 7.86 7.13 7.19 +4.6% 
Sweden 4.97 5.32 4.91 4.93 -0.8% 
United Kingdom 8.03 8.98 7.98 9.07 +13% 
Source: ECB (1999) 
 
In conclusion, Tables 4.2-4.5 indicate a general trend of a reduction of excess capacity in 
the six countries during the period 1985-1997. However, some national banking structures 
seem to have more room to reduce excess capacity than other. This is most evident for 
France and Germany, which appear to have considerably higher levels of excess capacity 
in terms of the number of credit institutions, branches, and bank employees. Italy and the 
Netherlands showed excess capacity in branch density, and the United Kingdom in the 
average number of bank employees. 
 
 65
Profitability in national financial systems 
The profitability of different national financial systems is estimated by the return on equity 
and by the return on assets. High levels of return suggest a high degree of profitability of a 
country’s national financial system. The average return on equity was highest in Sweden 
and the United Kingdom, followed by the Netherlands and Germany in the 1990-1997 time 
period (Table 4.6). Italian and French financial firms generated significantly lower returns. 
The average return on assets (Table 4.7) paints a similar picture, although Italian financial 
firms are more profitable according to this calculation. This measure also confirms that 
France is the least profitable environment for financial services firms. 
 
Table 4.6 Return on equity (net income as a percentage of equity) 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 Av. 
‘90-‘97 
France 10.1 10.4 6.9 2.9 0.5 3.6 4.8 7.7 5.9 
Germany 11.9 14.4 13.2 13.6 11.8 12.6 12.3 n.a. 12.8 
Italy 12.2 9.9 7.5 8.8 3.0 3.7 5.1 3.4 6.7 
Netherlands 12.3 12.7 13.9 15.9 16.2 17.0 17.6 n.a. 15.1 
Sweden20 3.0 56.3 17 5.7 19.1 21.1 24.0 13.0 19.9 
UK 14.4 8.6 7.3 19.3 27.4 28.6 25.6 26.4 19.7 
Source: OECD, in: ECB (1999) 
 
Table 4.7 Return on assets (net income as a percentage of total assets) 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 Av. 
‘90-‘97 
France 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.23 
Germany 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 n.a. 0.5 
Italy 0.9 0.8 0.6 0.8 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.56 
Netherlands 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 n.a. 0.63 
Sweden20 0.2 3.1 0.8 0.3 1.1 1.3 1.3 0.7 1.1 
UK 0.7 0.4 0.3 0.7 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 0.81 
Source: OECD, in: ECB (1999) 
 
In conclusion, profitability levels seem to vary substantially across different national 
financial systems. Apart from the maverick Swedish case (see footnote 2), the British 
financial market seems to be the most profitable environment for financial services firms. 
High levels of profitability in the British financial sector coincide with low levels of excess 
                                                           
20 Swedish banks faced a severe financial crisis in the early nineties. The Swedish 
government restructured the financial sector by splitting distressed financial firms into 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ banks. Low quality assets were placed into a special asset company; the 
‘bad’ bank. The performing assets were retained in the ‘good’ bank (Macey, 1999). This 
obviously distorted profitability figures. 
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capacity (see section 4.1.1). The German and Dutch markets occupy an intermediary 
position in terms of profitability across the six countries, despite apparent overcapacity. 
The relatively low degree of domestic competition in these countries might explain these 
contradictory findings (cf. Groeneveld and Swank, 1998). The Italian and French financial 
sectors have the lowest profitability. Excess capacity, especially in French (cf. 4.1.1), and 
the high degree of government control – the French and Italian financial sectors were only 
privatised in the early nineties (cf. section 4.5.1) – might have reduced realizing higher 
profits (Groeneveld and Swank, 1998). 
 
Concentration of national financial systems 
The degree of concentration of national banking structures is indicated by the proportion of 
assets, casu quo loans, held by the five largest credit institutions per country. Low levels of 
concentration suggest room for consolidation in a country’s financial market system. 
According to both indicators (Table 4.8 and 4.9), Swedish and Dutch financial sectors are 
most concentrated. The concentration ratios of the German and Italian financial sectors 
increased, but still have a long way to go compared to the Netherlands and Sweden21. The 
British financial sector also remains rather fragmented. France is an exception in that its 
concentration ratio decreased, despite of the restructuring of its financial services industry. 
 
Table 4.8 Concentration ratio (assets of the five biggest credit institutions as a  
percentage of total assets) 
 1985 1990 1995 1997 Change 
1985-1997 
France 46.00 42.50 41.30 40.30 -12.4% 
Germany n.a. 13.91 16.67 16.68 n.a. 
Italy 20.90 19.10 26.10 24.60 +17.7% 
Netherlands 69.30 73.40 76.10 79.40 +14.6% 
Sweden 60.22 70.02 85.85 89.71 +49% 
United Kingdom n.a. n.a. 27.00 28.00 n.a. 
Source: ECB (1999) 
 
                                                           
21 These conclusions deserve some nuances. Firstly, we used data pertaining to the 
combined banking sectors of the six countries. As such, this data do not reveal possibly 
highly divergent concentration ratios in subsectors. Secondly, intermediation activities of 
non-credit institutions should also be taken into consideration. A high concentration ratio 
of credit institutions should be judged differently if other types of financial institutions also 
have a substantial market share. Lack of internationally comparable data however prevents 
splitting out these data to subsectors (Groeneveld and Swank, 1998).   
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Table 4.9 Concentration ratio (loans of the five biggest credit institutions as a  
percentage of total loans) 
 1985 1990 1995 1997 Change 
1985-1997 
France 48.7 44.7 46.8 48.3 -0.8% 
Germany n.a. 13.48 13.83 13.71 +1.7%* 
Italy 16.6 15.1 26.3 25.9 +56% 
Netherlands 67.1 76.7 78.5 80.6 +20.1% 
Sweden 62.65 64.89 90.06 87.84 +40.2% 
United Kingdom n.a. n.a. 25 26 n.a. 
Source: ECB (1999) 
* Because of data unavailability, changes of the 1990-1997 period have been calculated. 
 
Both concentration indicators indicate that the smaller economies (Sweden and the 
Netherlands) are highly concentrated and have little room for further domestic 
consolidation. Relatively low concentration ratios in France, the United Kingdom, Italy, 
and especially Germany suggest potential for further consolidation in their financial 
markets. 
 
Conclusions 
We summarise differences and similarities in country’s banking structures by ranking the 
six countries on the three categories. The positions of the countries on the various 
indicators are listed in Table 4.1022. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
22 We acknowledge that this method has some limitations. For instance, we did not correct 
for population effects in the number of credit institutions. This put the UK in a 
disadvantage. Furthermore, we did not include the population density effect in the number 
of ATMs, which is unfavourable for Sweden’s score on this measure. Finally, these data 
are compiled on the basis of contributions of national EU banking supervisors, and not 
based on an agreed statistical framework (ECB, 1999). However, the main use of these 
data is in indicative purposes, which is the approach we use here. 
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Table 4.10 Ranking23 of the six countries on capacity, profitability, and 
concentration measures (data of 1997)  
 Capacity Profitability Concentration 
 Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank 
France 7 4 12 6 6 3 
Germany 9.5 6 8 4 12 6 
Italy 5.5 2 9 5 10 5 
Netherlands 6 3 6 3 4 2 
Sweden 5 1 3 1 2 1 
United Kingdom 7 4 3 1 8 4 
 
We draw some general conclusions from Table 4.10. First, the rankings of the six countries 
vary depending on which of the three categories is analysed. This indicates different stages 
of development of the structure of national financial systems across Europe. The United 
Kingdom for instance rates first on profitability indicators (i.e., has the highest 
profitability), but lags in capacity and concentration indicators. Italy, on the other hand, 
scores high on capacity measures, but ranks low in terms of profitability and concentration 
ratios. No country appears to have reached an end stage in developing its financial market 
structure. Second, one can draw some preliminary conclusions on the degree of 
development of the financial sectors across the six countries based on these overall scores. 
Sweden has the highest rank on all three categories, and is followed by the Netherlands 
and the United Kingdom. France and Italy occupy the fourth and fifth position in this 
country sample. Germany has the highest score in both capacity and concentration 
indicators, which ranks it on the sixth and last place. Overall, these data suggest each of 
these countries has room for further rationalisation of its financial services sector, but in 
different areas. 
This first reconnaissance showed basic characteristics of national financial systems across 
Europe and indicated differences in capacity, profitability, and concentration indicators 
between national financial systems. We continue by investigating whether these national 
                                                           
23 Regarding capacity indicators, we ranked countries along 1) the number of credit 
institutions (from low to high), 2) the number of branches per 1,000 residents (from low to 
high), 3) the number of ATMs per 1,000 residents (from high to low), and 4) the number of 
bank employees per 1,000 residents (from low to high) and summed these four ranking 
into an overall score. A high rank indicates low levels of excess capacity in terms of these 
indicators. 
Regarding profitability indicators, countries were ranked from high to low on both return 
on equity and return on assets to estimate the position on competition. These two rankings 
were summed into an overall score. High ranks indicate high levels of profitability. 
Regarding concentration indicators, countries were ranked from high to low on the two 
concentration measures and then summed into an overall score. High ranks indicate high 
concentration levels. 
 69
financial systems reacted differently in implementing new regulations and technologies, 
two forces that had major impact on the development of the European financial landscape 
during the last two decades. More specifically, we assess the diffusion over time of 
influential regulatory and technological developments across five European countries. The 
results allow discerning the degree of industry convergence versus national divergence in 
the European financial landscape. 
 
4.2 Diffusion of regulatory changes across Europe 
Financial systems and banking sectors of different European countries varied substantially 
for the larger part of the 20th century. Until the mid-eighties, the European financial 
services sector was characterised by significant governmental involvement. Numerous 
institutional and legal stipulations limited domestic, cross-border, and cross-sector 
activities of financial services firms. It is only since the last two decades that national 
financial systems of European countries really have started to move towards liberalisation. 
This process only came under full flow the European Union formulated a policy towards 
financial integration of its members. As such, this section concentrates on deregulations 
that aimed to bring different national financial systems into line with each other.   
Deregulation of financial services obviously had a major impact on the strategic renewal 
context of financial services firms. Prior to the integration of national financial markets, 
there were low levels of both domestic and international competition. Opening up national 
markets changed this rather sedate situation. It also increased the range of strategic choices 
financial firms had to make. The prospect of combining banking, insurance, and securities 
activities for instance forced managers to think about diversifying or specialising activities. 
Another example is the single licence principle, which opened up national markets to 
foreign competition and called for a choice in concentrating activities on the home country, 
or to internationalise operations. 
The deregulation of European financial services sector has been a gradual process that 
varied considerably across European countries. This section assesses the timing of 
regulatory implementation across five European countries: France, Italy, Netherlands, 
Sweden, and the United Kingdom. We concentrate on three categories of regulatory 
changes. These comprise regulations aimed at:  
1. Eliminating restrictions to domestic competition;  
2. Altering the scale and scope of financial activities; and  
3. Improving the external competitive position of financial firms (Gual, 1999). 
 
The first category relates to the process of increasing domestic competition, which includes 
the elimination of restrictions on the entry of new domestic firms and restrictions on 
mergers and acquisitions. It further comprises the removal of tools that restrain 
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competition such as interest rates controls and the loosening of capital flows controls that 
limit foreign competition. We compare the five countries by determining the timing at 
which capital flows and interest rates24 were deregulated. 
The second category comprises indicators on the relaxation of regulations that limit the 
scale and scope of financial services. These include restrictions on cross-border 
establishment and limits on combining banking, insurance, and securities activities within 
a single firm (EFB, 1999). This process is estimated by the years of implementation of the 
First and of the Second Banking Directive across the five European countries. 
The third category applies to variations in regulations that affect the external competitive 
position of financial firms. These include solvency regulations, capital adequacy 
requirements, and reserve and investment coefficients. These measures impact on the costs 
of doing business and place limits on the free use of deposits and a firm’s own funds (EFB, 
1999). We indicate these deregulations by stating the implementation period of 
harmonisation of prudential regulations across the five countries.  
 
Elimination of restrictions to domestic competition 
The first part of Table 4.11 presents the dates of deregulation of interest rates and the 
liberalisation of capital flows25. The year of the first moving country is shown and the time 
lag in years of the other countries The UK was the first mover regarding interest rate 
deregulation (1979). In 1981, the Netherlands deregulated interest rates. Hence the number 
‘2’ (years later) in Table 4.11. The UK also moved first in liberalising capital flows, 
closely followed by the Netherlands. France and Italy lagged eleven years in both the 
deregulation of interest rates and the liberalisation of capital flows. These late movers 
followed a more gradual policy of deregulating interest rates and liberalising capital flows 
(EFB, 1999), as did Sweden. 
 
Regulations that limit the scope and scale of financial activities 
Three directives guided the deregulation process in the European financial services sector. 
The 1973 directive abrogated discriminatory rules. It aimed to prevent discrimination 
between banks of European Community countries and national banks concerning freedom 
of establishment and freedom to provide self-employed activities of financial institutions.  
                                                           
24 Interest rate controls shift the nature of competition from competing on prices to 
competing on customer service. Banking strategies were then driven by technological 
developments and changing preferences of consumers (EFB, 1999). 
25 Credit controls are not included in this table. We note that, for some countries, the 
liberalisation process took off earlier than the date in the table, which indicates the year of 
full implementation. France, for instance, started liberalisation of fees as early as 1986 
(EFB, 1999). 
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The First Banking Directive was approved in 1977 and was based on the principle of 
generalised harmonisation. It intended to facilitate the access and the activities of credit 
institutions in European Community member states, and to eliminate the most important 
legal impediments between member states (Barreto, 2000).  
The Second Banking Directive was issued in 1989. It consisted of four principles, of which 
the single license principle is most important. This principle allows banks that are 
authorised by one of the EU member states to compete in any other EU member state 
without having to be authorised by the foreign member state (Barreto, 2000). The middle 
part of Table 4.11 shows that the UK and the Netherlands were the first to implement the 
First Banking Directive. They were also first in eliminating restrictions to domestic 
competition. France, which was late in deregulating interest rates and liberalising capital 
flows, however moved fast to implement the First Banking Directive. Sweden lags in 
implementing both Directives because of its late entrance to the European Union. 
The Second Banking Directive includes a list of financial activities that are subject to the 
single passport. There are still differences across countries regarding the extent to which it 
is allowed to combine banking, insurance, and securities activities within a single firm. 
Table 4.11 shows that there is still some variation in exploiting securities activities by 
banks, notably in Italy and the United Kingdom. 
 
Harmonisation of prudential regulation 
Prudential regulation aims to create a level playing field and to set minimum capital 
requirements. It includes, amongst other things, legislation on solvency ratios and the 
definition of own funds (Gual, 1999). The time interval during which prudential legislation 
was implemented is indicated in the bottom part of Table 4.11. Starting dates range 
between 1989 and 1991. Notable exception is the United Kingdom, which already started 
in 1985. Four countries finished implementation of prudential regulation in 1995, Italy 
having finished two years earlier26. 
The Basle accord is an important pillar of prudential regulation. It was issued on July 1, 
1988 by the Basle Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices, and 
linked minimal capital requirements to the perceived credit-risk exposure of banks’ assets 
and their off-balance-sheet positions (Robinson, 1995). It required internationally active 
banks to hold a minimum of eight percent spare capital as security against default on their 
                                                           
26 Note that the EU standards only set a lower bound on prudential requirements. We 
already indicated substantial differences between the UK and continental regimes, such as 
Germany and France (Financial Times, 2000). The same goes for reserve and investment 
coefficients. France, for instance, dismantled these in 1987. In the Netherlands and the UK, 
the coefficient was almost nil, whilst the level was still significant in Italy in 1995 (Gual, 
1999). 
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loans. These higher capital requirements result in a limit of how much capital can be put to 
work, potentially reducing shareholders’ returns (Financial Times, 2000).  
Not all countries implemented the Basle Accord in the same manner. The UK, for instance, 
has a system of differential capital requirements. Only the top banks are allowed to hold 
close to eight percent of risk-weighted assets, whilst most of the British banks are required 
to hold between 10 and 18 percent. Belgium and France also treat most established banks 
equally, although risky new banks may be forced to hold more capital (Financial Times, 
2000). Concurrently, the Basle Accord is under review. This review could imply that some 
European banks should hold more capital if they are seen as risky. Regulators will be given 
explicit powers to enforce the new requirements. The review may level the international 
playing field between UK and continental banks, as UK banks were required to hold more 
capital than their continental competitors. Banks may also be required to use internal 
ratings to measure loan risk weightings, which might have major consequences. Large 
banks that have sophisticated risk management systems can rate their internal risk. These 
systems may however be too expensive for smaller banks to build and maintain, which 
puts them at a disadvantage (Financial Times, 2000). 
 
Establishment of the European Monetary Union and introduction of the Euro 
The establishment of the European Monetary Union (EMU) and the introduction of the 
Euro is the culmination of European regulatory harmonisation. The Eurosystem, consisting 
of the European Central Bank (ECB) and the national central banks, sets the monetary 
policy for the EMU. ECB’s primary task is to maintain price stability within the Euro 
zone. Promotion of the single market is the Euro’s main objective. EU banks can lend and 
borrow without any exchange or interest risks, which encourages cross-border activities. 
The Euro further increases price transparency across European markets. Companies are 
now urged to think and act on a European instead of a national scale. This promotes both 
cross-border and domestic mergers and acquisitions in order to gain sufficient scale 
(Andrews, 2000; ECB, 1999). 
Table 4.11 summarises this section by presenting the diffusion pattern of regulatory 
changes across the five European countries. 
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Table 4.11 Pattern of diffusion of three categories of regulatory changes across  
Europe 
Regulatory changes FR IT NL SW UK 
Elimination of restrictions to domestic competition* 
Interest rate deregulation 11 11 2 6 0 (1979) 
Liberalisation of capital 
flows 
11 11 1 13 0 (1979) 
Regulations limiting scope and scale of financial activities** 
Implementation 1st Banking 
Directive 
0 (1980) 5 0 (1980) 13 0 (1980) 
Implementation 2nd Banking 
Directive 
1 0 (’92-’93) 0 (1992) 1 0 (‘92-
’93) 
Restrictions on combining 
banking, insurance, and 
securities activities 
No 
restr. 
Restr. on 
access, 
firewalls 
No 
restr. 
No 
restr. 
Restr. 
on 
bonds 
Harmonisation of prudential 
regulation*** 
‘90-’95 
 
‘91-’93 
 
‘91-’95 
 
‘89-’95 
 
‘85-’95 
 
Implementation period 
prudential regulation 
2 0 (1993) 2 2 2 
Introduction Euro/ 
European Monetary Union 
0 (1-1-
1999) 
0 (1-1-
1999) 
0 (1-1-
1999) 
0 (1-1-
1999) 
0 (1-1-
1999) 
* Adopted from Gual (1999: 37) 
** Adopted from Gual, (1999: 39) 
***  Adopted from Gual, (1999: 40) 
 
4.3 Diffusion of technological changes across Europe 
Financial services firms are one of the most intense users of information technology 
(Triplett and Bosworth, 2002). Innovations in information technologies – including 
telecommunication, information processing and other technologies – have had major 
impacts on the financial industry. The application of IT and other financial technologies 
has had positive effects on both back office and front office performance. A literature 
study by Berger (2003) concluded that technological advancements in financial services 
resulted in declining bank cost productivity. Profit productivity figures however improved. 
The explanation may be that on the one hand, technological developments have improved 
the quality and variety of banking services, which also increased costs. On the other hand, 
customers seem to have been willing to pay for these advancements, which resulted in 
revenues rising faster than cost levels. Technological developments finally may have 
spurred consolidation of the industry. Building on previous contributions (cf. Berger, 2003; 
Evans and Schmalensee, 2000; Essinger, 1999), we investigated the diffusion of 
technological developments along five indicators. These indicators do not comprise the full 
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spectrum of technological developments, but illustrate the multiplicity of technological 
advances made over the past thirty years and include: 
• the introduction of the first ATM network,  
• the first EFTPoS network,  
• the e-purse,  
• the introduction of remote banking facilities, and  
• the first branchless bank in a country.  
 
Table 4.12 shows the introduction year of each technology and time lags of ensuing 
countries for each of the five indicators. 
 
Table 4.12  Pattern of diffusion of five indicators of technological developments  
across Europe 
Technological Developments FR IT NL SW UK 
Introduction ATM network 12 11 13 0 (1972) 14 
Introduction EFTPoS network 0 (1984) 2 6 1 4 
Introduction e-purse 10 5 0 (1989) 9 6 
Introduction remote banking 
Telephone banking 
PC banking 
Internet banking 
 
5 
9 
2 
 
10 
12 
1 
 
8 
1 
2 
 
0 (1985) 
n.a. 
0 (1995) 
 
4 
0 (1985) 
2 
First branchless bank 5 6 -/- 5 0 (1989) 
Source: Erasmus Strategic Renewal Center 
 
ATM Network 
The introduction of the first Automated Teller Machine (ATM) network in a country is our 
first indicator. The first ATM network, Bankomat, was founded in 1972 in Sweden 
(OECD, 1996). Italy followed 11 years later with its Bancomat network (Friedman, 1983). 
In France, the Groupement Carte Bleue, together with Crédit Agricole and Crédit Mutuel, 
created the Groupement des Cartes Bancaires (CB) in 1984. It introduced interbancarité, 
which allowed customers to use their cards at any ATM, or EFTPoS terminal that accepts 
the CB card (www.cartebleue.com). In the Netherlands, Rabobank, ABN, Amro, NMB, 
and Van Lanschot formed an ATM network in 1985 (Hemelaar and Rudelheim, 1992). In 
the UK, the Link network was founded in 1986 (www.link.co.uk). 
 
EFTPoS Network 
EFTPoS, the second indicator, is defined as ‘an electronic payment method involving 
goods and services being paid for at the point of sale through electronic debit of the 
customer’s account’ (Essinger, 1999: 70). Debit cards are much more widely used in 
 75
Europe than in the USA, making this a better indicator than the introduction of the first 
credit card. We already mentioned that the French CB network was founded in 1984, 
consisting of an ATM and EFTPoS network. The Babs company was founded in 1985 and 
manages the Swedish EFTPoS network (Swedbank, 1998). In 1986, the Italians developed 
terminals that also accepted the Bancomat ATM cards and started a national EFTPoS 
experiment (Electronic Payments International, 1995). The UK’s first debit card payment 
system Switch was founded in 1988 (www.switch.co.uk). The Dutch did not introduce 
their EFTPoS network PIN until 1990 (Hemelaar and Rudelheim, 1992). 
 
E-purse 
The e-purse, a substitute of cash, is the third indicator. The e-purse is a card containing a 
microchip that stores electronic money, and can be combined with for example a debit 
card. The Netherlands was the first country to launch an e-purse trial in the city of 
Woerden in 1989. It was also the first to introduce a nationwide e-purse scheme, called 
Chipknip, in 1996 (Bank for International Settlements, 2000). Italy followed with the 
introduction of Cassamat, a local electronic purse. It was launched in 1994 in the district of 
Alto Adige by the Raiffeisen federation of cooperative credit institutions. The Mondex 
card was introduced in the UK in 1995 with a trial in Swindon. In Sweden, the nationwide 
e-purse scheme Cash Card was introduced in 1998 by a consortium of Nordbanken, 
Sparbanken, and SEB. The e-purse entered France when the Credit Mutuel Group acquired 
the license for the Mondex card - previously launched in the UK - and introduced it in 
Strasbourg in 1999 (www.mondex.fr). Although France was the last country to introduce 
the e-purse, it was the first in using the microchip technology in another way. In 1992, the 
magnetic stripe on the Cartes Bancaires cards was replaced by an e-purse-like microchip 
(www.cartes-bancaires.com). 
 
Remote banking 
Remote banking is the fourth indicator. It is defined as managing one’s account without 
physically going to a bank office. We split up remote banking into three different types: 
telephone banking, PC banking, and Internet banking27. Telephone banking allows 
managing one’s account by talking to a human operator or a computer. The terms PC 
banking and Internet banking are sometimes called online banking and are used 
interchangeably. A PC banking facility uses a computer and a modem to manage an 
account, and requires specific software to be installed on the customer’s computer. The 
customer’s account can only be managed using this computer. With Internet banking, no 
software needs to be installed, and the customer can manage her accounts wherever she has 
access to the Internet. 
                                                           
27 For a further analysis, see Daniel and Storey (1997); Taylor (1998). 
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Telephone banking 
Swedbank first introduced telephone banking in Sweden in 1985 (Direct Delivery 
International, 1996b). The other countries were much later in introducing these services, 
ranging from four years (UK) to ten years (Italy). First Direct was the first to offer a 
complete banking service in the UK via the telephone, although Nationwide and Abbey 
National already had telephone services for some time (Morgan, Cronin and Severn, 1995). 
Cortal, a Paribas subsidiary, introduced Finexpress in 1990 (Jack, 1995). In the 
Netherlands, ING subsidiary Postbank started its telephone banking service Girofoon in 
1993 (Postbank, 1993). Italy was the last country to introduce telephone banking. Cariplo 
(now Banca Intesa) introduced this service just days before Banca Commerciale Italia, 
which promoted the service as Italy’s first remote banking service in 1995 (Electronic 
Payments International, 1997). 
 
PC banking 
The UK was the first to pioneer PC banking in 1985. The Netherlands followed one year 
later. Italy and France lagged about ten years in introducing PC banking services. In the 
UK, the Bank of Scotland introduced its Home and Office Banking Service (HOBS) in 
1985 (www.bankofscotland.com), using a keyboard that was plugged into the TV at one 
end and the telephone socket at the other (Wilikinson, 1990). The customer could view his 
balance, scroll back through statements, transfer money between accounts, or pay bills 
directly. The system could also be operated by PC. In 1986, the Postbank introduced 
Girotel in the Netherlands (Postbank, 1986). In France, BNP introduced the PC banking 
service BNP Micro in 1994 (Bank Marketing International, 1995). France lags five years in 
telephone banking services and nine years in PC banking services. The French however 
had a complementary technology, the national videotex system Télétel. It was popularly 
known as Minitel and introduced in the early eighties by the French government in 
cooperation with France Telecom. The number of Minitel terminals grew from 120,000 in 
1983 17 million in 1999. This telephone-based interactive system offers a wide array of 
services including an electronic telephone directory and home shopping services. Almost 
all banks started a Minitel-based remote-banking system in the mid-1980s. French banks 
thus had no urgent need to offer other forms of remote banking. Italy was the last country 
to offer PC banking. In 1997, Cariplo launched QuiCariplo, which had both PC banking, 
and Internet banking options (Electronic Payments International, 1997). 
 
Internet banking 
The time lags in diffusion Internet banking are much shorter than for telephone and PC 
banking. Sweden leads in Internet banking because of its sparse population - branches are 
often distant from consumers’ homes - and its PC penetration ratio, which is the highest in 
Europe (Nairn, 1997). The Swedish bank Trygg-Banken (now SEB) was the first bank to 
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launch Internet banking in 1995 (Direct Delivery International, 1997). Internet banking 
was introduced in Italy in 1996 by Cassa Risparmio di Firenze (www.carifirenze.it). The 
Nationwide Building Society launched the UK’s first Internet banking service in 1997 
(Essinger, 1999: 263). The same year saw Rabobank offering Internet banking in the 
Netherlands (Financieele Dagblad, 1997), and Banque Directe (owned by BNP Paribas) in 
France (Hai, 2000). 
 
Branchless bank 
Our fifth indicator is the establishment of a country’s first branchless bank, defined as a 
bank that only offers remote banking services. Conventional banks also offer remote 
banking services, but these are typically complementary to the existing product line. A 
branchless bank is usually owned by a brick and mortar bank, but managed as a separate 
business unit under a different brand name.  
First Direct was the first to offer a complete banking service in the UK via the telephone in 
1989 (Morgan, Cronin and Severn, 1995). It was also the first branchless bank. Banque 
Directe of France, founded in 1994, was modelled on First Direct. Sweden also introduced 
its first branchless bank, Sesam (owned by S-E-Banken), in 1994 (Skandinaviska Enskilda 
Banken, 1995). In Italy, the insurer Ras created a separate business unit, called Rasbank, to 
offer telephone-banking services in 1995 (Direct Delivery International, 1996a). We did 
not find a branchless bank offering complete banking services in the Netherlands before 
the year 2000. 
 
4.4 Country-specific versus industry-generic patterns of  
diffusion 
Do the patterns of diffusion of regulatory changes and technological developments point at 
convergence or divergence in the European financial services sector? We answer this 
question by assessing country-specific patterns of diffusion versus industry-generic effects 
in diffusing regulatory and technological changes. Country-specific effects would indicate 
the relevance of addressing the national institutional context in studying strategic renewal, 
whereas industry-generic effects would point at intensifying environmental selection 
effects operating on financial firm’s strategic renewal behaviour. 
Figure 4.1 combines the findings of regulatory and technological indicators to compare the 
speed of diffusion across countries. Our findings suggest early and late moving national 
financial systems. The United Kingdom heads in diffusing regulatory changes, closely 
followed by the Netherlands. UK’s first mover behaviour results from its intention to use 
deregulation as a means to promote competition in its financial services sector. Sweden is 
early in diffusing technological developments, followed again by the Netherlands and the 
UK. These three countries also appeared to have the most advanced banking system 
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according to capacity, competition and concentration indicators (cf. Table 4.10). France 
and Italy are last in diffusing both regulatory and technological changes. Sweden’s position 
in diffusing regulatory changes can be explained by its late joining of the European Union. 
These differences suggest country-specific patterns of diffusion, and indicate the relevance 
of considering national institutional effects on strategic behaviour. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
The various technologies and regulations have been implemented at different speeds. To 
detect changes over time, we summed the time lags of each regulatory and technology 
indicator. Figure 4.2 shows accelerating diffusion rates of regulatory indicators. The 
accumulated delay (i.e., the sum of time lags of the four following countries with respect to 
the first moving country) of interest rate liberalisation amounted to 36 years. The more 
recent deregulations were diffused much faster. The acccumulated delay of prudential 
regulation was eight years, whilst the combined delay of implementing the Second 
Banking Directive only amounted two years. The implementation of the Euro and the 
EMU indicates the culmination of diffusing regulations, as it was implemented 
simultaneously in all EU member states. 
Source: Erasmus Strategic Renewal Center (Figure derived from Table 11 and 12) 
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Figure 4.1 Early and late moving countries in the diffusion of technologies  
and regulations 
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Figure 4.3 shows that recent technology developments were dispersed faster compared to 
older technologies. The accumulated time lags between the first mover and the followers 
regarding ATM networks, the oldest technology among the indicators, was fifty years. In 
the midst of the nineties, the average time lag of Internet banking amounted to only seven 
years. These increasing speed of diffusion of technologies suggest a process of European 
convergence, and indicate increasing environmental selection pressures on financial 
services firms’ strategic renewal behaviour. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Delay (in years) of implementation of regulations 
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Our findings show that the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Sweden are frontrunners 
in diffusing technologies. The UK and the Netherlands also moved first in implementing 
regulations. These findings parallel the high ranks on capacity, profitability and 
concentration indicators of these countries’ financial systems. France and Italy lagged in 
implementing regulations and technologies. This coincides with low ranks on profitability 
and concentration indicators (Italy) and on capacity and profitability indicators (France). 
The high degree of government involvement in their financial industry might be another 
reason. The French and Italian banking sectors were privatised in a later stage compared to 
the other three countries we studied. As a further illustration of convergent development in 
the European financial landscape, Exhibit 4.1 and 4.2 describe how Italy and France 
sought to restructure their financial sectors through privatising financial firms. 
 
Exhibit 4.1 Privatisation of financial services firms in Italy 
 
Italy’s privatisation effort was a major force behind the changes in the Italian economy
during the 1990s. Tthe public sector controlled about eighty per cent of the Italian 
banking sector in the early nineties. Banks were protected from competition and could
maintain high margins. During that time, the Italian financial sector was controlled by
a state holding company, fully owned by the Ministry of the Treasury, and charitable 
foundations that were supervised by local governments. The transformation of the
charitable foundations into joint-stock companies started the privatisation process. In a 
later stage, their shares were offered through the stock exchanges or private 
placements. 
The privatisation of Credito Italiano in December 1993 essentially started the Italian
privatisation process. Next, Banca Commerciale Italiana was privatised in February
1994. Both were commercial banks and were part of the immense state holding 
company Instituto per la Recostruzion Industriale (IRI). Constituent firms of the IRI 
holding firms were gradually privatised, until the IRI holding was eventually
dismantled in the year 2000. 
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Exhibit 4.1 and 4.2 indicate that France and Italy were late in privatising their financial 
services sector in relation to the other three countries. This coincides with their late mover 
behaviour in diffusing regulatory and technological changes and the less developed 
structure of their national financial system sector in terms of capacity, profitability and 
concentration (cf. section 4.1). On the other hand, the privatisation processes in France and 
Italy further reduced differences between national financial systems across Europe. As 
such, privatisation of the French and Italian financial sectors further decreased differences 
between national financial systems across Europe. Deregulations and technological 
advancements also had significant consequences regarding the structure of the European 
financial landscape. Deregulations lowered barriers to competition, as did opening up 
domestic markets to foreign competition. Technological advancements have exacerbated 
economies of scale effects in financial services (Berger, 2003). These, and other forces, 
Exhibit 4.2 Privatisation of financial services firms in France 
 
Ninety per cent of French banks were state-owned in the early eighties. By the mid-
eighties, however, the French government no longer considered the strategic position
of the financial sector a sufficient reason to maintain a direct hold on its strategic and
operating management. Another reason was that privatisations generated resources to
reduce the level of public debt, which is where much of the 180 billion French francs
revenues were allocated to (Ruozi and Anderloni, 1999). 
The privatisation of Paribas, Société Générale and Crédit Commercial de France in 
1987 started the French privatisation process. A second wave unfolded in the mid-
nineties. Banque Nationale de Paris (BNP) was privatised in 1993. A year later, Union
Des Assurances (UAP) became a private company. Assurances Générales de France 
was privatised in 1996, and GAN in 1998. The most recently privatised financial
corporation is Crédit Lyonnais in 1999.  
Typical for the French privatisation program was that the government often called on
privatised companies to act as ‘noyaux durs’ for other privatisation candidates. A 
‘noyaux dur’ is a strategic partner that holds ‘hard core’ stakes in privatizing
companies to for instance assist in hostile take-over situations (Rawsthorn, 1993a). The 
privatised Société Générale was one of the first companies to declare its interest in
acting as a ‘noyaux dur’ (Rawsthorn, 1993b), and more financial services firms 
followed. The French banking reform had significant effects on its formerly sedate
financial industry. Some banks even attempted to lock others in through cross-stake 
holdings, for instance in the case of the BNP-SocGen-Paribas battle in 1999. This case 
was exemplary for the renewed spirit in the French financial sector, and would have 
been unthinkable a decade earlier. 
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induced financial services companies to join forces and were major drivers for merger and 
acquisition activities in the European financial landscape. The ensuing section addresses 
consolidation patterns of European financial services firms. 
 
4.5 Consolidation patterns across European financial 
markets 
We first assess general characteristics of consolidation patterns by indicating the number 
and value of banking mergers and acquisitions. Table 4.13 illustrates that the number of 
banking mergers and acquisitions in six European countries decreased significantly during 
the nineties, whilst their value increased substantially. Within six years, the average value 
of mergers and acquisitions almost multiplied by ten: from $44 mln in the period 1991-
1992 to $416 mln in the years 1997-1998. 
 
Table 4.13 Banking merger and acquisition activity in six EU countries28 
 Number of M&As Value of M&As (Bln USD) 
 91-92 93-94 95-96 97-98 Total 91-92 93-94 95-96 97-98 Total 
France 133 71 50 36 290 2.4 0.5 6.5 4.0 13.4 
Germany 71 83 36 45 235 3.5 1.9 1.0 23.2 29.6 
Italy 122 105 93 55 375 5.3 6.1 5.3 30.1 46.8 
NL 20 13 8 9 50 0.1 0.1 2.2 0.4 2.8 
Sweden 38 23 8 8 77 1.1 0.4 0.1 2.1 3.7 
UK 71 40 25 17 153 7.5 3.3 22.6 11.0 44.4 
Total 455 335 220 170 1180 19.9 12.3 37.7 70.8 140.7 
Source: Adapted from BIS, Securities Data Company, in: Lumpkin (2000) 
 
The relatively high number, versus the low value, of mergers and acquisitions in 1991-
1994 coincides with the liberalisation of the banking regulations and the establishment of 
the Single European Market in 1992. This suggests that especially smaller banking 
organisations chose to combine forces to cope with these changes. A second wave 
followed, in which a smaller number of banks, which however were of higher value, 
became involved in merger and acquisition activities. This wave started in the years 
1995/1996 in France, the Netherlands, and the UK. It peaked in 1997, when the total value 
spent on mergers and acquisitions in these six counties exceeded 70 billion US Dollars. 
Additional data (cf. Center for Economic Policy Research) shows that the total value of 
bank mergers in all European countries amounted to 127 billion US dollars in the period of 
May 1997 to May 1998. This is almost twice the value of the previous year (Danthine et 
al., 1999). A period of mega-mergers in 1999 and 2000 formed the third wave. Examples 
                                                           
28 Note: Classified by industry of the target; only completed or pending deals; 
announcement date volumes. 1997 – 1998 data as at 30 October 1998. 
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are the 12 billion USD merger of BNP and Paribas in France in 1999, and the 32 billion 
USD merger between RBS and NatWest in the UK in 2000. 
Table 4.13 suggests country-specific consolidation patterns. The relatively lowly 
concentrated late movers Italy and France (cf. Table 4.8 and 4.9) had the highest number 
of mergers and acquisitions, followed by Germany. The fast moving countries showed 
significantly fewer transactions. Italy and the UK rank highest amongst the six countries in 
terms of value of mergers and acquisitions. Sweden and the Netherlands, which were 
already highly concentrated in the early nineties, had a low value of banking mergers and 
acquisitions because of smaller, rather than larger, banks being targeted in mergers and 
acquisitions. 
 
Cross-sectoral and international blurring in financial services 
To what extent are boundaries blurring between formerly segregated sectors in financial 
services? Are national borders still relevant, or do financial service firms operate 
internationally? These are important questions when studying strategic renewal behaviour 
of large European financial incumbents. Blurring boundaries between sectors or nations 
pose severe challenges to financial firms. Fading national and cross-sectoral borders 
request financials to choose between focusing on a particular sectoral or national niche, or 
to increase the scale and scope of their operations. 
To describe the international dimension of mergers and acquisitions, Table 4.14 shows the 
number of domestic versus cross-border acquisitions in the European banking sector. 
 
Table 4.14 Value of banking mergers and acquisitions in Europe (US$ billion) 
 1993 1995 1997 
Domestic bank/bank 9 24 60 
Cross-border bank/bank 1 8 7 
Source: Danthine et al. (1999) 
 
The data indicate that most mergers and acquisitions in the nineties were aimed at 
consolidating the domestic market to protect the home soil. The ongoing European 
integration process did not result in a significant increase in cross-border merger and 
acquisition activity. British, French and German financial institutions have been most 
active in international mergers and acquisitions. On the other hand, financial players in the 
UK, France, Spain, Italy and Belgium were targeted most (Groeneveld and Swank, 1998). 
The smaller Benelux and Scandinavian economies have seen the most significant and 
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successful cross-border mergers (The Banker, 2000c)29. This suggests that banks first need 
to consolidate domestically before expanding internationally. 
Analysing the geographical and sectoral breakdown of revenues of financial services firms 
helps to assess blurring boundaries between sectors and nations. Table 4.15 presents the 
sectoral breakdown of revenues of the world’s 53 largest financial groups in the year 2000 
(Van der Zwet, 2003)30. 
 
Table 4.15 Sectoral breakdown of revenues of the world’s largest financial groups 
Sectoral breakdown Banks (N=38) Insurers (N=15) 
Traditional banking income 46% 4% 
Investment banking income 38% 5% 
Insurance income 4% 61% 
Not specified 12% 30% 
Source: Van der Zwet (2003: 13) 
 
The data indicate only marginal sectoral blurring measured by operating income. Banks 
earn 4% of their income through insurance activities, whilst insurance companies earn on 
average 9% of operating income with banking activities. The degree of sectoral blurring 
however differs across countries. The Netherlands for instance appears to be an exception, 
as ING and Fortis have a high degree of cross-sectoral activities. 
Table 4.16 indicates the geographical distinction of revenues of large financials. The 
degree of international blurring seems to be substantial. US and other (non-US/European) 
financials earn some 30% of total income in foreign countries. European financials are 
most internationally diversified, earning more than half of their income in foreign 
countries. Interestingly, insurance companies focused more on foreign markets – earning 
65% of revenues in foreign countries, whereas banks had a home country bias – earning on 
average 61% of income in their home country (Van der Zwet, 2003). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
29 We already discussed how merger and acquisition activities impacted on the structure of 
national financial services sectors. We refer to the concentration ratios in section 4.1.3 for 
more information. 
30 Fifteen firms of these 53 financials are part of our sample of financial firms. 
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Table 4.16 Geographical breakdown of revenues of the world’s largest financial  
  groups 
Geographical breakdown Home country Foreign countries 
Total sample (N=38)* 51% 49% 
US financials (N=5) 69% 31% 
Other financials (N=26) 70% 30% 
Eur. financials (N=7) 45% 25% European/ 
30% non-European 
Source: Van der Zwet (2003: 18) 
* 38 out of the 53 financial groups reported a geographical distribution of revenues in their 
annual report of 2000. 
 
This section indicated increasing merger and acquisition activity across Europe. Most 
consolidation activity takes place within national markets. Cross-border mergers are still 
rare, and there are still no pan-European banks that have more than two home markets. 
Cross-sectoral blurring of boundaries appears to be limited in terms of the distribution of 
revenues of large financial groups. International boundaries however seem to have blurred 
substantially. The next section concludes this chapter and indicates potential future 
developments in the European financial landscape. 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
Our analysis suggests at least two findings. First, the results reveal country-specific 
patterns with regard to indicators of capacity, profitability and concentration. Country-
specifics also arose from the analysis of diffusion patterns of regulations and technologies. 
The United Kingdom and the Netherlands walk in front in diffusing regulations and 
technologies, whereas Italy, France and Germany implemented these changes later. 
Sweden is fastest in adopting new technologies, but its late entrance into the EU delayed 
the implementation of new regulations. We illustrated the catching-up of late movers 
France and Italy by discussing the privatisation processes of their financial services 
sectors. 
Second, our analysis indicates that country institutional differences in the pace of diffusion 
decrease over time, whilst selection pressures that operate on the European financial 
services industry and its incumbent firms are increasing. These processes suggest the 
emergence of industry-generic patterns. Our finding of patterns of convergence of national 
financial systems across Europe parallels the findings of other studies (cf. Groeneveld and 
Swank, 1998; ECB, 1999). Convergence is argued to level the playing field of formerly 
segmented financial systems, which makes the environment of financial players 
increasingly dynamic and competitive. It should however be noted that differences in fiscal 
treatment and supervisory and legal arrangements maintain country-specific characteristics 
of financial systems. 
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New regulations and technologies not only lowered barriers to compete internationally and 
cross-sectorally, but are also changing the structure of the European financial landscape. 
Firstly, pressures to consolidate are mitigated by novel technologies, new business models 
and strategic alliances (The Banker, 2000c), which are alternatives for the classical pattern 
of mergers and acquisitions to consolidate. Information technology by itself, however, is 
no panacea. It serves incumbent financial services firms by enabling a multi-channel 
banking strategy (The Banker, 2000d), streamlining operations and increase services to 
consumers. However, it also allows other players to enter financial services. General 
Electric, Microsoft and telecom companies such as KPN and Vodaphone, and European 
retailers like Ahold, Sainsbury and Tesco entered the financial services sector. The 
confrontation of these new entrants and financial incumbents poses major strategic 
challenges. These changes are driving the European financial services sector further into a 
state of hypercompetition. 
We now begin to see the shape of an upcoming ‘rugged landscape’ that is shaking up the 
incumbent financial players. Strategic renewal is a necessity to survive in such an 
environment. The next chapter investigates how European financial services firms dealt 
with the increasing dynamics and complexities in the European financial services 
landscape by studying strategic renewal behaviour at the industry, country, and firm levels 
of analysis. 
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5 Differences and similarities in strategic renewal  
behaviour of European financial incumbents 
 
The analysis of the changing landscape of European financial services indicated increasing 
turbulence in the environment of financial incumbents. Deregulations and the introduction 
of new technologies point at increasing convergence across European countries. However, 
the results also indicated that national differences still persist. This chapter focuses on 
strategic renewal behaviour of financial incumbents operating in this changing landscape. 
Based on descriptive statistics, we investigate to what extent, and regarding which strategic 
renewal attributes, differences and/or similarities in strategic renewal behaviour are 
apparent at the industry, country, and firm level of analysis. 
This chapter is structured along six sections. We first recapture the four research themes 
that arose from our theory discussion, and then present the main characteristics of the 
database of strategic renewal actions. To assess environmental selection effects on 
strategic renewal behaviour, the third section analyses differences and similarities across 
banking and insurance sectors on strategic renewal behaviour. The fourth section 
investigates strategic renewal characteristics across countries to study the effect of 
operating from different institutional environments. We then analyse the firm level to study 
managerial intentionality effects in strategic renewal behaviour. The findings of this 
exploratory chapter are summarised in the conclusion section, and used to set up the lines 
of research of a selection of financials in the next chapter. 
 
5.1 Themes for research 
This study is grounded in four theoretical perspectives on strategic renewal, which we 
introduced in the second chapter. Building on these perspectives, we developed a set of 
propositions that distinguished between four types of effects in strategic renewal 
behaviour: environmental selection, institutional, managerial intentionality, and 
coevolutionary interaction effects. Population ecology (Hannan and Freeman, 1977; 1984) 
and institutional theory (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Greenwood and Hinings, 1996) 
emphasise the impact of selection effects on the organisation. Selection effects are 
theorised to constrain an organisation’s latitude to undertake strategic renewal actions. 
Arguing from these selection perspectives, similarities in strategic renewal behaviour will 
be greater than firm specific differences. Exploitation and mimetic behaviour are theorised 
to be the idealtype strategic renewal trajectories according to these perspectives. 
Depending on whether the industry (population ecology) or national institutional context 
(institutional theory) places limits on individual organisation’s leeway, we expect the data 
to show similarities in strategic renewal behaviour across the entire sample of firms 
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(environmental selection effects), or across countries (institutional effects). Adaptation 
effects on the other hand suppose managerial freedom in strategic acting. Managerial 
agency (Child, 1972; Miles and Snow, 1978) and dynamic capabilities theory (Teece, 
1984; Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997) ascribe managers room for choosing and designing 
firm idiosyncratic strategic renewal actions. This suggests organisations can choose to 
deviate from other firms in their environment, and firm specificity of strategic renewal 
behaviour (managerial intentionality effects). Before we go into a deeper analysis of 
whether and how these multiple effects affect strategic renewal behaviour, we first show 
main characteristics of strategic renewal actions of our research sample. 
 
5.2 Characteristics of strategic renewal behaviour across 
sample of European financial services firms 
The thirty sample firms executed in total 1592 strategic actions during the 1990-1997 
research period as reported in the Financial Times and Letters to the Shareholder. This 
section presents the main characteristics of the strategic renewal actions database. We 
coded strategic renewal actions into four coding categories. These four categories 
concatenate into a four-digit code, which result in twelve strategy types (cf. Table 3.2). 
Figure 5.1 presents the number of actions per strategy type of the entire sample of 
European financial services firms. Type H, aimed at exploiting international markets by 
acquiring or cooperating with external parties, was the dominant action type across the 
research sample. On the other extreme, strategy type D, actions that cut ties with external 
international parties, was the least executed type of action. Exhibit 5.1 displays the legend 
for the different types of strategic renewal actions (cf. Table 3.2). 
 
Exhibit 5.1 Legend of twelve strategy types 
Strategy 
type 
Coding 
key 
Coding description 
A 0000 Internal, domestic market, exploitation, contraction action 
B 1000 External, domestic market, exploitation, contraction action 
C 0100 Internal, international market, exploitation, contraction action 
D 1100 External, international market, exploitation, contraction action 
E 0001 Internal, domestic market, exploitation, expansion action 
F 1001 External, domestic market, exploitation, expansion action 
G 0101 Internal, international market, exploitation, expansion action 
H 1101 External, international market, exploitation, expansion action 
I 0011 Internal, domestic market, exploration, expansion action 
J 1011 External, domestic market, exploration, expansion action 
K 0111 Internal, international market, exploration, expansion action 
L 1111 External, international market, exploration, expansion action 
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We zoom in on the time dimension in Figure 5.2. The number of actions varies 
considerably over the research period. In 1990, the thirty financials undertook 235 strategic 
renewal actions, after which the number gradually declined to 143 in 1993. It then rose to a 
maximum of 259 actions in 1997. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We now decompose the data into the four coding categories that make up the strategy 
types. These are the internal/ external, domestic/ international, exploitation/ exploration, 
Figure 5.2 Number of actions per year (entire sample of financials, 1990-1997) 
Source: Erasmus Strategic Renewal Center 
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Figure 5.1 Number of actions per strategy type (entire sample of financials,
1990-1997) 
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and contraction/ expansion category. Figure 5.3 presents the percentual division of 
strategic renewal actions on each of the four categories over time. It shows that the 
trendlines are rather stable over the entire research period. The percentage of expansion 
actions moves around the 75% line. The proportion of international actions is slightly over 
50% in the 1990-1997 time period, whilst the share of external actions winds around the 
50% line. The proportion of exploration actions sways around the 25% mark. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We continue by investigating similarities across firms operating within the banking or 
insurance sector. 
 
5.3 Strategic renewal behaviour in banking and insurance  
firms 
This section aggregates strategic renewal actions of banking firms and of insurance firms 
(based on SIC code; see Table 3.1) to investigate differences and similarities across 
sectors. We first show the evolvement of strategic renewal behaviour of banking and 
insurance firms across the four strategic renewal categories, and then refine the analysis by 
investigating the division of strategy types across banking and insurance firms. We 
conclude by integrating the main findings of both analyses. 
Figure 5.4 displays the evolvement of the balance of four categories of strategic renewal 
for both banking and insurance firms over time. Table 5.1 indicated that insurance firms 
have a stronger preference for using external actions than banking firms (see also Figure 
5.4a). A similar difference appears from the evolvement of the international versus 
Figure 5.3 Timelines of four categories of strategic actions of sample of financials 
Source: Erasmus Strategic Renewal Center 
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domestic category (Figure 5.4b). Insurance firms are more oriented toward international 
markets than banking firms. The exploitation/ exploration category indicates that both 
banking and insurance firms favoured exploitation (75% of total number of actions) over 
exploration actions (25%). Banking firms however show a more stable pattern than 
insurance firms (Figure 5.4c). The contraction versus expansion category indicates that 
most actions of both banking and insurance firms were aimed at expansion. Banking firms 
were slightly more oriented towards expansion than insurance firms (Figure 5.4d). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.1 shows the averaged scores of banking and insurance firms on the four strategic 
renewal categories over the eight-year research period. We used ANOVA and t-tests to test 
whether banking and insurance firms significantly differ on strategic renewal categories. P-
values of t-tests indicate that the internal/ external and especially the domestic/ 
international category show significant differences (at a 5% significance level) between 
banking and insurance firms, whilst the exploitation/ exploration and contraction/ 
expansion categories of strategic renewal actions do not significantly differ between 
industries. 
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Table 5.1 Statistics of industry differences on the four categories of strategic  
renewal actions 
Strategic 
category 
 Industry P-
value 
 Total sample Banks Insurers  
 Mean (S.D.) N Mean (S.D.) N Mean (S.D.) N  
External/ 
internal 
.47 (.31) 234 .43 (.28) 150 .53 (.34) 84 .03 
International/ 
domestic 
.54 (.34) 234 .48 (.33) 150 .63 (.34) 84 .00 
Exploitation/ 
exploration 
.26 (.26) 232 .26 (.24) 14831 .25 (.29) 84 .86 
Expansion/ 
contraction 
.76 (.26) 234 .78 (.23) 150 .72 (.31) 84 .06 
 
We calculated the percentual division per strategy type to get a more detailed insight into 
strategic renewal behaviour of banking and insurance companies. A first observation is that 
the percentual division amongst the twelve strategy types in banking firms is much more 
even than in insurance firms. The biggest difference lies in strategy types H (external 
international exploitation expansion) and E (internal domestic market exploitation 
expansion). Strategy type H had a much higher occurrence in insurance firms (22% of all 
actions) than in banking firms (13%). Strategy type E was much more popular with 
banking firms (12% for banking firms versus 6% for insurers). Strategy types F, B, C and J 
also illustrate different renewal behaviour. The other coding categories show much less 
marked differences. 
                                                           
31 The data did not allow to determine the exploitation/exploration category of the Dutch 
Rabobank in two years. The other categories could however be coded. Hence the 
difference of two (150-148) observations between the exploitation/exploration category 
and the other categories. 
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Table 5.2 details the means and standard deviations of strategy types of the total sample 
and per industry. It also presents the P-values of t-tests to indicate the significance level of 
differences between banks and insurers. Four strategy types are statistically different at a 
5% significance level. These correspond with the strategy types that appeared to be 
different based on Figure 5.5. 
 
Table 5.2 Statistics of industry differences on the twelve strategy types32 
Strategy type Industry P-value 
 Total sample* Banks* Insurers*  
 Mean 
(%) 
(S.D.) 
(%) 
Mean 
(%) 
(S.D.) 
(%) 
Mean 
(%) 
(S.D.) 
(%) 
 
A 12.4 (19.9) 13.2 (19.8) 11.1 (20.0) .44 
B 2.6 (9.7) 1.3 (4.2) 5.1 (15.0) .00 
C 8.4 (16.0) 7.0 (12.0) 11.0 (22.0) .09 
D 1.9 (8.0) 1.5 (5.0) 2.5 (12.0) .37 
E 11.4 (20.3) 14.1 (22.2) 6.5 (15.3) .01 
F 12.2 (18.5) 14.4 (19.3) 8.4 (16.5) .02 
G 7.4 (13.0) 8.0 (14.0) 6.5 (11.0) .38 
H 18.3 (25.2) 14.3 (21.3) 25.4 (29.7) .00 
I 5.5 (11.0) 6.5 (12.0) 3.7 (1.0) .07 
J 3.1 (8.1) 3.6 (8.1) 2.2 (8.2) .22 
K 9.5 (18.0) 9.5 (17.0) 9.5 (18.0) .99 
L 7.3 (14.0) 6.8 (12.0) 8.3 (16.0) .40 
* Ntotal = 23233; Nbanks = 148; Ninsurers = 84 
                                                           
32 We used the yearly ratios to get a sufficient number of observations. 
33 Maximum number of observations is (30 companies * 8 years) = 240. Our data has 8 
missing values as our data sources did not indicate actions of some companies during some 
of the years during the 1990-1997 research period. 
Figure 5.5 Percentual division of strategy types in banking and insurance firms 
Source: Erasmus Strategic Renewal Center 
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In conclusion, there appear to be some differences in renewal behaviour between European 
banking and insurance firms. There is a marked difference in the percentage of 
international versus domestic market actions. Most of this difference can be explained by 
the difference in strategy types H en E (respectively external international exploitation 
expansion, and internal domestic market exploitation expansion). The difference between 
these two strategy types also explains to a large extent the difference in the external/ 
internal category. The difference in international versus domestic market orientation of 
strategic actions corresponds with Van der Zwet’s (2003) study, who concluded that banks 
have a clear home bias, whereas insurance companies generate most of their income in 
foreign countries (cf. section 4.6.1). The exploration/ exploitation and expansion/ 
contraction ratio show no significant differences between banking and insurance firms. 
Moreover, half of the strategy types do not differ significantly across banks and insurers. 
 
5.4 Strategic renewal behaviour across countries 
This section analyses differences and similarities across countries. We first compare ratios 
of the four action categories aggregated on country level, and then investigate the division 
of strategy types across nations. To investigate the relation between individual firms’ 
renewal behaviour and the national context, we assess the relatedness of individual firm’s 
ratios within each country. The findings of these analyses are synthesised to evaluate the 
influence of the national institutional context on strategic renewal behaviour. 
Table 5.3 shows the statistics on the four categories of strategic renewal actions across the 
seven countries. P-values of F-tests indicate statistically significant differences between the 
countries on all four coding categories at a 5% significance level. This indicates that the 
national context has a stronger influence on similar strategic renewal behaviour than the 
industry context (cf. Table 5.1). The internal/ external category shows quite some variance 
across the seven countries. It ranges from 25% external and 75% internal actions in the 
three UK firms to a division of 66% external to 34% internal actions of Dutch firms. The 
variety is even greater on the domestic/ international category. The Dutch financials were 
the most internationally active firms of the sample (78% of all actions), closely followed 
by French and German companies (about 70% international versus 30% domestic market). 
Norwegian financials, on the other hand, were much more oriented towards their home 
market (81% of all actions took place on domestic soil). Italian, British and Swedish firms 
had more balanced scores on this category. The exploration/ exploitation ratio shows less 
variance. Italian and British firms had the lowest scores; respectively 17% and 20% of 
their actions were exploration-oriented. Dutch and Norwegian firms display slightly higher 
ratios: respectively 24% and 26%. French and Swedish firms, in their turn, have higher 
scores (respectively 31% and 33%) than firms from the previously mentioned countries. 
Most exploration oriented were German financials (43%). The expansion/ contraction 
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category varies significantly and ranges from an average of 43% expansion actions by 
Norwegian firms to a maximum of 90% expansion actions undertaken by German firms. 
British firms averaged 53%. Firms from both Sweden and France lie within the 70%-80% 
bracket, whilst Italian and Dutch firms had average ratios of respectively 84% and 88%. 
 
Division of strategy types on national level 
This section analyses strategic renewal behaviour at the country level of analysis. We 
calculated the division of strategy types for each country by calculating the average 
percentual use of strategy types of individual firms. We use these data to detect the 
dominant renewal behaviour of financial incumbents operating within a country. We link 
these findings to the characteristics of the national financial markets that were described in 
chapter four. 
 
France 
External international exploitation expansion (type H) actions are most popular amongst 
the French firms (Figure 5.6), followed by strategy types L and K (both being international 
exploration actions; the first using external organisations, and the second the internal 
organisation). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This pattern indicates that French financials aimed to increase the scope of their 
international activities by expanding their geographical reach and by developing new 
activities on international markets. Some of the international operations were however 
Source: Erasmus Strategic Renewal Center 
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being rationalised and disposed of, as indicated by the fourth ranked strategy type (C: 
internal international exploitation contraction actions). 
The five largest French banks had a concentration ratio of about 41% in the 1990-1997 
period (cf. Table 4.8). This indicates room for domestic consolidation. French financials 
moreover score low on profitability indicators (cf. Tables 4.6 and 4.7). These data suggest 
that the French financials had some way to go in optimising the structure of their financial 
market. One would expect their renewal behaviour to focus on the domestic market. Our 
data however indicate a prevalence of internationalisation actions. Approximately half of 
international actions of French financials were aimed at exploration, that is, entering new 
geographic regions or developing new activities on international markets. This is a higher 
percentage than firms operating from other countries, and indicates that French financials 
were trying to establish operations on new foreign markets and exposed French financials 
to more competitive international markets. One explanation may be that foreign financials 
could not penetrate as easily into the French financial sector as French financial could in 
foreign markets. The Bank of France kept an eye on the French financial services sector, 
and foreign takeovers were tightly monitored and guided by the French government (Julius 
Baer, 1999). The high degree of governmental influence on the French financial sector (cf. 
section 4.5.1) thus seems to play a significant role in explaining the international 
orientation of French financials. 
 
Germany 
Figure 5.7 presents the averages of German firms. Strategy type H (external international 
exploitation expansion) is used most by German firms. Second and third ranked are 
respectively external and internal international exploration actions (strategy types L and 
K). German financials focused on developing international markets, preferably by 
acquiring or cooperating with other firms (external actions). A large part of international 
actions had an exploratory nature. The renewal behaviour of German financials thus 
resembled that of French companies. Germany was the least concentrated country in our 
sample of six EU countries (cf. Table 4.8 and 4.9), and German financials occupy an 
intermediate position in terms of profitability (Table 4.6; 4.7). A large part of international 
actions (approximately 70%) consisted of cooperative agreements or minority stakes in 
foreign financials, and only a few of full acquisitions. A substantial part of international 
actions of German financials were aimed at exploration, that is, entering new international 
markets or developing new activities in foreign countries. These underline the scouting 
character of internationalisation actions. 
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Italy 
Increasing the scale of activities, predominantly on the domestic, and then on the 
international market, dominated the strategic renewal behaviour of the five Italian firms. 
Strategy types E and F were used the most by Italian financials during the 1990-1997 
period (Figure 5.8). These are actions aimed at exploiting the home market, either by the 
internal or via external organisations. Third in rank are type H, or external international 
exploitation expansion actions.  
Contrary to French and German firms, it appears that Italian financials preferred to 
increase the scale and efficiency of domestic operations above developing international 
operations. The high degree of exploitation expansion actions on the domestic market is in 
line with the relatively low concentration ratio of 25% of the largest five Italian credit 
institutions (cf. Table 4.8 and 4.9), and with the second lowest score on indicators of 
profitability amongst the six countries investigated (Table 4.6 and 4.7). A closer look at the 
data reveals that domestic market actions occurred throughout the entire research period. 
Internationalisation actions were concentrated on the period 1994-1997. Italian financials 
seem to have followed a sequential process of consolidation on the domestic market, 
followed by a period of international expansion. 
 
 
 
 
Source: Erasmus Strategic Renewal Center 
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The Netherlands 
Increasing scale on international markets, preferably by cooperating or acquiring other 
firms, is how one can describe the renewal behaviour of Dutch financial firms. Second in 
popularity are strategic actions that sought to explore international markets. Figure 5.9 
shows that external international exploitation expansion (H) was the dominant strategy 
type of Dutch financials, followed by strategy types G, F and K. 
The Dutch financial sector is highly concentrated (cf. Table 4.8 and 4.9) and has relatively 
low numbers of consumers. Dutch financials had to expand internationally34 to get 
sufficient scale compared to other large European financials. Speed may explain the 
predominantly external orientation of internationalisation actions. Cooperation agreements 
or acquisitions can be put to work much quicker, and on a larger scale, than autonomously 
developing international operations. Overcapacity on most European markets (cf. section 
4.1.1) was another reason for the dominance of external actions over internal actions. It is 
more reasonable to acquire or use another firms’ network than to autonomously develop a 
network on markets that have overcapacity. 
 
 
 
                                                           
34 Most internationalisation actions of Dutch firms were aimed at the European market. 
Second came actions on the US market, third actions in the Pacific region. 
Source: Erasmus Strategic Renewal Center 
Figure 5.8 Percentual division of strategy types of Italian financials (1990-1997) 
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Norway 
Norwegian firms had three preferential strategy types (Figure 5.10): A, E and F. The first 
two are internal actions respectively aimed at scaling down (A) or up (E) activities on the 
domestic market. The third ranked strategy type, F, also focused on increasing domestic 
activities, however using external organisations. These three strategy types suggest a high 
degree of rationalisation and consolidation of activities by Norwegian financials on their 
home market during the 1990-1997 period. 
The Norwegian financial system faced a severe crisis in the early nineties. Norwegian 
financials reacted to this crisis by rationalising and scaling down domestic market 
activities. They further consolidated domestic market activities by acquiring or cooperating 
with other financials. These actions allowed little room for expanding or exploring 
international markets as firms from other countries in our sample have done. 
Source: Erasmus Strategic Renewal Center 
Figure 5.9 Percentual division of strategy types of Dutch financials (1990-1997) 
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Sweden 
Figure 5.11 indicates that strategy type A has been most used by Swedish financials. Those 
are internal domestic market exploitation contraction actions. Second ranked is an almost 
opposite strategy type; K (internal international market exploration expansion). Strategy 
types F, H, I, C, and G were undertaken at roughly the same rate by Swedish financials. 
Most of these actions are focused on exploitation expansion actions. This set of actions 
however is rather diverse regarding the internal versus external, and domestic versus 
international categories. 
The distressed state of the Swedish financial system in the early nineties explains the high 
degree of domestic market rationalisation (contraction) actions. The crisis was already 
conquered by the mid-nineties due to adequate government intervention. Swedish firms 
then sought to explore international markets – which is consistent with the extremely high 
concentration ratio of the Swedish credit institutions. Domestic market consolidation (that 
is, increasing scale) was another dominant pattern during the research period. The 
concentration ratio of the five largest credit institutions in Sweden rose by 15% in terms of 
assets, and 25% in terms of loans in the 1990-1995 time window (Table 4.8 and 4.9). 
Source: Erasmus Strategic Renewal Center 
Figure 5.10 Percentual division of strategy types of Norwegian financials 
(1990-1997) 
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United Kingdom 
British financials’ strategic renewal behaviour was dominated by strategy types A and C 
(Figure 5.12). Both are internal exploitation contraction actions (aimed at rationalising 
existing operations). The first type of actions is aimed at the domestic market, and the 
second on international markets. Third in rank are E, or internal domestic market 
exploitation expansion actions. A large set of actions, which have a mixed nature on all of 
the four categories, had similar proportions. 
In the early nineties, British financial firms faced a severe economical headwind. This 
forced them to weed out unprofitable operations to increase efficiency and profitability. 
The larger part of these rationalisation operations were located on the domestic market, 
which is one explanation for the dominance of domestic market actions. Other 
explanations for the focus on the domestic market are the low degree of concentration of 
the British financials and their relatively high degree of profitability, which render actions 
aimed at internationalisation less attractive. 
Figure 5.11 Percentual division of strategy types of Swedish financials (1990-1997) 
Source: Erasmus Strategic Renewal Center 
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Conclusion 
The analysis of financial firms’ strategic behaviour firms aggregated on country level 
indicates substantial differences across the seven European countries. Table 5.3 indicates 
significant differences between countries on the four categories of strategic renewal 
actions. Table 5.4 displays the percentual division of strategy types aggregated at country 
level. French, Dutch and German firms show some similarities in strategic renewal 
behaviour – all preferring strategy type H. Their dominant focus was international market 
expansion, mostly by using external parties. Financials located in Sweden, Norway and the 
United Kingdom share similarities in terms of domestic market consolidating and 
contraction actions. Italian firms are difficult to position, sharing some characteristics with 
Norwegian firms (in terms of domestic market exploitation), and some with French, Dutch 
and German firms (regarding international market expansion). P-values of F-tests further 
indicate that eight strategy types were significantly different at the 5% significance level. 
This also indicates a strong influence of the national context on individual firms’ strategic 
renewal behaviour. 
The references we made to developments in the seven European countries, such as the 
crises in Norway and Sweden and economic turmoil in the United Kingdom in the early 
nineties, suggest a rather strong influence of difficult periods within a country on the 
strategic behaviour of financial firms. Some patterns, such as the focus on international 
markets of Dutch firms, and the domestic market orientation of British financials, have 
links to the concentration and profitability characteristics of these nations. Other types of 
Figure 5.12 Percentual division of strategy types of British financials (1990-1997) 
Source: Erasmus Strategic Renewal Center 
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behaviour, for instance the high degree of exploration of German firms, and the 
internationalisation drive by of French and German firms, are more difficult to explain by 
general characteristics. This might relate to exploration resulting from managerial 
intentionality behaviour, i.e., being generated at the firm level of analysis. Instead of 
looking for explanations at the institutional level, processes and characteristics at the 
organisation level could better explain exploration-type actions of strategic renewal. 
This analysis indicates that the national institutional context within which financial 
services firms operate seems to have a substantial impact on the strategic behaviour of 
European financials. Periods of economic adversity especially appear to have a significant 
influence on individual firms’ strategic acting. Other characteristics of national financial 
systems, such as concentration ratios and profitability figures, also seem to relate to 
financial firms’ strategic renewal behaviour. However, not all can be explained by national 
institutional characteristics. We now turn to the firm level of analysis to look for 
explanations at the firm level. 
 
 104
Table 5.3 Statistics of country differences on four categories of strategic renewal 
Strategic category Country 
 France Germany Italy Netherlands 
 Mean (S.D.) Mean (S.D.) Mean (S.D.) Mean (S.D.) 
External/internal .55 (.26) .60 (.25) .46 (.28) .66 (.30) 
International/domestic .71 (.21) .70 (.18) .38 (.31) .78 (.28) 
Exploration/exploitation .31 (.20) .43 (.28) .17 (.19) .23 (.32) 
Expansion/contraction .77 (.23) .90 (.14) .84 (.19) .88 (.20) 
NFrance=39, NGermany=32, NItaly=38, NNetherlands=38, NNorway=31, NSweden=32,  
 
Table 5.4 Statistics of country differences on the twelve strategy types 
Strategy type Country 
 France Germany Italy Netherlands 
 Mean 
(%) 
(S.D.) 
(%) 
Mean 
(%) 
(S.D.) 
(%) 
Mean 
(%) 
(S.D.) 
(%) 
Mean 
(%) 
(S.D.) 
(%) 
A 6.1 (11.3) 3.2 (7.3) 6.9 (11.4) 5.6 (17.5) 
B 4.6 (11.0) 2.5 (7.3) 3.5 (16.0) 2.0 (6.5) 
C 10.0 (13.0) 1.6 (6.2) 5.5 (8.7) 4.5 (9.8) 
D 2.8 (6.8) 4.9 (19.0) 1.6 (4.5) 1.5 (3.9) 
E 5.1 (13.8) 3.0 (7.7) 27.2 (23.8) 2.4 (7.6) 
F 7.7 (10.9) 8.8 (12.3) 18.6 (18.6) 10.9 (20.7) 
G 6.9 (9.7) 7.7 (10.0) 7.8 (12.0) 12.0 (16.0) 
H 26.6 (27.6) 27.0 (24.5) 12.6 (15.6) 37.7 (33.3) 
I 2.6 (5.9) 8.0 (12.0) 3.6 (8.6) 1.3 (5.8) 
J 2.8 (5.6) 4.3 (8.4) 2.3 (6.5) 2.6 (10.0) 
K 13.0 (15.0) 13.0 (21.0) 4.5 (6.7) 11.0 (18.0) 
L 12.0 (15.0) 16.0 (15.0) 5.9 (17.0) 8.90 (15.0) 
NFrance=39, NGermany=32, NItaly=38, NNetherlands=36, NNorway=31, NSweden=32, NUnitedKingdom=24,  
 
 
5.5 Strategic renewal behaviour across firms 
The previous sections investigated sectoral and country-specific characteristics in patterns 
of strategic renewal behaviour. We continue by analysing differences and similarities at the 
firm level of analysis. This section will result in firm specific characteristics in trajectories 
of strategic behaviour. 
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actions 
 P-value 
Norway Sweden UK  
Mean (S.D.) Mean (S.D.) Mean (S.D.)  
.31 (.32) .31 (.26) .25 (.20) .00 
.19 (.32) .50 (.36) .39 (.25) .00 
.11 (.16) .33 (.31) .20 (.20) .00 
.58 (.34) .72 (.27) .53 (.21) .00 
NUnitedKingdom=24 
 
 
 P-value 
Norway Sweden UK  
Mean (%) (S.D.) (%) Mean (%) (S.D.) (%) Mean (%) (S.D.) (%)  
26.9 (27.2) 19.0 (24.0) 26.6 (20.1) .00 
3.1 (10.0) .0 (.0) 1.7 (4.6) .59 
13.0 (27.0) 10.0 (23.0) 18.0 (14.0) .00 
.0 (.0) 6.3 (3.5) 1.5 (3.6) .26 
19.2 (23.8) 11.0 (27.0) 11.4 (15.4) .00 
20.9 (26.2) 9.1 (18.1) 8.8 (16.1) .01 
4.7 (19.0) 5.7 (12.0) 6.5 (7.7) .33 
1.6 (9.0) 10.1 (19.8) 5.8 (9.6) .00 
8.8 (16.0) 8.0 (14.0) 8.3 (14.0) .01 
1.9 (7.4) 3.8 (11.0) 4.4 (6.9) .83 
.0 (.0) 19.0 (29.0) 5.2 (11.0) .00 
3.6 (2.0) 3.9 (10.0) 2.2 (4.3) .00 
NTotal=232 
 
Table 5.5 shows the statistics of the four strategic categories of the total sample of 
financials. The external/ internal ratio varies from .15 (Prudential) to .83 (Allianz). United 
Bank of Norway had the lowest score on the international/ domestic ratio (.00), whilst 
Aegon (.95) was most internationally oriented. The differences on the exploration/ 
exploitation ratio are the lowest, ranging from .04 (Rabobank) to .49 (Société Générale and 
Commerzbank). The expansion/ contraction ratio is highest for Cariplo (.95) and lowest for 
Storebrand (.33). P-values of F-tests indicate that European financial firms significantly 
differ on all four coding categories at a 5% confidence level. This suggests that financial 
firms differentiate in their strategic renewal behaviour from one another. 
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Table 5.5 Statistics of firm differences on the four categories of strategic renewal  
actions35 
Company External/  
internal 
International/ 
domestic 
Exploration/ 
exploitation 
Expansion/ 
contraction 
 Mean (S.D.) N Mean (S.D.) N Mean (S.D.) N Mean (S.D.) N 
Axa .64 (.25) 8 .65 (.23) 8 .21 (.21) 8 .75 (.25) 8 
BNP .68 (.24) 8 .84 (.05) 8 .37 (.20) 8 .83 (.18) 8 
Paribas .43 (.26) 8 .50 (.26) 8 .24 (.20) 8 .67 (.25) 8 
SocGen .43 (.17) 8 .81 (.10) 8 .49 (.12) 8 .90 (.15) 8 
UAP .58 (.33) 7 .74 (.13) 7 .23 (.14) 7 .70 (.26) 7 
Allianz .83 (.22) 8 .71 (.16) 8 .32 (.29) 8 .85 (.17) 8 
Commerzb. .62 (.17) 8 .60 (.24) 8 .49 (.35) 8 .93 (.14) 8 
Deutsche B. .43 (.12) 8 .72 (.15) 8 .42 (.08) 8 .87 (.15) 8 
Dresdner B. .51 (.29) 8 .77 (.16) 8 .48 (.35) 8 .94 (.12) 8 
BCI .48 (.30) 8 .33 (.26) 8 .09 (.12) 8 .89 (.12) 8 
Cariplo .41 (.27) 7 .31 (.23) 7 .25 (.14) 7 .95 (.09) 7 
CRI .31 (.27) 8 .24 (.14) 8 .11 (.09) 8 .80 (.13) 8 
Generali .49 (.17) 8 .79 (.12) 8 .24 (.10) 8 .90 (.07) 8 
INA .65 (.31) 7 .21 (.39) 7 .19 (.38) 7 .65 (.32) 7 
Abn Amro .63 (.31) 8 .85 (.10) 8 .23 (.16) 8 .88 (.10) 8 
Aegon .71 (.31) 8 .95 (.15) 8 .25 (.39) 8 .93 (.20) 8 
Fortis .71 (.37) 7 .38 (.32) 7 .16 (.37) 7 .72 (.34) 7 
ING .51 (.22) 8 .84 (.23) 8 .40 (.38) 8 .92 (.14) 8 
Rabobank .75 (.31) 7 .81 (.21) 7 .04 (.09) 5 .93 (.13) 7 
Christiania .29 (.26) 8 .07 (.14) 8 .13 (.17) 8 .52 (.32) 8 
DNB .24 (.25) 8 .30 (.36) 8 .07 (.10) 8 .72 (.32) 8 
Storebrand .33 (.47) 7 .43 (.45) 7 .12 (.21) 7 .33 (.32) 7 
UBN .40 (.32) 8 .00 (.00) 8 .13 (.18) 8 .71 (.33) 8 
Handelsb. .37 (.33) 8 .61 (.33) 8 .38 (.35) 8 .90 (.15) 8 
S-E-B .25 (.21) 8 .29 (.25) 8 .29 (.24) 8 .73 (.20) 8 
Skandia .19 (.20) 8 .82 (.20) 8 .40 (.35) 8 .60 (.42) 8 
Swedbank .42 (.27) 8 .27 (.33) 8 .26 (.35) 8 .67 (.18) 8 
Barclays .26 (.14) 8 .51 (.14) 8 .23 (.06) 8 .58 (.10) 8 
Lloyds TSB .32 (.23) 8 .36 (.22) 8 .15 (.18) 8 .51 (.18) 8 
Prudential .15 (.18) 8 .30 (.33) 8 .23 (.29) 8 .51 (.32) 8 
P-value .00 .00 .00 .00 
 
Table 5.6 shows the percentual division per strategy type (averaged over the eight years) 
for the research sample. We do not discuss each firm individually on its strategic renewal 
characteristics. Instead, we zoom in on the most important findings of this analysis. P-
values of F-tests indicate significant differences (at a 5% confidence level) of nine out of 
twelve strategy types. Strategic renewal behaviour was similar in three strategy types. This 
                                                           
35 The mean ratios in Table 5.5 are unweighted averages over the eight years (1990-1997). 
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points at deviant strategic renewal behaviour on most strategy types of large European 
financials.  
Table 5.6 also shows the frequency of strategic renewal actions (SRA) per year. The 
frequency varies over the sample of firms, the bigger firms typically displaying a higher 
frequency than the smaller firms. We also note significant differences between firms on 
this metric – suggesting that European financials differed in the number of strategic actions 
they undertook during the research period. 
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Table 5.6 
 
Statistics of firm
 differences on the tw
elve strategy types 
C
om
pany 
A
 
B
 
C
 
D
 
E
 
F 
 
M
ean 
(%
) 
(S.D
.) 
(%
) 
N
 
M
ean 
(%
) 
(S.D
.) 
(%
) 
N
 
M
ean 
(%
) 
(S.D
.) 
(%
) 
N
 
M
ean 
(%
) 
(S.D
.) 
(%
) 
N
 
M
ean 
(%
) 
(S.D
.) 
(%
) 
N
 
M
ean 
(%
) 
(S.D
.) 
(%
) 
N
 
A
xa 
10.1 
(10.8) 
8 
7.6 
(18.0) 
8 
3.7 
(7.9) 
8 
5.2 
(8.8) 
8 
6.4 
(14.1) 
8 
8.6 
(8.6) 
8 
BN
P 
2.5 
(7.1) 
8 
1.6 
(4.4) 
8 
15.0 
(15.0) 
8 
.0 
(.0) 
8 
.0 
(.0) 
8 
7.3 
(10.4) 
8 
Paribas 
12.0 
(17.7) 
8 
4.5 
(9.2) 
8 
11.0 
(13.0) 
8 
6.5 
(9.8) 
8 
15.7 
(24.8) 
8 
12.1 
(16.1) 
8 
SocG
en 
.0 
(.0) 
8 
.0 
(.0) 
8 
9.9 
(15.0) 
8 
.0 
(.0) 
8 
1.6 
(4.4) 
8 
5.8 
(10.8) 
8 
U
A
P 
6.0 
(10.4) 
7 
9.9 
(14.0) 
7 
12.0 
(15.0) 
7 
2.4 
(6.3) 
7 
1.6 
(4.2) 
7 
4.2 
(7.2) 
7 
A
llianz 
2.1 
(5.9) 
8 
8.3 
(13.0) 
8 
.0 
(.0) 
8 
13.0 
(35.0) 
8 
.0 
(.0) 
8 
7.7 
(10.9) 
8 
C
om
m
erzb. 
1.8 
(5.1) 
8 
1.8 
(5.1) 
8 
.0 
(.0) 
8 
4.2 
(12.0) 
8 
4.2 
(11.8) 
8 
11.5 
(16.0) 
8 
D
resdner B. 
4.2 
(11.8) 
8 
.0 
(.0) 
8 
.0 
(.0) 
8 
2.1 
(5.9) 
8 
4.5 
(9.1) 
8 
7.3 
(13.7) 
8 
D
eutsche B. 
4.7 
(5.4) 
8 
.0 
(.0) 
8 
6.3 
(12.0) 
8 
0.8 
(2.4) 
8 
3.2 
(4.8) 
8 
8.7 
(9.5) 
8 
BC
I 
.0 
(.0) 
8 
.0 
(.0) 
8 
11.0 
(12.0) 
8 
.0 
(.0) 
8 
39.1 
(17.8) 
8 
22.4 
(26.3) 
8 
C
ariplo 
1.1 
(2.9) 
7 
.0 
(.0) 
7 
.0 
(.0) 
7 
4.0 
(7.6) 
7 
31.3 
(19.4) 
7 
23.5 
(14.9) 
7 
C
R
I 
9.8 
(7.1) 
8 
1.9 
(3.6) 
8 
8.2 
(9.4) 
8 
1.0 
(2.7) 
8 
42.0 
(28.5) 
8 
18.9 
(15.0) 
8 
G
enerali 
4.4 
(9.0) 
8 
.0 
(.0) 
8 
6.5 
(7.1) 
8 
0.9 
(2.5) 
8 
4.7 
(5.2) 
8 
10.4 
(4.9) 
8 
IN
A
 
20.0 
(17.7) 
7 
17.0 
(37.0) 
7 
.0 
(.0) 
7 
2.4 
(6.3) 
7 
18.6 
(22.3) 
7 
18.6 
(26.1) 
7 
A
BN
 A
m
ro 
6.1 
(9.6) 
8 
.8 
(2.4) 
8 
3.2 
(5.9) 
8 
3.0 
(5.7) 
8 
1.8 
(5.1) 
8 
5.8 
(8.5) 
8 
A
egon 
.0 
(.0) 
8 
1.8 
(5.1) 
8 
5.4 
(15.0) 
8 
.0 
(.0) 
8 
3.6 
(10.1) 
8 
.0 
(.0) 
8 
Fortis 
14.3 
(37.8) 
7 
4.8 
(13.0) 
7 
7.4 
(10.0) 
7 
2.0 
(5.4) 
7 
.0 
(.0) 
7 
36.5 
(34.3) 
7 
IN
G
 
1.8 
(5.1) 
8 
.0 
(.0) 
8 
5.4 
(9.9) 
8 
1.8 
(3.4) 
8 
4.2 
(11.8) 
8 
.7 
(2.1) 
8 
R
abobank 
7.3 
(10.1) 
5 
3.3 
(7.5) 
5 
.0 
(.0) 
5 
.0 
(.0) 
5 
2.0 
(4.5) 
5 
17.0 
(12.9) 
5 
C
hristiania 
37.5 
(31.8) 
8 
3.1 
(8.8) 
8 
7.3 
(14.0) 
8 
.0 
(.0) 
8 
17.7 
(20.1) 
8 
21.9 
(26.3) 
8 
D
N
B 
16.9 
(18.9) 
8 
2.5 
(7.1) 
8 
11.0 
(16.0) 
8 
.0 
(.0) 
8 
30.0 
(27.8) 
8 
14.9 
(19.2) 
8 
Storebrand 
23.8 
(23.3) 
7 
7.1 
(19.0) 
7 
36.0 
(48.0) 
7 
.0 
(.0) 
7 
9.5 
(25.2) 
7 
4.8 
(12.6) 
7 
U
BN
 
29.0 
(32.7) 
8 
.0 
(.0) 
8 
.0 
(.0) 
8 
.0 
(.0) 
8 
18.3 
(21.7) 
8 
40.0 
(32.1) 
8 
H
andelsb. 
7.5 
(14.9) 
8 
.0 
(.0) 
8 
.0 
(.0) 
8 
.0 
(.0) 
8 
9.4 
(18.6) 
8 
4.7 
(9.3) 
8 
S-E-B 
26.0 
(20.4) 
8 
.0 
(.0) 
8 
2.5 
(7.1) 
8 
2.5 
(7.1) 
8 
28.6 
(45.2) 
8 
.0 
(.0) 
8 
Skandia 
6.7 
(12.8) 
8 
.0 
(.0) 
8 
34.0 
(37.0) 
8 
.0 
(.0) 
8 
6.3 
(17.7) 
8 
.0 
(.0) 
8 
Sw
edbank 
35.8 
(32.4) 
8 
.0 
(.0) 
8 
4.2 
(12.0) 
8 
.0 
(0.) 
8 
.0 
(.0) 
8 
31.7 
(24.0) 
8 
Barclays 
16.2 
(11.0) 
8 
2.6 
(4.0) 
8 
23.0 
(12.0) 
8 
.7 
(2.1) 
8 
12.4 
(6.4) 
8 
6.3 
(6.2) 
8 
Lloyds TSB 
28.3 
(8.6) 
8 
.0 
(.0) 
8 
18.0 
(15.0) 
8 
3.7 
(5.5) 
8 
4.7 
(7.5) 
8 
15.7 
(25.7) 
8 
Prudential 
35.4 
(30.2) 
8 
2.5 
(7.1) 
8 
12.0 
(13.0) 
8 
.0 
(.0) 
8 
17.1 
(24.3) 
8 
4.3 
(8.1) 
8 
P-value 
.00 
.24 
.00 
.66 
.00 
.00 
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Table 5.6 (continued) 
Statistics of firm
 differences on the tw
elve strategy types 
 
G
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om
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.) 
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) 
N
 
M
ean 
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) 
(S.D
.) 
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) 
N
 
M
ean 
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) 
(S.D
.) 
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) 
N
 
M
ean 
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) 
(S.D
.) 
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) 
N
 
M
ean 
(%
) 
(S.D
.) 
(%
) 
N
 
M
ean 
(%
) 
(S.D
.) 
(%
) 
N
 
M
ean 
 
(S.D
.) 
 
N
 
A
xa 
6.4 
(9.6 
8 
31.0 
(29.7) 
8 
8.9 
(11.0) 
8 
3.3 
(4.6) 
8 
.0 
(.0) 
8 
8.8 
(11.0) 
8 
9.3 
(5.9) 
8 
BN
P 
7.6 
(11.0) 
8 
28.8 
(24.0) 
8 
21.0 
(24.0) 
8 
.0 
(.0) 
8 
5.9 
(8.3) 
8 
10.0 
(11.0) 
8 
6.8 
(1.8) 
8 
Paribas 
1.4 
(3.9) 
8 
13.0 
(17.7) 
8 
5.9 
(9.3) 
8 
2.1 
(5.9) 
8 
1.3 
(3.5) 
8 
15.0 
(15.0) 
8 
7 
(2.7) 
8 
SocG
en 
16.0 
(9.4) 
8 
17.4 
(17.0) 
8 
12.0 
(14.0) 
8 
7.1 
(9.8) 
8 
4.9 
(6.8) 
8 
25.0 
(22.0) 
8 
7.3 
(3.1) 
8 
U
A
P 
2.4 
(6.3) 
7 
44.8 
(40.5) 
7 
11.0 
(12.0) 
7 
.0 
(.0) 
7 
1.6 
(4.2) 
7 
5.2 
(9.7) 
7 
6.4 
(1.7) 
7 
A
llianz 
5.7 
(12.0) 
8 
39.6 
(27.2) 
8 
15.0 
(15.0) 
8 
2.1 
(5.9) 
8 
4.6 
(8.5) 
8 
2.1 
(5.9) 
8 
5.5 
(1.9) 
8 
C
om
m
erzb. 
4.3 
(8.1) 
8 
22.2 
(23.5) 
8 
19.0 
(19.0) 
8 
19.0 
(16.0) 
8 
4.2 
(12.0) 
8 
8.3 
(15.0) 
8 
4.9 
(2.0) 
8 
D
resdner B. 
8.0 
(13.0) 
8 
25.9 
(32.0) 
8 
18.0 
(16.0) 
8 
2.8 
(5.9) 
8 
5.5 
(8.0) 
8 
22.0 
(34.0) 
8 
6.6 
(6.3) 
8 
D
eutsche B. 
13.0 
(7.2) 
8 
20.1 
(9.1) 
8 
11.0 
(12.0) 
8 
8.2 
(8.4) 
8 
3.2 
(6.1) 
8 
22.0 
(14.0) 
8 
11.0 
(4.0) 
8 
BC
I 
1.5 
(2.8) 
8 
16.2 
(18.1) 
8 
.8 
(2.4) 
8 
3.2 
(7.1) 
8 
4.0 
(7.0) 
8 
1.4 
(3.9) 
8 
8.4 
(5.5) 
8 
C
ariplo 
11.0 
(14.0) 
7 
5.5 
(7.4) 
7 
7.0 
(8.7) 
7 
11.0 
(16.0) 
7 
1.2 
(3.2) 
7 
4.7 
(6.5) 
7 
6.9 
(4.9) 
8 
C
R
I 
3.1 
(3.5) 
8 
4.3 
(8.0) 
8 
1.9 
(5.4) 
8 
1.6 
(4.6) 
8 
1.6 
(3.0) 
8 
5.7 
(4.4) 
8 
14.6 
(8.8) 
8 
G
enerali 
23.0 
(11.0) 
8 
30.4 
(11.7) 
8 
6.9 
(6.1) 
8 
2.3 
(4.7) 
8 
.0 
(.0) 
8 
10.0 
(9.7) 
8 
12.6 
(2.8) 
8 
IN
A
 
.0 
(.0) 
7 
4.8 
(12.6) 
7 
14.0 
(38.0) 
7 
.0 
(.0) 
7 
4.8 
(13.0) 
7 
.0 
(.0) 
7 
3.1 
(2.2) 
8 
A
BN
 A
m
ro 
12.0 
(.16) 
8 
44.7 
(24.0) 
8 
6.5 
(10.0) 
8 
.8 
(2.4) 
8 
.0 
(.0) 
8 
15.0 
(18.0) 
8 
9.5 
(4.2) 
8 
A
egon 
4.9 
(9.5) 
8 
59.4 
(43.1) 
8 
10.0 
(20.0) 
8 
.0 
(.0) 
8 
.0 
(.0) 
8 
15.0 
(21.0) 
8 
3.3 
(2.0) 
8 
Fortis 
7.4 
(10.0) 
7 
9.8 
(14.3) 
7 
11.0 
(20.0) 
7 
.0 
(.0) 
7 
7.1 
(19.0) 
7 
.0 
(.0) 
7 
3.9 
(3.1) 
8 
IN
G
 
16.0 
(12.0) 
8 
30.8 
(28.0) 
8 
13.0 
(12.0) 
8 
5.2 
(12.0) 
8 
4.2 
(12.0) 
8 
18.0 
(23.0) 
8 
7.8 
(4.8) 
8 
R
abobank 
24.0 
(27.0) 
5 
42.0 
(35.5) 
5 
2.0 
(4.5) 
5 
.0 
(.0) 
5 
2.0 
(4.5) 
5 
.0 
(.0) 
5 
4.4 
(3.7) 
8 
C
hristiania 
.0 
(.0) 
8 
.0 
(.0) 
8 
.0 
(.0) 
8 
8.3 
(15.0) 
8 
4.2 
(12.0) 
8 
.0 
(.0) 
8 
2.9 
(1.0) 
8 
D
N
B 
18.0 
(35.0) 
8 
.0 
(.0) 
8 
1.4 
(3.9) 
8 
2.5 
(7.1) 
8 
3.1 
(8.8) 
8 
.0 
(.0) 
8 
4.4 
(2.4) 
8 
Storebrand 
.0 
(.0) 
7 
7.1 
(18.9) 
7 
.0 
(.0) 
7 
12.0 
(21.0) 
7 
.0 
(.0) 
7 
.0 
(.0) 
7 
1.8 
(1.0) 
8 
U
BN
 
.0 
(.0) 
8 
.0 
(.0) 
8 
.0 
(.0) 
8 
13.0 
(18.0) 
8 
.0 
(.0) 
8 
.0 
(.0) 
8 
3.9 
(3.1) 
8 
H
andelsb. 
18.0 
(16.0) 
8 
19.7 
(34.0) 
8 
5.0 
(14.0) 
8 
7.8 
(18.0) 
8 
9.4 
(19.0) 
8 
19.0 
(22.0) 
8 
4.3 
(2.2) 
8 
S-E-B 
5.0 
(9.3) 
8 
4.3 
(8.1) 
8 
1.8 
(5.1) 
8 
13.0 
(18.0) 
8 
6.0 
(12.0) 
8 
10.0 
(20.0) 
8 
3.6 
(2.3) 
8 
Skandia 
.0 
(.0) 
8 
14.0 
(15.5) 
8 
.0 
(.0) 
8 
6.7 
(13.0) 
8 
.0 
(.0) 
8 
33.0 
(37.0) 
8 
3.8 
(1.9) 
8 
Sw
edbank 
.0 
(.0) 
8 
2.5 
(7.1) 
8 
8.8 
(13.0) 
8 
4.6 
(8.5) 
8 
.0 
(.0) 
8 
13.0 
(35.0) 
8 
3.1 
(1.9) 
8 
Barclays 
7.6 
(6.0) 
8 
7.9 
(9.2) 
8 
3.7 
(4.0) 
8 
8.0 
(5.4) 
8 
4.5 
(4.5) 
8 
6.9 
(6.3) 
8 
17.1 
(5.0) 
8 
Lloyds TSB 
8.5 
(10.0) 
8 
5.9 
(10.1) 
8 
.8 
(2.4) 
8 
8.3 
(18.0) 
8 
6.2 
(8.9) 
8 
.0 
(.0) 
8 
10.4 
(5.1) 
8 
Prudential 
3.5 
(6.2) 
8 
3.6 
(10.1) 
8 
2.1 
(5.9) 
8 
8.6 
(16.0) 
8 
2.5 
(7.1) 
8 
8.8 
(18.0) 
8 
5.6 
(2.0) 
8 
P-value 
.00 
.00 
.05 
.82 
.00 
.01 
.00 
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The data of the firm level of analysis show significant differences at the four coding 
categories and on nine (out of twelve) strategy types. Financial firms showed similar 
behaviour on three strategy types. We also found differences regarding the number of 
strategic actions that were employed by European financials. These findings indicate room 
for firm specific, or idiosyncratic, strategic renewal behaviour. The concluding section of 
this chapter goes deeper into these findings. 
 
5.6 Differences and similarities at the sector, country, and 
firm level of analysis 
This chapter investigated main characteristics of strategic renewal behaviour across the 
research sample. We started by showing main characteristics of strategic renewal, followed 
by descriptive statistics pertaining to the industry, country, and firm levels of analysis. The 
main conclusions are that: 
1. At the sector level of analysis, there are more similarities than differences between 
European financials. That is, belonging to the banking or insurance sector does lead to 
some, but less important differences in strategic renewal behaviour than those found 
at the country and firm level of analysis. 
2. At the country level of analysis, differences are more apparent than similarities. A 
financial’s home country seems to have a significant influence on individual 
financials’ strategic renewal behaviour. 
3. At the firm level of analysis, differences prevail over similarities. European financials 
appear to have adopted firm-specific strategic renewal behaviour. 
4. Not all strategy types that significantly differ at the sector level of analysis also differ 
at the country and/ or firm level of analysis. The strategic categories that significantly 
differ at the sector level of analysis do also differ at the country and firm level of 
analysis. 
 
Table 5.7 illustrates these findings in greater detail. It shows the P-values of the four 
coding categories and the twelve strategy types to indicate differences and similarities 
across sectors, countries, and firms. 
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Table 5.7 Summary of differences and similarities across sectors, countries, and 
firms 
Metric Sector Country Firm 
Coding category P-value P-value P-value 
External/ internal .03 .00 .00 
International/ domestic .00 .00 .00 
Exploration/ exploitation .86 .00 .00 
Expansion/contraction .06 .00 .00 
    
Strategy type36    
A .44 .00 .00 
B .00 .59 .24 
C .09 .00 .00 
D .37 .26 .66 
E .01 .00 .00 
F .02 .01 .00 
G .38 .33 .00 
H .00 .00 .00 
I .07 .01 .05 
J .22 .83 .82 
K .99 .00 .00 
L .40 .00 .01 
 
1. More similarities than differences across sectors 
The analysis of strategic behaviour between banking and insurance firms revealed similar 
behaviour with respect to the exploration/ exploitation, and expansion/ contraction 
categories, as well as on eight strategy types. This finding points at industry effects 
pertaining to the content of strategic renewal. 
The results further indicated a marked difference in the external/ internal and international/ 
domestic categories, suggesting differences regarding the context dimension of strategic 
renewal. Moreover, we found differences in four strategy types. A further investigation of 
the strategy types revealed that especially strategy types H and E largely explain this 
difference. Insurance firms undertook a higher percentage of external international 
exploitation actions, whereas banking firms preferred internal domestic market 
exploitation expansion actions. 
 
2. More differences than similarities across countries 
At the country level of analysis, the results indicated more differences than similarities in 
strategic renewal behaviour analysis. Significant differences appeared at all four coding 
                                                           
36 We acknowledge that some strategy types were employed more than others. We found 
this does not change the balance of differences and similarities across sectors, countries, or 
firms. 
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categories and in eight strategy types. Moreover, it appeared that differences between 
national institutional and market characteristics on country level, as well as major shocks 
that occurred during the research period, had a significant influence on the distribution of 
strategy types of financial services firms. These results point at country effects. 
 
3. More differences than similarities across firms 
Strategic renewal behaviour also appeared to differ at the firm level of analysis. The thirty 
European financials significantly differed at all four coding categories, and in nine strategy 
types. Moreover, differences appeared regarding the frequency of strategic renewal 
actions. This suggests firm specific effects. 
 
4. Comparing findings of different levels of analysis 
There are some deviations regarding differences and similarities in the use of strategy 
types depending on level of analysis. Strategy type B (cutting ties with external parties at 
the home market) is significantly different at the sector level of analysis, but not at the 
country or firm level of analysis. This is remarkable, as strategy types (and strategic 
orientations) typically tend to be more different at the country and firm level of analysis 
than at the sector level of analysis. 
 
The next chapter discusses these preliminary findings more deeply. Based on the results of 
the changing landscape of European financial services and the four main findings of 
strategic renewal behaviour of the sample of financial incumbents, we select a subsample 
to further test our findings that strategic renewal attributes tend to operate differently at 
different levels of analysis. 
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6 Strategic renewal of British, Dutch, and French 
financial incumbents 
 
We analysed strategic renewal behaviour across the sample of European financial 
incumbents at three different levels of analysis in the previous chapter. The findings point 
at the three dimensions of strategic renewal operating differently, depending on the level of 
analysis chosen. We aim to study these generic findings more precisely by focusing on a 
subset of countries and firms that allows a more detailed analysis of strategic renewal 
behaviour. The analysis of the changing landscape of European financial services pictured 
changes in the European financial services industry. The results suggest growing 
convergence among European countries, and indicate increasing levels of environmental 
turbulence during the nineties. National differences however still exist. The results suggest 
that some countries moved faster than others in diffusing changes. More specifically, 
regulatory and technological changes were implemented quickest in the British and Dutch 
financial services sectors. Sweden was fast in implementing new technologies, but slow in 
diffusing new regulations. France and Italy were late movers in both regulatory and 
technological developments. This chapter explores strategic renewal characteristics of a 
subset of our sample of firms. More specifically, we selected financials from the two fast 
moving countries the Netherlands and the UK, and of late mover France. This provides 
different research contexts in terms of national institutional environments. We structure 
our investigation of financial incumbents’ strategic renewal behaviour around our set of 
propositions. 
The first section investigates how financial incumbents renew in an increasingly turbulent 
environment, and seeks to disentangle environmental selection, institutional, and 
managerial intentionality effects on strategic renewal. The results show that the sample of 
British, Dutch, and French financial services firms favoured exploitation over exploration 
actions. This suggests similarities regarding the content of strategic renewal actions across 
firms and nations. The context of renewal actions, measured as the balance of external to 
internal renewal actions, shows similarity across firms operating within one country. This 
indicates national specific or institutional effects. The frequency of renewal actions 
however appears to be a firm-specific variable, suggesting managerial intentionality. These 
results suggest analysing strategic renewal at the industry, country, and firm level to enable 
dissecting different effects on strategic renewal behaviour. 
We acknowledge this finding by investigating interdependencies between the three levels 
of analysis. As such, the second section assesses interaction effects between levels of 
analysis to study coevolution in financial services. We specifically investigate country-
firm, within-country, and firm-regulatory coevolutionary interactions. In summary, these 
findings suggest that single lens perspectives partially explain strategic renewal behaviour 
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of large European financial services firms, and the addition of a coevolutionary perspective 
aids to understand deviations of single lens perspectives. 
 
6.1 Strategic renewal characteristics of British, Dutch, and 
French financials 
This section investigates strategic renewal behaviour of the selection of financial 
incumbents. We structure the analysis around the three dimensions of strategic renewal, 
and first present results aggregated at the country level of analysis. Similarities across 
countries indicate industry selection effects, whilst differences point at national 
institutional effects. We then zoom in on the firm level of analysis to study managerial 
intentionality. 
The context of strategic renewal is indicated by the external/ internal ratio of strategic 
renewal actions. Table 6.1 displays average external/ internal actions ratios of the Dutch, 
British, and French financial incumbents. Dutch incumbents appear to have a preference 
for external over internal actions, and Figure 6.1 shows the development of this ratio over 
the research period for each of the three countries. About 60% of strategic actions of Dutch 
financials were externally oriented. French incumbents are on average more balanced in 
using external and internal actions of renewal. U.K. firms show a different pattern. On 
average, only one quarter of their actions were externally oriented. 
 
Table 6.1 Averaged indicators of context, content, and process of strategic renewal  
actions of financial incumbents in three countries (1990-1997) 
 Dutch financials French financials British financials 
External/ internal ratio* 0.63 0.55 0.24 
Exploration/ 
exploitation ratio** 
0.20 0.32 0.21 
Frequency of renewal 
actions*** 
5.8 7.4 10.7 
Source: Erasmus Strategic Renewal Center 
*     External actions related to total number of actions (NL N=209; FR: N=257; UK:  
        N=217) 
**   Exploration actions related to total number of actions (NL N=209; FR: N=257; UK:  
        N=217) 
*** Average number of renewal actions per year per firm 
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The content of strategic renewal is operationalised using the exploration/ exploitation ratio. 
Table 6.1 also shows this indicator using the averaged ratio of financial incumbents 
analysed in each country, and Figure 6.2 shows the development of this ratio over time. 
Contrary to the findings with respect to external/ internal ratios, the Dutch, French, and 
U.K. firms appear to have comparable average exploration/ exploitation ratios. In all three 
countries, exploitation actions by far outnumber exploration actions. Both Dutch and UK 
incumbents appeared to have about 80% of their actions focused on exploitation. French 
companies were also biased towards using exploitation actions of renewal, averaging about 
70% over the research period. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thirdly, we focus on the process of strategic renewal, which is indicated by the frequency 
of strategic renewal actions. Table 6.2 presents the average number of renewal actions per 
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Figure 6.1 Average external/ internal ratio of Dutch, French, and British  
financials (1990-1997) 
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Figure 6.2 Average exploration/ exploitation ratio of Dutch, French, and British  
financials (1990-1997) 
Source: Erasmus Strategic Renewal Center 
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country per year. These data indicate differences across countries. Dutch firms have the 
lowest number of strategic actions per year. British firms are most active, and French firms 
fall in between the frequency scores of Dutch and British firms. 
We continue by investigating differences and similarities at firm level. Table 6.2 presents 
eight-year averages of the external/ internal ratio and standard deviations of the thirteen 
individual companies. Four Dutch financial incumbents predominantly used external 
actions, whereas one company deviated from the rest. This company, ING, had a balance 
of 48% external to 52% internal actions. Three French incumbents had evenly balanced 
external/ internal ratios. BNP and UAP however used more external than internal actions. 
All three British firms favoured internal over external actions. 
Table 6.2 also presents standard deviation scores. We use the standard deviation as a 
measure of the volatility of strategic renewal behaviour. The standard deviations indicate 
that some firms, like Barclays and Société Générale, have had a more stable pattern on the 
context dimension of strategic renewal than others, such as Fortis and UAP. Figures 6.3-
6.5 further indicate different trajectories over time of the sample companies. That is, 
although the average ratio might be similar, the timing and balancing of strategic renewal 
actions show firm-specifics. 
 
Table 6.2 Firm specific average external/ internal actions ratios and standard  
deviations (1990-1997)37 
Dutch financials French financials British financials 
ABN Amro 0.68 (0.31) Axa 0.53 (0.25) Barclays 0.28 (0.14) 
Aegon 0.58 (0.30) BNP 0.70 (0.24) Lloyds TSB 0.29 (0.23) 
Fortis 0.74 (0.37) Paribas 0.45 (0.26) Prudential 0.16 (0.18) 
ING 0.48 (0.22) SocGen 0.47 (0.17)   
Rabobank 0.66 (0.30) UAP 0.60 (0.33)   
Source: Erasmus Strategic Renewal Center 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
37 The mean ratios in Table 6.2 are weighted averages over the eight years (1990-1997). 
Source: Erasmus Strategic Renewal Center 
Figure 6.3 External/ internal ratio of British financials (1990-1997)
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Table 6.3 presents the eight-year averages and standard deviations of the exploration/ 
exploitation actions ratio. Most of the thirteen firms exhibited exploration/ exploitation 
ratios of between 10% and 25% in the 1990-1997 study period. Two firms, ING and 
Société Générale, however, showed exploration/ exploitation ratios that were significantly 
higher than the other sample firms. BNP also has a higher exploration score. The standard 
deviations of the exploration/ exploitation ratios indicate varying levels of volatility across 
this sample of incumbents. It ranges between a low of 0.06 (Barclays), indicating a stable 
pattern of exploitation to exploration actions, to a high of 0.39 (Aegon), suggesting 
substantial variance between years of mainly exploitation, and years of predominantly 
exploration actions. Figures 6.6-6.8 illustrate this volatility, or differences in balancing 
exploration and exploitation actions over time, regarding this dimension. 
Figure 6.4 External/ internal ratio of Dutch financials (1990-1997)
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Figure 6.5 External/ internal ratio of French financials (1990-1997) 
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Table 6.3 Firm specific average exploration/ exploitation actions ratios and 
standard deviations (1990-1997)38 
Dutch financials French financials UK financials  
ABN Amro 0.21 (0.16) Axa 0.26 (0.21) Barclays 0.23 (0.06) 
Aegon 0.21 (0.39) BNP 0.37 (0.20) Lloyds TSB 0.14 (0.18) 
Fortis 0.10 (0.37) Paribas 0.25 (0.20) Prudential 0.24 (0.29) 
ING 0.42 (0.38) SocGen 0.48 (0.12)   
Rabobank 0.07 (0.09) UAP 0.23 (0.14)   
Source: Erasmus Strategic Renewal Center 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
38 The mean ratios in Table 6.3 are weighted averages over the eight years (1990-1997). 
Figure 6.6 Exploration/ exploitation ratio of British financials (1990-1997) 
Source: Erasmus Strategic Renewal Center 
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Figure 6.7 Exploration/ exploitation ratio of Dutch financials (1990-1997) 
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We thirdly investigate the process dimension of renewal actions at firm level. The 
frequency of strategic renewal actions, calculated as the average number of renewal actions 
per year over the time period 1990-1997, is presented in Table 6.3. The data show 
significant differences in the firm specific average frequencies of strategic renewal actions. 
In the Netherlands, ABN Amro had the highest average number of actions per year (9.5). 
In France, Axa (9.3 actions per year) was most active, whilst the British Barclays 
undertook on average 16.6 actions per year. This starkly contrasts with the least active 
firms we investigated in the three countries. Aegon executed on average 3.3, UAP 6.4, and 
Prudential 5.6 actions per year. 
 
Table 6.4 Firm specific average number of renewal actions per year (frequency) 
(1990-1997) 
Dutch financials French financials UK financials 
ABN Amro 9.5 Axa 9.3 Barclays 16.6 
Aegon 3.3 BNP 6.8 Lloyds TSB 10.0 
Fortis 3.9 Paribas 7.0 Prudential 5.6 
ING 7.8 Société Générale 7.3   
Rabobank 4.4 UAP 6.4   
Source: Erasmus Strategic Renewal Center 
 
Analysis and interpretation 
To summarise the findings across the thirteen firms, we position the companies along two 
dimensions. The horizontal axis of Figure 6.9 shows the average external/ internal ratio 
over the eight-year research period. The vertical axis depicts the eight-year average 
exploration/ exploitation ratio. The results show that the exploration/ exploitation ratio of 
strategic renewal actions is fairly similar across the sample of firms. In other words, the 
content of strategic renewal seems to be influenced by environmental selection effects. The 
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Figure 6.8 Exploration/ exploitation ratio of French financials (1990-1997) 
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external/ internal ratio of strategic renewal actions shows differences across the three 
countries. The context of strategic renewal thus appears to be driven by institutional 
effects. Both the frequency and volatility of strategic renewal actions show differences 
across the sample of incumbents. This suggests that the process of strategic renewal is 
influenced by managerial intentionality. Moreover, two firms appeared to deviate from the 
other by showing a higher exploration/ exploitation ratio than the other sample firms. This 
also suggests managerial intentionality effects. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In conclusion, the analysis of strategic renewal behaviour of British, Dutch, and French 
incumbents suggests that: 
 
• The average ratio of external to internal actions in strategic renewal processes is fairly 
constant within countries. Dutch financials are much more externally oriented than 
their UK counterparts, whilst the ratios of French financials are more balanced. This 
suggests the existence of institutional effects, and provides preliminary support for 
proposition 2. 
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• The average ratio of exploration versus exploitation actions in strategic renewal 
processes of large financial service firms is remarkably similar across the three 
countries. This similarity may indicate environmental selection effects, and supports 
proposition 3. 
• ING and Société Générale are maverick firms as they are more exploration-oriented 
than the other firms. This indicates managerial intentionality at firm level. Moreover, 
the frequency and volatility of strategic renewal processes of incumbent financials 
differ. These differences point at managerial intentionality effects, and support 
proposition 1. 
 
This section investigated three dimensions of strategic renewal. The results suggested 
preliminary evidence regarding the propositions derived from the three single-lens 
theoretical perspectives. We will elaborate these findings in the final chapter, which 
discusses our findings. To investigate the proposition that relates to coevolutionary effects, 
we now assess interaction effects that operate between levels of analysis. 
 
6.2 Coevolution in strategic renewal: interaction effects 
between industry, country, and firm levels of analysis 
This section addresses coevolutionary dynamics by investigating interaction effects 
between environmental selection, institutional, and managerial intentionality effects in 
strategic renewal behaviour. We investigate coevolutionary dynamics in three ways. First, 
we investigate the link between the country and firm level of analysis. Specifically, we 
investigate the connection between countries’ speed of implementing regulatory changes 
on the one hand, and the pace of implementing new technologies by incumbent financials 
operating in those countries on the other hand. We then concentrate on one country and 
assess differences in the diffusion of five technologies among the five largest Dutch 
financials. Finally, we examine the coevolutionary path of the evolvement of the Dutch 
financial regulatory and supervisory structure and the genesis and development of Dutch 
incumbent ING. 
We first focus on how across the three countries the pace of implementing regulatory 
changes relates to the diffusion speed of new technologies by incumbent firms. We 
hypothesise that de- and reregulations increase the level of competition, which induces 
incumbents to speed up the implementation of new technologies to maintain their 
competitive positioning. The expectation is that first moving countries regarding regulatory 
changes (the Netherlands and the UK) have higher implementation speeds of new 
technologies compared to late moving countries (France). 
Figure 6.10 depicts each country’s first moving incumbent in implementing remote 
banking technologies, in introducing the e-purse, and in establishing a branchless bank. We 
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selected these innovations above innovations that required collective efforts, such as the 
introduction of an EFTPoS network, to highlight strategic renewal actions by individual 
incumbents. Figure 6.10 illustrates that British incumbents were first in implementing 
these technological innovations, whereas French incumbents lagged in implementing new 
technologies. Dutch incumbents were faster than French incumbents in three out of five 
new technologies. This suggests that incumbents in first mover countries regarding 
regulatory changes also move first in implementing technological innovations. This may 
induce positive feedback effects. Regulators of countries that have fast moving firms in 
implementing technological innovations may be inclined to speed up regulatory change, 
which enables a next series of technological innovations. Figure 6.10 further reveals first 
mover behaviour at firm level concerning the timing of strategic renewal actions. BNP is a 
first mover in three technologies in France, and ING is first in implementing four of five 
technologies in the Netherlands. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Technological 
Innovation** 
France The Netherlands United Kingdom 
Tel. banking 1990 (Paribas) 1993 (ING) 1989 (First Direct) 
PC banking 1994 (BNP) 1986 (Postbank 
[ING]) 
1985 (Bank of 
Scotland) 
E-purse 1999 (Crédit 
Mutuel) 
1989 (Dutch bank 
consortium) 
1995 (Mondex 
consortium) 
Branchless bank 1994 (BNP) 1996 (ING) 1989 (First Direct) 
Internet banking 1997 (BNP Paribas) 1996 (ING) 1997 (Nationwide) 
Source: Erasmus Strategic Renewal Center 
*   Indicates the year of implementation of the first mover in one of the five countries 
     investigated  (also see Table 4.12). 
** Also see Table 4.12. 
Figure 6.10 First mover incumbents in implementing five technological innovations  
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We now focus on one country to investigate coevolutionary dynamics and interaction 
effects. We selected the Netherlands for reasons of data availability and for the fact that we 
could investigate all five large Dutch incumbents, who have a combined market share of 
about 90%. Figure 6.10 illustrated that ING moved first in implementing four out of five 
technological innovations. ING played a distinct role in the development of the e-purse in 
the Netherlands. This case illustrates cross-industry interaction effects between the banking 
and telecom industries, and the role of mavericks in developing a financial services 
technology. It further exemplifies how interactions between financial incumbents and non-
financial players can drive technological developments. 
In 1989, a consortium including all major Dutch banks (including a predecessor of ING), 
consumer organisations and retailers undertook a chipcard trial in Woerden. The 
consortium however decided not to pursue this technology. Another attempt in the early 
nineties, which was initiated by PTT Telecom, the Dutch telephone operator, also failed as 
the Dutch banks that were invited to join forces to develop a common e-purse application 
did not want to develop a joint e-purse at that time. Eventually, in 1995 a consortium of 
large Dutch banks, including ING, developed the Chipknip – the Dutch e-purse. ING’s 
Postbank left the consortium within a month after its introduction. It decided to pursue a 
different, more innovative e-purse strategy. It linked up with PTT Telecom and developed 
the more sophisticated Chipper. The original consortium accelerated the rollout of their 
Chipknip e-purse and introduced it at the end of 1996. Postbank and PTT Telecom 
introduced the Chipper in the second half of 1997 (BIS, 2000). The Chipknip consortium 
reacted to the Chipper project by improving the functionality of their product to remain 
competitive. Despite all these efforts, the use of both the Chipknip and Chipper by the 
public was moderate. Chipper and Chipknip jointly promoted the use of both e-purse 
systems and eventually signed an interoperability agreement. In 1999, the two alliances 
agreed on a convenant and integrated the two e-purse systems (De Vries and Nielen, 
2001). 
This case illustrates how managerial intentionality of PTT Telecom and ING on e-purse 
technology accelerated the introduction of the Chipknip and took its functionality to a 
higher level. As an example of the feedback mechanism of firm-environment relations 
(Baum and Singh, 1994), these first movers subsequently influenced the selection 
pressures on other incumbents. On the other hand, the moderate success of both e-purse 
systems by consumers led to environmental pressures to join forces and integrate both 
systems. 
Thirdly, we address interaction between the firm and regulatory level and zoom in on the 
case of Dutch incumbent ING to study coevolution effects. ING appeared to be an outlier 
in terms of its exploration/ exploitation ratio, which suggests managerial intentionality. 
ING’s genesis was not only enabled by a change in Dutch financial regulations, but also 
triggered this change, which indicates interaction effects between firm behaviour and 
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national regulatory developments. Moreover, the successful development of ING 
subsequently contributed to an alteration of the Dutch governance structure of banking and 
insurance activities. 
In the second half of the eighties, innovative Dutch financial services firms started to 
combine banking and insurance activities. This made it increasingly difficult to sustain the 
ban on combining banking and insurance operation within one firm. Similar developments 
took place in other EU-countries. These developments brought the Dutch government to 
lift the ban on combining banking and insurance operations from January 1, 1990. Dutch 
insurer Nationale Nederlanden was already negotiating with NMB Postbank to merge and 
establish the Internationale Nederlanden Group (ING). The merger was completed in 
March 1991. The newly formed ING was the first of the major Dutch financials in 
implementing the concept of integrated financial servicing.  
As a result of increasing interdependencies between banking and insurance operations, the 
regulatory and supervisory systems have changed again. According to the 1990 change in 
regulation, banking and insurance activities should be legally separated. However, 
integrated financial institutions such as ING gradually dissected their operational structure 
from their legal structure to promote cross-fertilisation of banking and insurance activities. 
This complicated the supervision of the formerly sectorally separated financial activities. 
To add a cross-sector perspective to the sectoral supervisory model, in July 1999 the Dutch 
Board of Financial Supervisors, which represents supervisory agencies of the banking, 
insurance, and securities sectors, was founded. 
In summary, developments in combining banking and insurance activities induced 
deregulations. Nationale Nederlanden and NMB Postbank preempted this bank-insurance 
deregulation and formed ING. The evolvement of the operational structure complicated the 
supervisory process, and led to the addition of a cross-sectoral Board to deal with these 
complexities. This case exemplifies mutual-causal interactions between actions of financial 
incumbents and national legislation. 
 
6.3 Conclusion 
This chapter investigated the content, context, and process of strategic renewal behaviour 
of financial incumbents in France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. The findings 
indicate that the average ratio of exploration to exploitaton actions does not show 
substantial differences across the sample of financials. This points at environmental 
selection effects regarding the content of strategic renewal. The ratio of external to internal 
actions varies depending on the country within which financial incumbents are located. 
The strategic renewal context thus seems to be influenced by institutional effects. Firm 
specific differences in the frequency and volatility of strategic renewal actions points at 
managerial intentionality regarding the process dimension of strategic renewal. Outlier 
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behaviour of ING and Société Générale, which have deviating scores on the exploration/ 
exploitation ratio compared to the other firms in the sample, also indicate managerial 
intentionality. 
In conclusion, these findings indicate that all three single lens perspectives are helpful to 
explain strategic renewal behaviour of large European financial services firms. However, 
no one single lens can fully explain all observations. The addition of coevolutionary 
interaction effects, as we did in the second section, appears to be helpful in understanding 
deviating patterns of strategic renewal. We will discuss these findings more extensively in 
the final chapter. 
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7 Discussion and conclusion 
 
Exposure to changing environments (Guth and Ginsberg, 1990) and accumulating inertial 
pressures of maturing organisations (Hannan and Freeman, 1977; Delacroix and 
Swaminathan, 1991; Miller and Chen, 1994) require large incumbent firms to renew 
themselves. We adopted a dynamic action perspective of strategic renewal to study the 
interplay between adaptation and selection effects in strategic renewal behaviour of 
financial incumbents. More precisely, we distinguished between managerial intentionality, 
institutional, and environmental selection effects in the content, context, and process 
dimension of strategic renewal. The managerial intentionality perspective was covered by 
the strategic choice and dynamic capabilities approach. Classical and neo-institutional 
theory addressed the institutional perspective. Population ecology and the resource-based 
view of the firm informed about the environmental selection perspective. A coevolutionary 
perspective was added to integrate the single-lens perspectives. Coevolutionary theory 
asserts that it is the concurrent operation of adaptation and selection forces that explains 
strategic renewal. We built on three theoretical perspectives that capture the adaptation-
selection debate and chose the European financial services industry as our research site. 
We investigated the industry and national level of analysis to assess changing 
environmental selection and national institutional forces. At firm level, we studied the 
response of financial incumbents in terms of their strategic renewal behaviour. 
This final chapter discusses and concludes the findings of this study. We first discuss the 
key issues of our research by returning to our research questions and propositions. We then 
pull together the findings of changes in the landscape of European financial services and 
strategic renewal behaviour of financial incumbents. This is followed by an overview of 
scientific and managerial contributions. Limitations of our work and issues for further 
research are indicated next, after which we conclude this study. 
 
7.1 Key issues 
This research investigated changing environmental selection and institutional forces and 
strategic renewal behaviour of thirty large financial incumbents from seven European 
countries. It aimed to assess both adaptation and selection effects in the context, content, 
and process of strategic renewal behaviour of large incumbent firms operating in the 
European financial services sector. We moreover sought to increase understanding 
regarding interaction effects between single-lens perspectives in strategic renewal actions. 
Two research questions guided this thesis: 
 
 
 
 128
1. How do large multi-unit firms renew in an increasingly turbulent environment? 
 
2. To which extent are strategic renewal actions driven by managerial intentionality, 
and/ or by environmental selection and institutional pressures? 
 
To answer these research questions, we used three single-lens perspectives and 
coevolutionary theory to develop a framework of strategic renewal actions and a set of 
propositions. Exhibit 7.1 recapitulates the propositions. 
To investigate these research questions and propositions, we needed to develop an 
appropriate research methodology, which measured realised strategy using 
contemporaneous data, and that allowed both longitudinal and cross-sectional analyses. 
We operationalised the strategic renewal construct along the context, content, and process 
dimensions and developed attributes for each dimension. 
Chapter four investigated changes in the competitive landscape of European financial 
services. The findings suggest increasing convergence across national financial systems in 
the European Union, which was indicated by decreasing diffusion times of new regulations 
and technologies. This suggests increasing environmental selection forces. We also found 
that differences between financial systems of European countries are still significant. This 
indicates firms are still subject to institutional influences related to characteristics of their 
home market. 
We continued by showing strategic renewal characteristics at the sector, country, and firm 
level of analysis using descriptive statistics. The outcomes suggested the concurrent 
operation of industry, country, and firm effects on financial incumbents’ strategic renewal 
behaviour. Chapter six built on these preliminary findings by investigating this subsample 
of financial incumbents in greater detail. The analysis of the changing landscape of 
European financial services indicated fast and late moving countries in terms of 
implementing new regulations and technologies. We selected financial incumbents from 
two fast moving countries; the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, and incumbents from 
France, a late mover, to explore characteristics of strategic renewal behaviour of selected 
financial incumbents in the period 1990-1997. The outcomes showed similarities on 
country and industry level, indicating environmental selection and institutional effects. The 
results also revealed firm-specific differences, which suggest managerial intentionality. 
Moreover, we studied coevolutionary interaction effects operating between levels of 
analysis. We now discuss our findings in greater detail. 
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7.2 Differences and similarities in strategic renewal 
behaviour across sectors, countries, and firms 
 
Table 7.1 summarises differences and similarities in strategic renewal behaviour at the 
sector, country, and firm levels of analysis. It shows that similarities prevail over 
differences at the sector level. At the country and firm level, differences prevail over 
similarities. 
 
Exhibit 7.1 Overview of propositions 
 
Proposition 1. From a managerial intentionality approach, renewal actions of 
incumbent firms will show firm-specific patterns regarding the temporal dimension of 
strategic renewal actions. 
 
Proposition 2. From an institutional approach, an incumbent firm will mimic the
renewal actions of other incumbent firms in its institutional environment. 
 
Proposition 3. From an population ecology approach, incumbent firms pursue 
exploitation actions over exploration actions to achieve high reliability, accountability 
and reproducibility. 
 
Proposition 4. From a coevolutionary perspective, interaction effects of environmental 
selection, institutional effects at country level, and managerial intentionality at firm 
level explain deviations of observed strategic renewal actions of incumbent firms from 
predictions derived from single-lens theories. 
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Table 7.1 Summary of differences and similarities across sectors, countries, and  
firms 
Metric Sector Country Firm 
Coding categories Different (D) or Similar (S)* 
External/internal D D D 
International/domestic D D D 
Exploration/exploitation S D D 
Expansion/contraction 
 
S D D 
Strategy type 
(Mean (%) total sample) 
   
A S D D 
B D S S 
C S D D 
D S S S 
E D D D 
F D D D 
G S S D 
H D D D 
I S D D 
J S S S 
K S D D 
L S D D 
* We used a 5% confidence level to evaluate the statistical significance of differences 
across sectors, countries, or firms (p < 0.05). 
 
Differences and similarities across sectors 
Does strategic renewal behaviour differ between banking and insurance firms? No 
significant difference was found on the exploration/ exploitation and expansion/ 
contraction categories. The sample average of 0.28 in the exploration/ exploitation 
category (i.e., 28% of all actions being exploration oriented) indicates environmental 
selection effects. This supports proposition 3, which stated that incumbent firms would 
prefer exploitation over exploitation actions in their quest for reliability, accountability and 
reproducibility (Hannan and Freeman, 1989). Banking and insurance firms further do not 
significantly differ on the expansion/ contraction category. Both banks (0.75) and insurers 
(0.72) prefered expansion over contraction actions. This is a further indication of industry 
generic, or environmental selection, effects that mediate strategic renewal behaviour of 
financial services firms. 
Our analysis revealed that banking and insurance firms do differ on the external/ internal 
and international/ domestic coding category. Insurance companies seem to prefer external 
actions over internal actions (average ratio: 0.53), whilst banking firms use more internal 
actions (average ratio: 0.43). The international/ domestic category also appears to be 
significantly different depending on sector. Banks and insurers differed in six out of twelve 
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strategy types. The greatest difference is in strategy types H (increasing scale on 
international markets by acquiring or cooperating external parties) and E (increasing scale 
on the home market using the internal organisation). Insurance firms are more 
internationally oriented (0.63) than banks (0.48). Van der Zwet (2003) corroborated this 
finding. She also found a home bias of banking firms and a stronger international 
orientation in terms of origin of revenues of insurance firms. 
 
Differences and similarities across countries 
Strategic renewal behaviour appeared to strongly differ across the seven European 
countries. The four coding categories, and eight out of twelve strategy types, were 
significantly different at a 5% confidence level. These differences point at national 
institutional effects. In section 7.1.2, we already indicated that these effects might stem 
from being colocated in a national context (Porac, Thomas and Baden-Fuller, 1994), or 
that contextual variation (Dijksterhuis et al., 1999) due to different national contexts might 
impact managerial logics on how to undertake strategic renewal. Another explanation, 
which builds on cultural differences, is that differences between countries reflect cultural 
differences (Schneider, 1989; Newman and Nollen, 1996). 
Contingency theory (Burns and Stalker, 1961; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967) offers an 
alternative explanation to different strategic renewal behaviour depending on the national 
context. We noticed that especially periods of economic adversity could be traced back in 
financial firms’ strategic renewal actions (cf. 5.4.9). This suggests that different strategic 
renewal behaviour may be caused by different situational characteristics within which 
firms operate. Different types of strategic renewal behaviour are required in different 
environmental circumstances. 
 
Differences and similarities across firms 
At the firm level, differences in renewal behaviour prevailed over similarities regarding 
strategic categories, strategy types, and frequency of strategic renewal actions. This 
indicates that incumbent financial firms seem to have had sufficient slack (Cyert and 
March, 1963) or managerial leeway (Child, 1972) to undertake firm-specific trajectories of 
strategic renewal. It should however be noted that not all firms survived during our 
research period. For instance, Axa incorporated UAP, another French insurer. In Norway 
and Sweden, the government had to set up large restructuring operations to salvage its 
financial companies. These incidences indicate that, although managerial intentionality 
effects appeared to be strong, firms had to cope with some strong inertial and 
environmental pressures. 
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7.3 Strategic renewal behaviour of British, Dutch and 
French financial incumbents 
We investigated strategic renewal behaviour of British, Dutch, and French financials to 
investigate how financial incumbents renew in an increasingly turbulent environment, and 
to disentangle environmental selection, institutional, and managerial intentionality effects 
on strategic renewal. This analysis generated four observations: 
 
1. The content dimension of strategic renewal, measured by the 
exploration/exploitation dimension of large financials’ strategic renewal actions, 
is remarkably similar across the three countries. Industry-generic, or 
environmental selection effects may cause this similarity.  
2. The context dimension of strategic renewal, operationalised by the 
external/internal dimension of strategic renewal actions, appears to be fairly 
similar between financial incumbents that share the same home market. Most 
strategic actions of Dutch incumbents are externally oriented, whilst British 
financials typically engaged in internally oriented strategic renewal actions. The 
external to internal ratio of French financial incumbents are more evenly 
balanced. This suggests country-specific, or institutional effects. 
3. The process dimension of strategic renewal, which was indicated by the 
frequency and volatility of financial incumbents’ strategic renewal actions, do not 
show similarities across or within countries, but seem to be different at the firm 
level of analysis. Moreover, two firms appeared to have deviated from the rest of 
the sample by having significantly higher exploration/ exploitation ratios. These 
findings point at firm-specific, or managerial intentionality effects. 
4. Coevolutionary interaction effects were investigated by linking macro-level 
changes to micro-level changes. First, we assessed interaction effects between the 
country and firm level by studying the connection between the speed of 
implementing regulatory changes at country level and the pace of technological 
diffusion by financial incumbents at firm level.  Second, we assessed different 
diffusion patterns of technologies of five large Dutch financials. The coevolution 
of firm strategic behaviour and regulatory changes was investigated by assessing 
the genesis and development of the Dutch ING and the evolvement of the Dutch 
regulatory and supervisory structure. 
 
We now discuss these four effects more elaborately and link the findings to propositions. 
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Environmental selection effects on strategic renewal 
The analysis of strategic renewal behaviour of British, Dutch, and French financials 
indicated that eleven, of the thirteen incumbent firms investigated, show similar averaged 
exploration/ exploitation ratios. These suggest selection pressures regarding the content 
dimension of strategic renewal, as financial incumbents preferred exploitation over 
exploration actions during the research period. This finding relates to proposition 3, which 
hypothesised that from a population ecology perspective, exploitation would outbalance 
exploration in the renewal behaviour of large incumbent firms. We note that the 
incumbents investigated (see Table 3.2) include insurance companies, banks, and 
allfinance firms, which are rooted in different regulatory and national environments, and 
have different path dependencies. Despite these differences, our sample of incumbent 
financials appeared to prefer increasing their reliability, accountability and reproducibility 
by favouring exploitation over exploration to maintain fit with their environment (Hannan 
and Freeman, 1984). 
Similarity in exploration/ exploitation ratios also sheds light on organisations’ historical 
legacy (Child, 1972). In terms of the resource-based view of the firm (Nelson and Winter, 
1982), financial incumbents appear to prefer leveraging their routines and resources above 
changing the routines and developing new resources and competencies. Selection forces 
‘arise from the constraining role played by cultural elements, such as symbols, cognitive 
systems, and norms and rules’ (Aldrich, 1999: 49). Regarding these cognitive systems, 
Weick (1979) suggests that managerial beliefs can be inferred from actions. To the extent 
this is the case, the firms investigated may share a common industry recipe (Spender, 
1989), dominant logic (Prahalad and Bettis, 1986), or top management mindset regarding 
the exploration-exploitation dimension of strategic renewal actions (Barr et al., 1992). We 
did not investigate whether the causes of similarity stem from common dominant logics, 
similar top management mindsets regarding exploration/ exploitation actions, or in features 
commonly ascribed to strategic groups (McGee and Thomas, 1986; Peteraf and Shanley, 
1997). The firms investigated, however, are all financial incumbents that share a common 
industrial context, the EU-financial services industry. This suggests that the impact of 
variation in national selection environments on the prevailing management logics 
regarding the exploration-exploitation dimension in the financial services sector appeared 
to be limited (Dijksterhuis et al., 1999). 
 
Institutional effects on strategic renewal 
The second finding indicates institutional effects regarding the context dimension of 
strategic renewal. Differences on the external/internal dimension of strategic renewal 
actions may have resulted from the distinct economic and institutional structures of these 
countries. The Dutch financial services industry was highly concentrated in the research 
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period, whereas other countries were much less concentrated (cf. 4.1.3). If Dutch 
companies wanted to grow, they had to develop internationally. Given the degree of excess 
capacity of financial systems across Europe in the nineties (cf. 4.1.1), Dutch financials 
preferred to acquire financial activities abroad, or to cooperate with foreign financials. This 
explains the preference for using the external – and international – dimension of renewal 
actions of Dutch financials. British financials were confronted with a different climate. In 
the early nineties, the British financial players had to overcome a troublesome period 
caused by an economical slowdown. This induced restructuring operations, which are 
typically internal actions, aimed at streamlining the – domestic – organisation. 
There are multiple potential explanations about the underlying mechanism. First, 
differences regarding the external/ internal ratio may be contingent on the national context. 
In the language of Porac, Thomas and Baden-Fuller (1994), the firms are ‘colocated’ in a 
national context. It appears that contextual variation (Dijksterhuis et al., 1999) due to 
different national contexts might have a modifying impact on prevailing management 
logics. A second explanation is that mimetic behaviour (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) or 
bandwagon effects (Abrahamson and Rosenkopf, 1993) may have played an important role 
for financial incumbents regarding the context dimension of strategic renewal. Dutch 
financials showed a pattern of acquiring and partnering with foreign financials in a quest to 
grow their operations, whereas British financials exhibited similarities regarding 
restructuring their operations. A third explanation is that the divergence in external/ 
internal ratios reflects differences in managerial attitudes and values stemming from 
cultural differences (Schneider, 1989; Newman and Nollen, 1996). Overall, this second 
finding illustrates proposition 2. 
 
Managerial intentionality effects on strategic renewal 
The third finding is related to the process dimension of strategic renewal actions and points 
at managerial intentionality effects. British, Dutch and French financial incumbents 
differed markedly in terms of the frequency of renewal actions, i.e. the average number of 
renewal actions per year as shown in Table 6.4. The incumbents also diverged with respect 
to the standard deviation of both ratios, indicating firm specifics in terms of the volatility 
of strategic renewal patterns (cf. Tables 6.2 and 6.3). These findings show that financial 
incumbents appeared to have their own timing of renewal actions. This indicates that the 
financials investigated seem to have had sufficient slack (Cyert and March, 1963) to allow 
for, and use, different timing and frequency of actions of renewal. This finding suggests 
incumbents can overcome structural inertia and still be viable, illustrating proposition 1. 
Table 6.3 indicates that ING and Société Générale have significantly higher average 
exploration/exploitation ratios than the other sample firms. These two incumbents seem to 
have deviated by exploring the environment to a greater extent than their competitors. 
These firms possibly have a higher absorptive capacity than the other incumbent firms. 
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Firms with higher levels of absorptive capacity tend to consider opportunities in their 
environment independent of current performance criteria in their industry, which might 
result in higher exploration/exploitation ratios. This facilitates managerial intentionality, 
which is reflected in more proactive strategic behaviour regarding the changing selection 
environment (Van Den Bosch et al., 1999, 2003). As such, ING and Société Générale 
could be interesting examples of managerial intentionality regarding the content dimension 
of strategic renewal. This finding indicates managerial intentionality at firm level. 
 
Coevolutionary dynamics and principles of self-renewing incumbents 
Explaining strategic renewal behaviour of financial incumbents using a managerial 
intentionality, institutional, or selection approach offers partial explanations. Depending on 
the level of analysis and point of view taken, propositions 1, 2 and 3 can all be illustrated 
within the corresponding theoretical approach. This suggests that single-lens theories offer 
partial, but complementary, explanations of strategic renewal behaviour. The analysis of 
coevolutionary interaction effects (cf. section 6.2) indicated that all three effects, and the 
interaction effects, play a significant role in understanding strategic renewal behaviour. 
Regarding coevolutionary effects, our research indicates that deviations of observed 
renewal actions from predictions of single-lens theories can be better understood using 
interaction effects based on a coevolutionary perspective, supporting proposition 4. We 
investigated interaction effects in three ways and found that: 
• Incumbents from countries that were fast in implementing new regulations were faster 
in implementing new technologies than incumbents from countries that implemented 
new regulations in a later stage. This suggests positive feedback effects between de- 
and reregulations and the introduction of new technologies by financial incumbents. 
• Deviant behaviour of one financial incumbent and linking up with a non-financial 
company having complementary resources resulted in an accelerated introduction and 
more sophisticated e-purse technology in the Netherlands. This indicates that 
managerial intentionality of one maverick incumbent that linked up with a non-
financial player can result in increasing selection pressures on other incumbents. 
• Preemptive moves of banking and insurance firms in combining bank and insurance 
products accelerated deregulations in combining banking and insurance services. 
These changes coevolved into the genesis and development of ING, which in turn 
induced changes in the Dutch supervisory structure of financial activities. This case 
suggests a chain of mutual-causal interactions between legislative and supervisory 
bodies and incumbents’ actions. 
 
Coevolution ‘is at the root of self-organizing behaviour’ (McKelvey, 2002: 1). We reflect 
on how our findings contribute to understanding principles of self-renewing organisations. 
Volberda and Lewin (2003) identify three overarching principles of how to become and 
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sustain a self-renewing organisation. The first principle relates to managing the ‘internal 
rates of change’. Enabling strategies can drive momentum and early mover behaviour. The 
second principle is ‘optimising self-organizing’. Managing the rate of internal growth 
through innovation is a key enabling strategy. Forms of decentralised structures are also 
associated with this principle. The third principle highlights the necessity of synchronizing 
concurrent exploitation and exploration (March, 1991). Slack is a requirement to pursue 
parallel strategies aimed at exploration. Do the findings of this thesis provide empirical 
evidence of these three key principles in the context of self-renewing incumbents? 
To address this question, we relate the three principles to our findings of the strategic 
renewal of the Dutch incumbents. The first principle suggests relatively low 
external/internal ratios (i.e. internal renewal actions outnumber external ones). As 
indicated above, ING had the lowest external/internal ratio of the five Dutch incumbents 
(see Figure 6.9), and is first mover in implementing most technological innovations in the 
Netherlands (see Figure 6.10). 
The second principle stresses the importance of internal growth through innovation and 
forms of decentralised organisational structures. Again, ING has the lowest 
external/internal ratio and the highest exploration/exploitation ratio of the Dutch 
incumbents. It is also well known for its decentralised structure. Due to large-scale merger 
and acquisition processes, ING emerged as a collection of unconnected divisions. Each 
division is subject to its own selection environment. 
The third principle regards synchronising exploitation and exploration and pursuing 
multiple strategies. The principle does not explicate at what level, and during which time 
period, the synchronisation between exploitation and exploration activities has to take 
place. ING’s on-line financial services strategy exemplifies the pursuance of a parallel 
exploration strategy. Major divisions, such as ING’s Postbank and Nationale Nederlanden, 
developed their own on-line strategies. Only very recently top management emphasised the 
necessity of creating an ING-wide Internet portal. In sum, the empirical evidence provided 
here shows that our metrics can be helpful in further exploring self-renewing organisations 
and in operationalising the three principles. 
 
7.4 Contributions 
This study contributes to the field of strategic management research and to the 
development of coevolutionary theory on several issues. It also has a number of 
implications for the management of large incumbent firms. This section distinguishes 
between scientific and managerial contributions that emerged from our findings. 
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Scientific contributions 
How does this study contribute to answering questions related to the adaptation-selection 
debate (Lewin and Volberda, 1999)? Many publications on coevolution have a conceptual 
nature (e.g., Lewin and Volberda, 1999; McKelvey, 1997) and most empirical 
contributions use a case study approach in which narration and a historical analysis are 
applied (e.g., Carney and Gedajlovic, 2002; Djelic and Ainamo, 1999; Huygens et al., 
2001; Jones, 2001). Our study makes at least three contributions to coevolutionary 
research. First, we contributed to coevolutionary research by developing metrics that 
measure strategic renewal actions of firms, which allow distinguishing between 
environmental selection, institutional, managerial intentionality, and coevolutionary 
interactions effects (Lewin and Volberda, 1999) in strategic renewal behaviour of financial 
incumbents. Such metrics have been lacking up till now. Second, our results indicate that 
single-lens perspectives cannot explain coevolutionary interaction effects operating 
between different levels of analysis in the empirical world. Single-lens perspectives offer 
partial explanations of strategic renewal behaviour. The addition of a coevolutionary 
approach allows understanding interaction effects between levels of analysis and places 
single-lens findings in a broader perspective. Previous research on this topic reached 
similar conclusions (cf. Lewin and Volberda, 1999). Third, in a more detailed empirical 
analysis for one incumbent firm, it appeared these metrics provide preliminary evidence 
for three coevolutionary principles, which Volberda and Lewin (2003) associate with self-
renewing organisations. 
 
Managerial contributions 
The results of our study indicate that the four theoretical perspectives all appear to be 
valuable lenses in studying and explaining strategic renewal. How do these results translate 
into managerial practice? Managers are often inclined to think that they can alter the path 
of their organisation. Our study indeed indicates room for managerial intentionality. We 
however also found that environmental selection effects influence incumbent financials’ 
strategic renewal behaviour. This was most evident in the predilection for exploitation over 
exploration. Our findings suggest that renewal activities of financials incumbents’ 
managers are typically aimed at rationalising current activities to increase the efficiency 
and productivity of their organisation or increasing the scale of their operations. Exploring 
the environment by entering new markets or by undertaking new activities is a much less 
employed way of renewal. Likewise, the national institutional context appeared to be 
strongly connected to financial incumbents’ strategic renewal behaviour. These findings 
indicate that environmental selection and institutional effects, which place a limit on 
managerial leeway to renew the organisation, bind managerial intentionality. 
This study raises the important managerial question as to whether there is one best 
trajectory of renewal, or, alternatively, whether there are multiple successful renewal 
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trajectories. The environmental selection perspective suggests one best fitting path of 
strategic renewal. This path should be exploited by the population of organizations and 
attributes manager little managerial leeway. The institutional relaxes the assumption of one 
best way somewhat, but indicates that institutional forces may drive firms into herd 
behaviour. Different institutional environments may result in multiple renewal trajectories. 
Following the herd may be appropriate if the company is risk-averse or lacks distinctive 
resources. The managerial intentionality perspective suggests multiple renewal trajectories 
are viable. Managers may opt for firm-specific renewal trajectories to utilise distinctive 
resources. 
The results from our study show that firms can and do take multiple trajectories of 
renewal, although the results might be equifinal. Smith and Zeithaml (1996) and Volberda 
(1996; 1998) even showed multiple effective trajectories of strategic renewal within the 
same firm. On the basis of our empirical data, therefore, we conjecture that firms have not 
found a single ‘one best path’ of strategic renewal. Incumbents seem to have sufficient 
slack to undertake deviant strategic renewal trajectories and survive. 
 
7.5 Limitations and issues for future research 
No study is without limitations. We distinguish between limitations regarding the changing 
financial landscape of the European financial sector and strategic renewal behaviour of 
financial incumbents. We further note issues for further research. 
 
Limitations and issues for future research regarding the changing European financial 
landscape 
The analysis of the changing landscape in the European financial services sector has a 
number of limitations. As our regulatory and technological indicators are mainly related to 
the banking industry, developments in for instance the insurance and securities sector were 
largely kept out of the analysis. The ongoing revolution and blurring boundaries between 
these sectors and other industries, and the invasion of new ‘clicks’ players in the on-line 
financial services sector (see e.g. Hensmans et al., 2001) had significant impact on the 
competitive dynamics in the European financial landscape. This places further demands on 
the strategic renewal of financial incumbents. A second limitation is our focus on the 
diffusion of two forces. Other major influences, including changing demographics and 
consumer preferences, and the impact of disintermediation, corporate governance 
structures, and back office rationalisation were left out of the analysis. A third limitation is 
our focus on a selection of European Union countries. 
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A number of issues remain to be addressed in future research39. A first issue is the 
incorporation of more EU-countries into the analysis. Spain for instance offers an 
interesting research context because of its pace of consolidation and cross-border 
acquisitions and the emergence of new banking models (Canals, 1998). A second 
recommendation is to investigate the impact of global changes on the European financial 
services landscape. For example, how do initiatives such as the creation of global player 
Citigroup influence the pace and nature of strategic renewal journeys of European financial 
incumbents? The emergence of global players raises other questions. Who will belong to 
the top-ten truly global financial services providers? Which of the European based players 
will be on that list or will become a successful niche player (The Banker, 2000a)? Which 
financial firms will take which position in the envisioned multi-layered European financial 
landscape (cf. ECB, 1999; Groeneveld and Swank, 199840)? What are consequences for 
profitability and survival chances for not choosing, or for making the wrong choice? The 
third issue relates to differences in the speed of penetration of new technologies within 
countries. We focused on the introduction dates of regulations and new technologies in 
each of the countries investigated. We did not estimate the speed of penetration of new 
technologies across firms within countries. This analysis would increase our understanding 
of diffusion patterns across firms, and unveils first and late moving firms. These data can 
be used to assess interaction effects between the firm and other analysis levels. Section 6.2 
indicated the value of such analyses. We further did not delve into dissimilarities arising 
from implementing different technologies, which are indicated to have differential 
consequences on effects rates (Berger, 2003). A last suggestion is to investigate the 
relation between the profitability of incumbents versus new entrants and the speed of 
adoption of technological and regulatory developments. For example, the relatively high 
ROEs of especially British banks have attracted new entrants with new approaches. These 
might have speeded up the diffusion of regulations and technologies in financial services in 
the United Kingdom (The Banker, 2000b). 
 
                                                           
39 See Taylor (1999) for an action list to cope with changes in the financial services 
industry. 
40 Groeneveld and Swank (1998) and the European Central Bank (ECB, 1999) indicate that 
the European financial sector might be evolving into a three-layered structure. The first 
layer comprises small financial firms that have a strong domestic basis. The second layer 
consists of regional European players. These banks are active in a number of EU countries. 
The third layer regards a small number of very large financial service firms that cover both 
European and intercontinental financial markets. These sources indicate that there will 
probably remain room for niche players and specialised institutions. 
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Limitations and issues for future research regarding the strategic renewal behaviour 
of European financial incumbents 
The strengths of this study include its cross-sectional time series sample of 30 firms based 
in seven European countries, the large number of strategic actions studied, and the 
development of new measures of strategic renewal. Our research however also has a 
number of limitations. Our data has potential biases. Strategic renewal actions were 
measured in terms of their number and not their magnitude. Weighing renewal actions in 
terms of their magnitude, however, was not possible. The Financial Times and the Annual 
Reports of the incumbents investigated do not systematically report the present, let alone 
the expected future impact or consequences of strategic renewal actions. Marginal 
activities however are less likely to be reported than those of greater significance. As the 
marginal projects of the investigated firms are subject to the same potential bias, and since 
actions are evaluated in terms of their ratios rather than counts, interpretation problems 
caused by this potential bias are largely avoided. 
We note several issues for future research. A first suggestion is to develop research 
methodologies that measure strategic renewal actions not only in terms of their number, 
but also by magnitude and determine the impact on the indicators used in this study. 
Second, we suggest to include new entrants into future coevolutionary studies of strategic 
renewal behaviour. We mainly focused on financial incumbent firms and excluded new 
entrants. These new entrants may be either start-ups or incumbent firms from other 
industries, such as the ICT or retail industries. Interaction effects between strategic renewal 
behaviour of incumbent firms and new entrants penetrating the financial services landscape 
might increase exploration/ exploitation ratios of financial incumbents (Hensmans et al., 
2001). Adding new entrants to the analysis also helps in comparing strategic renewal 
measures. For instance, measuring strategic renewal dimensions of new entrants is helpful 
in assessing the scores on these dimensions by financial incumbents and adds to put 
strategic renewal behaviour of financials in a broader perspective. Furthermore, 
introducing new entrants in the coevolutionary analysis enables investigating to what 
extent new entrants are related to damping mechanisms - being mechanisms that influence 
the rate of coevolution (McKelvey, 2002). Third, future studies could set up case studies of 
outlier companies in terms of strategic renewal behaviour. These case studies may be 
designed to enhance understanding regarding managerial, organisational and knowledge 
process factors that enable and inhibit self-renewing organisations. We already indicated 
that the absorptive capacity construct and its expected relation with proactive behaviour 
(Van Den Bosch et al., 1999; 2003) could be helpful in this endeavor. Case studies can also 
contribute to link strategic renewal behaviour to idealised renewal journeys (Volberda et 
al, 2001). Although our data provide some clues whether incumbents were engaged in an 
emergent, directed, facilitated, and/or transformational renewal trajectory, more detailed 
analysis is needed to be more conclusive. Fourth, our findings suggest that the national 
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context of financial services firms has a strong impact on the strategic renewal behaviour 
of individual firms. Next to institutional differences across countries, contingency factors 
in financial firms’ environment might also play a role in influencing strategic renewal 
behaviour. Our discussion of renewal patterns of financials clustered on country level 
indicated a significant influence of country-specific characteristics including the five-firm 
concentration ratio, the state of the economy, and market size. These characteristics point 
at different contingencies operating on the strategic renewal behaviour of individual firms. 
Future research is required to unravel institutional and contingency effects on strategic 
renewal behaviour. Fifth, we suggest investigating to what extent CEO changes and 
changes in the composition of the Top Management Team impact incumbents’ strategic 
renewal behaviour. For instance, do incumbent firms that hire more outside managers 
undertake more explorative actions than other incumbents? Do significant Top 
Management Team or CEO changes lead to a changing pattern of strategic renewal 
behaviour? Sixth, our discussion of renewal patterns of financials clustered on country 
level indicated a significant influence of country-specific characteristics including the five-
firm concentration ratio, the state of the economy, and market size. These characteristics 
point at different contingencies operating on the strategic renewal behaviour of individual 
firms. Future research is required to unravel contingency effects from institutional effects 
regarding different cross-country strategic renewal behaviour. Another issue for future 
research is the impact of distinct journeys of strategic renewal on performance. For 
instance, do explorative firms perform better than exploitative firms? What is the 
difference in performance between internally and externally renewing firms? Do firms that  
follow distinctive renewal trajectories achieve better results than those that follow the 
herd? Finally, we suggest applying other analysis techniques in future research that allow 
to further address coevolutionary interaction effects. One example is to use event history 
analysis (cf. Greve, 2000) that allows incorporating temporal effects – one of the main 
requirements of coevolutionary research (Lewin and Volberda, 1999; McKelvey, 1997). 
 
7.6 Conclusion 
Can and do firms renew themselves to adapt to their environments? Our analysis suggests 
that a coevolutionary approach may be helpful to overcome partial explanations of single-
lens perspectives, although more research is needed in this area. In previous research on 
this topic, similar conclusions have been reached. Lewin and Volberda (1999) for instance 
discussed antecedents of various aspects of coevolution. In comparison to previous studies, 
however, this research has at least three contributions. First, we proposed to use metrics 
linking strategic renewal actions of firms to environmental selection, institutional effects 
and managerial intentionality. Such metrics have been lacking up till now. Second, we 
showed that single-lens perspectives cannot explain coevolutionary interaction effects 
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operating in the empirical world between managerial intentionality at firm level, 
institutional effects at the country level, and environmental selection at the industry level 
of analysis. Third, in a more detailed empirical analysis for one incumbent firm, it 
appeared these metrics provide preliminary evidence for the three principles Volberda and 
Lewin (2003) associate with self-renewing organisations.  
We suggest three ways to progress coevolutionary research. First, researchers may 
investigate other single-lens theories to assess selection, institutional effects and 
managerial intentionality in coevolutionary dynamics. Second, and even more important 
for building coevolutionary theories, is the development of conceptual metrics, such as 
those presented in this study, to link multiple levels of analysis. Third, these metrics can be 
applied in empirical research to explore the nature and types of coevolutionary interaction 
effects and of principles of self-renewing organisations. By combining these efforts, 
coevolutionary theory building and empirical research can progress. 
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Samenvatting 
 
Organisaties worden geconfronteerd met continu veranderende omgevingen en 
omstandigheden. Daarnaast hebben organisaties de neiging te verstarren wanneer zij groter 
worden. Het veranderen van omgevingen enerzijds en de neiging tot verstarring anderzijds 
vraagt om vernieuwing om te kunnen overleven. Vernieuwing kan worden bewerkstelligd 
door bestaande middelen op een andere manier in te zetten, of door verouderde activiteiten 
te revitaliseren. Bedrijven dienen echter tevens rekening te houden met hun huidige 
strategische activiteiten (Ghemawat, 1991), wat vraagt om stabiliteit. Dit impliceert een 
paradox. Organisaties dienen zowel de bestaande activiteiten te exploiteren om de huidige 
levensvatbaarheid in stand te houden, en tevens te exploreren om de toekomstige 
levensvatbaarheid veilig te stellen (Levinthal en March, 1993).  
Vanuit een theoretisch oogpunt kan strategische vernieuwing op verschillende niveaus 
plaatsvinden en zowel door krachten van binnen als van buiten de organisatie worden 
beïnvloed. Strategische keuzetheorie (Child, 1972; Miles en Snow, 1978) gaat ervan uit dat 
organisaties in staat zijn hun lot te veranderen door zich aan de omgeving aan te passen of 
de omgeving te veranderen. Daarentegen stelt populatie-ecologie theorie (Hannan en 
Freeman, 1977, 1984; Aldrich en Pfeffer, 1976) dat omgevingen organisaties selecteren 
middels een proces van variatie, selectie en retentie. Managers dienen hun omgeving te 
exploiteren om een goede fit te creëren, terwijl exploratie de overlevingskansen juist 
verkleint. Organisaties met verouderde competenties zullen op termijn worden vervangen 
door nieuwe organisaties: strategische vernieuwing vindt plaats op populatieniveau. 
Institutionele theorie stelt dat organisaties convergeren naar institutioneel bepaalde 
archetypen. Volgens neo-institutionele theorie is strategische vernieuwing moeilijk te 
controleren daar het ontstaat uit de wisselwerking tussen de institutionele context en 
organisatiedynamiek. 
Deze variëteit aan paradigma’s in organisatietheorie laat verschillende zijden van hetzelfde 
fenomeen zien. Het ontbreken van een uniforme theorie heeft voortgang belemmerd 
doordat diverse theorieën tot tegenstrijdige conclusies zijn gekomen (McKelvey, 1997). 
Daarom past deze studie een coevolutionaire benadering toe, waarbij een drietal 
perspectieven wordt toegepast, die op verschillende posities op het adaptatie-selectie 
continuüm liggen. Oftewel, we vatten strategische vernieuwing op als de gezamenlijke 
uitkomst van omgevingsdeterminisme en organisatorisch voluntarisme.  
De doelstelling van dit onderzoek is de interactie tussen organisatorische adaptatie 
enerzijds, en selectie als gevolg van institutionele effecten en selectiekrachten (“population 
ecology”) anderzijds, te begrijpen. Hiervan zijn twee onderzoeksvragen afgeleid. Ten 
eerste, hoe vernieuwen grote, complexe bedrijven zich in een steeds turbulenter wordende 
omgeving? Ten tweede, in welke mate worden strategische vernieuwingsacties beïnvloed 
door management intentionaliteit, en in welke mate door institutionele effecten en 
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selectiekrachten (“population ecology”)? In dit verband wordt strategische vernieuwing 
opgevat als een driedimensionaal concept, bestaande uit de inhoud, context en het proces 
van strategische vernieuwing. Strategische vernieuwing wordt gedefinieerd als het patroon 
van strategische acties met als doel de organisatie en omgeving op elkaar af te stemmen: 
die acties zijn gericht op het veranderen van “path dependence” (Volberda e.a., 2001). 
Om deze vragen te beantwoorden is een theoretisch kader ontwikkeld dat drie “single-
lens” theoretische stromingen relateert aan een coevolutionair perspectief. Op basis hiervan 
is een aantal proposities ontwikkeld. De onderzoeksmethodologie is gericht op het in kaart 
brengen van strategische vernieuwingstrajecten van gevestigde financiële ondernemingen 
op basis van een documentanalyse gedurende de periode van 1990 tot en met 1997. 
Daarnaast zijn veranderingen in het Europese financiële landschap in kaart gebracht, 
waarbij we ons met name hebben gericht op processen van convergentie en divergentie 
tussen Europese landen. Door deze opzet hebben we strategische vernieuwing vanuit 
meerdere theoretische invalshoeken kunnen onderzoeken en meerdere niveaus in de 
analyse kunnen betrekken. 
 
Theorie 
Op basis van drie “single-lens” theoretische perspectieven, gekoppeld aan een 
coevolutionaire benadering, is een theoretisch kader van strategische vernieuwing 
ontwikkeld, alsmede een viertal proposities. Strategische keuzetheorie (Child, 1972; Miles 
en Snow, 1978) stelt dat organisaties kunnen veranderen door zich aan de omgeving aan te 
passen en door hun omgeving te beïnvloeden. Doelgerichte actie is hierbij een belangrijk 
concept, waarbij de theorie ervan uitgaat dat management intenties ertoe doen: grote, 
complexe bedrijven kunnen zichzelf vernieuwen. Institutionele theorie is gebaseerd op de 
notie van organisatorische gelijkvormigheid. Klassieke institutionele theorie stelt dat 
organisaties als gevolg van institutionele krachten zullen convergeren naar institutioneel 
bepaalde archetypen. Het neo-klassieke perspectief stelt dat organisatorische processen, 
zoals dat van strategische vernieuwing, voortkomen uit de wisselwerking tussen de 
institutionele context en ondernemingsspecifieke organisatorische dynamiek. 
“Resource-based” theorie en populatie-ecologie concenterren zich op verschillende 
niveaus van analyse, maar hanteren gelijksoortige logica om verschillen in prestaties te 
verklaren. Samen geven zij invulling aan het omgevingsselectieperspectief (zie Barney, 
2000a). “Resource-based” theorie beschouwt de onderneming als een bundel van materiële 
en immateriële middelen die dienen te worden geïdentificeerd, geselecteerd, ontwikkeld en 
benut teneinde superieure prestaties te genereren (Wernerfelt, 1984; Learned et al., 1969). 
Bedrijven zijn in staat om uitmuntende korte termijn prestaties te behalen, maar zijn op de 
lange termijn niet in staat tot verandering. Oftewel, ‘Firms are stuck with what they have, 
and have to live with what they lack’ (Baden-Fuller en Volberda, 1996: 11). Volgens 
populatie-ecologie theorie is strategische vernieuwing op organisatieniveau extreem lastig. 
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Vernieuwing vindt veeleer plaats middels een proces waarbij de markt bedrijven 
uitselecteert. De bestaande organisatiepopulatie wordt in de loop der tijd vervangen door 
nieuwe organisaties. Strategische vernieuwing vindt volgens dit perspectief plaats op het 
populatieniveau. 
Interactie-effecten binnen en tussen verschillende analyseniveaus zijn een kernonderwerp 
in coevolutionair onderzoek. Interactie-effecten zijn veelal niet lineair en kunnen leiden tot 
intuïtief tegenstrijdige uitkomsten als gevolg van terugkoppelingsmechanismen. Binnen dit 
onderzoek hanteren we de definitie van coevolutie van Lewin en Volberda (1999: 526) als 
‘de gezamenlijke uitkomst van management intenties, institutionele en selectie-effecten’. 
Op basis van deze theoretische perspectieven is een aantal proposities ontwikkeld. Deze 
staan weergeven in onderstaande box. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Het empirische deel van deze dissertatie heeft zich met name gericht op de eerste drie 
proposities. Daarnaast zijn enkele empirische kwesties onderzocht die volgen uit de vierde 
propositie. 
 
Methode 
Teneinde de onderzoeksvragen en proposities te beantwoorden dient er een passende 
onderzoeksmethode te worden toegepast. De methodiek dient gerealiseerde strategische 
Overzicht van proposities 
 
Propositie 1. Vanuit een management intentionaliteitsperspectief zullen
vernieuwingsacties van grote bestaande ondernemingen bedrijfsspecifieke patronen
vertonen aangaande de tijdsdimensie van strategische vernieuwingsacties. 
 
Propositie 2. Vanuit een institutionele benadering zal een grote bestaande onderneming
de vernieuwingsacties van andere grote bestaande ondernemingen in de institutionele
omgeving navolgen. 
 
Propositie 3. Volgens de “population ecology”-benadering zullen grote bestaande 
ondernemingen meer exploitatie dan exploratie acties ondernemen teneinde een hoge
mate van “reliability, accountability, and reproducibility” na te streven. 
 
Propositie 4. Vanuit een coevolutionair perspectief verklaren interactie-effecten tussen 
“environmental selection”, institutionele krachten op nationaal niveau, en management
intentionaliteit op bedrijfsniveau, afwijkingen van strategische vernieuwingsacties van
grote bestaande ondernemingen van voorspellingen op basis van “single-lens” 
theorieën. 
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acties te kunnen bepalen aan de hand van gelijktijdige data, waarmee zowel cross-
sectionele als longitudinale analyses mogelijk zijn. Hiertoe is het strategisch 
vernieuwingsconstruct opgevat als een driedimensionaal concept, bestaande uit de 
inhouds-, context- en procesdimensie. Aan de hand van documentanalyses van artikelen in 
de Financial Times en jaarverslagen van de onderzochte ondernemingen zijn strategische 
acties geïdentificeerd en vervolgens gecodeerd voor een aantal attributen die relateren aan 
de drie voornoemde dimensies. Dit is gedaan voor de dertig grootste financiële 
ondernemingen uit in totaal zeven Europese landen gedurende de periode 1990 tot en met 
1997. Daarnaast zijn ontwikkelingen in de omgeving van financiële bedrijven 
geanalyseerd. Hiertoe hebben we veranderingen met betrekking tot regulering en nieuwe 
technologieën in een vijftal Europese landen in kaart gebracht. 
 
Het veranderende landschap van de Europese financiële sector 
Om de omstandigheden waarin gevestigde financiële ondernemingen zich vernieuwen te 
onderzoeken, hebben we veranderingen in het landschap van de Europese financiële sector 
onderzocht. Doelstelling was te onderzoeken of nationale financiële systemen die tezamen 
de Europese financiële sector vormen, convergeren of divergeren. Hiermee wordt een 
indicatie van veranderingen in selectiekrachten en van institutionele omgevingen 
verkregen. Ten eerste is een vergelijking gemaakt tussen nationale financiële systemen 
(“national financial systems”) aan de hand van de ontwikkeling van indicatoren van 
capaciteit, winstgevendheid en concentratie in Europese landen gedurende de negentiger 
jaren. De resultaten geven aan dat nationale financiële systemen in verschillende stadia van 
ontwikkeling verkeren. Daarnaast lijkt er voldoende ruimte voor verdere ontwikkeling van 
nationale financiële systemen. Ten tweede is onderzoek gedaan naar de verspreiding van 
regulering en nieuwe technologieën over Europese landen. De voortdurende bekorting ten 
aanzien van implementatie van regulering en nieuwe technologieën wijzen op toenemende 
convergentie tussen nationale financiële systemen in de Europese Unie. Dit suggereert een 
toenemende selectiedruk vanuit de omgeving van Europese financiële bedrijven. Daarnaast 
bleken nog steeds belangrijke verschillen tussen landen te bestaan. Financiële bedrijven 
worden dus nog steeds beïnvloed door institutionele invloeden als gevolg van specifieke 
karakteristieken van hun thuismarkt. 
 
Resultaten 
We onderzochten generieke kenmerken van strategische vernieuwing op de dertig grootste 
gevestigde financiële ondernemingen uit zeven Europese landen. Uit deze analyse bleken 
zowel verschillen als overeenkomsten te bestaan in het strategisch vernieuwingsgedrag van 
de onderzochte financiële ondernemingen. Op sectorniveau vonden we meer 
overeenkomsten dan verschillen, terwijl we op land- en bedrijfsniveau meer verschillen 
dan overeenkomsten vonden in de set van strategische vernieuwingsattributen. 
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Op basis van deze eerste bevindingen hebben we een aantal bedrijven nader onderzocht om 
de aard van de verschillen en overeenkomsten op de drie niveaus van analyse – industrie-, 
land- en bedrijfsniveau – te bepalen. Uit de analyse van het veranderende landschap van de 
Europese financiële sector bleken sommige landen snel, en andere landen minder snel te 
zijn in het implementeren van nieuwe reguleringen en technologieën. In het zesde 
hoofdstuk analyseren we het strategisch vernieuwingsgedrag van financiële 
ondernemingen uit twee snel implementerende landen; Nederland en Engeland, en van 
ondernemingen uit een minder snel implementerend land; Frankrijk. Dit onderzoek vond 
plaats middels een analyse van de context-, inhouds- en procesdimensie van strategische 
vernieuwing. De resultaten gaven aan dat de gemiddelde verhouding tussen exploratie en 
exploitatie-acties behoorlijk constant is tussen de bedrijven uit de drie landen. Deze 
gelijkheid van scores wijst op omgevingsselectie-effecten wat betreft de inhoud van 
strategische vernieuwing en ondersteunt propositie 3. De gemiddelde verhouding tussen 
externe en interne acties in strategische vernieuwingsprocessen is behoorlijk constant 
tussen bedrijven die een zelfde thuismarkt hebben. De context van strategische 
vernieuwing lijkt dus beïnvloed te worden door institutionele effecten, wat overeenkomt 
met propositie 2. Verschillen in de frequentie en volatiliteit van strategische 
vernieuwingsacties wijzen op management intentionaliteitseffecten betreffende de 
procesdimensie van strategische vernieuwing. Deze bevindingen ondersteunen propositie 
1. Daarnaast lijken ING en Société Générale voorbeelden te zijn van effecten van 
management intentionaliteit wat betreft hun opvallend hoge exploratiescore. 
Het voorgaande geeft aan dat geen van de “single-lens” theoretische perspectieven de 
waarnemingen volledig kan verklaren. Daarom werden coevolutionaire interactie-effecten 
onderzocht door veranderingen op macro-niveau te verbinden met veranderingen op 
micro-niveau. De resultaten gaven aan dat het coevolutionair perspectief helpt afwijkende 
patronen van strategische vernieuwing te verklaren, wat propositie 4 ondersteunt. 
 
Conclusies 
Kunnen bedrijven zichzelf vernieuwen en zich aanpassen aan hun omgeving? Ons 
onderzoek geeft aan dat “single-lens” theoretische perspectieven deelverklaringen bieden 
voor het vernieuwingsgedrag van grote gevestigde ondernemingen; in het geval van deze 
studie van gevestigde financiële instellingen. “Single-lens” theorieën focussen elk op een 
afzonderlijke dimensie van strategische vernieuwing en hebben betrekking op 
verschillende niveaus van analyse. Daarmee kan strategisch vernieuwingsgedrag echter 
niet ‘integraal’ verklaard worden. Een coevolutionaire benadering kan bijdragen aan het 
begrijpen van verklaringen die “single-lens” theorieën leveren en tevens kan deze 
benadering bevindingen op verschillende analyseniveaus integreren. 
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and do large established organisations renew themselves to adapt to
their environment? Three single-lens theories, relating to environ-
mental selection, institutional theory, managerial intentionality, and
a coevolutionary perspective are used to investigate strategic renewal
of incumbent European financial services firms. We derive propositions
and distinguish between three dimensions of strategic renewal to
develop metrics that investigate our propositions in a multi-level,
multi-country, longitudinal study of the European financial services
industry.
The results suggest the following clues for further investigation.
From an environmental selection perspective, we find financial incum-
bents have a preference for exploitation renewal actions. Country
institutional environments appear to explain to what extent financial
incumbents prefer internal and/or external renewal actions. Managerial
intentionality seems to explain outlier behaviour and firm-specific
frequency and timing of renewal actions. From a coevolutionary per-
spective, interaction effects contribute to explain deviations from
predictions derived from the single-lens theories applied in this thesis.
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